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THE BROADCASTING OF POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
SILKE, Daniel, MSocSc. University of Cape Town, 1989. 
This dissertation studies the broadcasting of politics in South 
Africa from 1920 to the end of the P. W. Botha era in 1989; that is, 
the reaction of radio and television to the changing political 
environment. Since 1948 South Africa's broadcasting system has 
incteasingly been influenced by the ruling National Party as they 
strengthened their authority. This follows the Lasswell 
communications model which emphasizes the role of the controller in 
the communications flow as well as Fagen•s and Siebert•s description 
of authoritarianism as a national political system. 
A study of the historical legacy of broadcasting in South Africa 
clearly shows an authoritarian orientation. This is accomplished 
through an investigation utilizing historical material including 
Tomaselli as well as press reports and Hansard. The advent of 
television has seen this maintained in a variety of forms. 
These contradictions are a reflection of the socio-political 
pressures that have recently emerged to influence the National Party. 
This is a function of the reforming of their past ideology as well as 
of internal economic advances ~nd political upheavals which increase 
i 
the influ.ence of non-State elements upon the electronic media as 
depicted in the De Fleur model. 
The broadcasting system is increasingly shown to reflect an inclusive 
picture adapting to the political and economic realities in which it 
operates. The emerging trend moves away from authoritarianism in a 
more liberal and pluralistic direction. 
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This thesis is a direct result of my lifelong interest in and 
exposure to radio and television. Within South Africa, broadcasting 
is increasingly adapting to the ever changing macro environment 
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Studies for their faith and interest in me and to all my friends 
whose encouragement is appreciated. Gwen Zeller has been invaluable 
in allowing her press clippings to be monopolized. Leigh Mukheiber, 
Dale Kaplan and Andy Scholtz have kindly provided much needed 
computer assistance. I would lastly like to thank my mother, Mrs. 
Freda Silke, for her valued help and tolerance during the writing of 
this dissertation! 
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GLOSSARY 
GLOSSARY: 
Authoritarianism. Policy -0f strict governmental control of 
broadcasting with little regard for popular taste. [Head, 
1985:404]. 
BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation). Nonprofit statutory 
corporation that conducts Britain 1 s public service 
broadcasting.[Head, 1985:404]. 
Bop-TV. Indep~ndent television channel based in Bophuthatswana. 
Broadcast Media. Radio and Television. Interchangeable with 
Broadcasting. 
Broadcasting. Communication of sound and pictures to the general 
public by means of radio waves in space. [Head, 1985:405]. 
Broadcasting System. All the legal broadcasting services in a country 
or territory. [Head, 1985:11]. 
Cable TV. System for deli_vering television programmes to 
subscribers over cables rather than by means of over-the-air 
TV stations. [Head, 1985:405]. 
Capital Radio. Independent FM, MW and SW radio station based in the 
Transkei. 
Channel. (1) Group of frequencies designated for the use of a single 
station. (2) The station usin~ a particular channel. (3) The 
programming available on a particular cable TV channel, as 
"Sports Channel." (4) A network such as TVl.[Head, 1985:406]. 
Clandestine. Applied to secretive, unauthorized stations having 
political motives.[Head, 1985:405]. 
Control Paradigm. Strictly organized and regulated media usually 
operating under monopoly State-run domination. Also see 
Authoritarianism. 
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DBS (Direct Broadca~t Satellite). A satellite with sufficient power 
to be receivable by small antennas suitable for individual 
home use.[Head, 1985: 406]. 
Development Media Theory. Media Policies employed in the light of 
common circumstances of developing countries. Acceptance of 
economic development (thus social change) and often the 
correlated •nation building• as an overriding objective. 
[McQuail, 1987:120-121]. 
Electronic Media. Media utilizing a particular technology of 
microcircuits and microchips. 
External Service. A government broadcasting service openly aimed 
at foreign countries as an official arm of international 
diplomacy. External services make extensive use of short-wave 
radio.[Head, 1~85:408]. 
First World. The industrialized, democratic nations, referred to. 
loosely as 'the West•. Compare with Third World.[Head, 
1985:408]. 
Free Press Theory. Policy that·prescribes that an individual 
should be free to publish what he or she likes and is thus an 
extension of other rights - to hold opinions freely, to 
express them, to assemble and organize others.[McQuail, 
1987:113]. 
IBA (Independent Broadcasting Authority). British nonprofit public 
corporation set up to authorize and supervise commercial 
radio and television operations.[Head, 1985:409]. 
Independent Radio Stations. Non-SABC commercial radio stations 
operating to South African audiences. Usually based in 
1 homelands 1 • 
viii 
Interference. In telecommunications services, radio energy that 
conflicts with intended signals, causing.·distortion and loss 
of intelligibility. Conflicts come from other transmitters 
and from such natural causes such as electrical storms. 
Janning is intentional interference.[Head, 1985:410]. 
Jamming. Creation of deliberate interference to prevent domestic 
reception of programmes, usually aimed at external services 
coming from foreign countries.[Head, 1985:410]. 
License Fee, Receiver. A fee paid by users for the right to 
operate receiving sets.[Head, 1985:411]. 
Mass Electronic Media. Radio and Television. An element of 
Electronic Media. Interchangeable with Broadcast Media. 
Mass Media. A combination of elements of the Electronic Media and the 
Print Media.[Marchant, 1988:9]. 
Media Imperialism. Alleged cultural domination of Third World 
countries by Western nations through control over 
communication media, notably by means of international news 
agencies and programme syndication.[Head, 1985:411]. 
Mixed System. A broadcasting system in which two or more entities 
with contrasting programming motives compete, typically 
pitting a public service component against a commercial 
component.[Head, 1985:411]. 
M-NET. South African independent subscription television(STV) 
service. 
MW (Medium Wave). Adjective often used to designate standard or AM 
broadcasting.[Head, 1985:411]. 
PAL (Phase Alternate Line). West German colour TV system, 
generally used in Europe.[Head, 1985:413]. 
ix 
Paternalism. A policy halfway between authoritarianism and 
permissivism, generally eschewing censorship but not entirely 
subservient to the lowest common denominator of audience 
preferences.[Head, 1985:413]. 
Permissivism. Policy of imposing minimal governmental controls 
over the free play of marketplace demands, characteristic of 
highly commercial broadcast services. Emphasizes audience 
wants as indicated by tuning behaviour. Compare with 
authoritarianism and paternalism.[Head, 1985:413]. 
Pluralism. Condition obtaining when a broadcast system has several 
competing components animated by differing motivations for 
programming. See also Mixed System.[Head, 1985:413]. 
Print Media. Newspapers, magazines, books, pamphlets, direct mail, 
circulars and billboards.[Marchant, 1988:9]. Compared with 
Electronic Media. 
PWV (P~etoria Witwatersrand Vereniging). Refers to this given high 
population and industry area of the Transvaal. 
Radio Bop. Independent MW and FM radio station based in 
Bophuthatswana. 
Radio Five. National FM Stereo radio station operated by the SABC. 
Radio Metro. MW Transvaal based Radio station aimed at urban 
Blacks broadcasting in English. Operated by the SABC. 
Radio Moscow. The official external service of the Soviet Union. 
Radio RSA. The official external service of South Africa. Operated 
by the SABC 
Radio 702. Independent MW radio station based in Bophuthatswana. 
SABC (South African Broadcasting Corporation). South Africa's 
state-run broadcasting service; 
x 
Service. The programming of any broadcasting network or st~tion 
that makes up a part of of a national broadcasting 
system.[Head, 1985:417]. 
Social Responsibility Theory. Theory that reconciles independence 
with obligation to society. Media has obligation to serve the 
I democratic pdlitics of a country.[McQuail, 1987:116]. 
Soviet Media Theory. Policy that all media should be subject to 
control by agencies of the working class - primarily the 
Communist Party.[McQuail, 1987:118]. 
Spill-over. Domestic signals that inadvertently cross national 
boundaries.[Head, 1985:417]. 
System. A nation's broadcasting services and their organizational 
structure considered in the aggregate.[Head, 1985:417]. 
ST V ( S u b s c r i p t i o n Te 1 e v i s i o ,n ) • Co de d ( s c r am b 1 e d o v er - t h e -
air(broadcast) television service for which audiences pay a 
subscription fee.[Head, 1985:417]. 
Telematic Media. New Media at the core of which is a visual 
display unit(television screen) linked to a computer network. 
[McQuail, 1987:16]. 
Third World. The less developed countries of the world, numbering 
about a hundred. Compare with First World.[Head, 1985:418]. 
TVl. Premier television channel operated by the SABC. Broadcasts 
in English and Afrikaans on a shared basis. 
TV2 & TV3. Television channels operated by the SABC. Broadcasts in 
several Black languages. 
TV4. Television channel operated by the SABC. Utilizes 
transmitters of TV2/3 broadcasting in English and Afrikaans. 
VOA. (Voice of America). The official external service of the 
United States of America. 
xi 
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WHO. An eleme1nt o.f Lasswell '.s commuriication mo,del[se~ Chapter two].. 
I' ,· . ·• { 
Refers to WHO saysWHAl: in WHICH CHANNEL. 
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INTRODUCTION 
. •j. 
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< ..•. · 
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Throughout the world, broadcasting has become a vital feature of 
common life. From highly industrialized nations to newly developing 
countries, both radio and television, have established themselves 
over a r~markably short period of time as purveyors of education, 
entertainment and political instruction for their respective 
citizenry. Broadcasting in the modern society is increasingly 
becoming an integral part of the social values and culture of states 
as well as of the political institutions and systems of these 
societies. 
This thesis will focus on the political characteristics of 
broadcasting in South Africa. As shall be discussed, the broadcasting 
institutions of a particular country often mirror the dominating 
political system resulting in broadcasting systems being categofized 
according to government policy and ideology. The consequent dynamics 
of the politics of South Africa will therefore be of major importance 
in analyzing the broadcast media. 
The effect of such national political systems on the mass media has 
led to these:systems b~ing neatly defined into normative theories of 
the press. These theories range from the Authoritarian/control 
paradigm through the Development and Third World model to the Free 
Press classification. Mixed (pluralistic) trends are also discernible 
where characteristics overlap. 
The task of this thesis will be to investigate empirically the 
, 
broadcast media in South Africa from its beginnings in the 1920's to 
the end of the PW Botha era in 1989. This investigation will 
therefore examine the dynamic nature of the characteristics of radio )( 
and television as a function of its changing relationship with the 
state. This will be undertaken with a view to gauging whether the 
1 
attributes of broadcasting evident in the-contemporary period enable 
a classification within any one, or within a combination of the 
normative theories as outlined. 
Initially, it will be necessary to broadly define the 
I 
I 
I 
i 
terms1 that 
shall be. extensively used i.n this thesis. This will be useful as much 
of the termin6logy is specific to the study of broadcasting and 
should be related to their definitions. This shall be accomplished in 
Chapter One. 
Chapter Two will discuss the normative authoritarian theory as the 
basis for the discussion relating to the politics of broadcasting in 
South Africa. This ana·lysis of a control paradigm theory wi 11 be X 
illustrated utilizing.the contribution of Harold Lasswell whose 
seminal study highlighted the importance of the controllers of the 
mass media. This is further enhanced by Melvin De Fleur who has 
detailed the mass media as a social system containing many component 
elements such as the audience, producers and advertisers which may 
influence the media .. 
The role of the controllers and component elements will be guided by 
an investigation of the characteristics of the national political 
systems outlined by Richard Fagen. Special attention will be focused 
on the control paradigm of Authoritarian theory as it is essential to 
the understanding of the South African broadcasting culture. Here, 
the works of Siebert and Schramm as well as McQuail have been useful. 
The Authoritarian theory will be examined in relation to the 
alternative theories of communication such as the permutations of the ~ 
democratic model. The development of such normative permutations has 
lead to considerable over-lapping and mitigates against easy 
categorizations. ~owever, the control paradigm is of particular 
2 
relevance in explaining the historical development of broadcasting in 
South Africa which has occurred according to the authoritarian model 
and still retains elements thereof. 
Having discussed the fundamental tenets of authoritarianism within 
communications, Chapter Three will highlight the historical ~ 
development of broadcasting in South.Africa. lhis analysis will show 
the broadening of the radio network from its inception in the 1920's 
through to the debates regarding the merits and demerits of the 
introduction of television in the late 1960's. This will be 
accomplished using available source material including academic 
works, the articulation of policy in Hansard Parliamentary Debates 
and newspaper reports. 
The historical development of broadcasting in South Africa has 
largely coincided with the advent of National Party rule since 1948. __,.\ 
The emerging technological advancements have continuously been 
harnessed by the ruling group in its quest to solidify and maintain 
voter support. This has seen the broadcasting paradigm increasingly 
take on the authoritarian characteristics of minority policed and 
controlled political activity which restricts personal freedoms, 
emasculates undesirable opposition and imposes media censorship. 
However, the nature of authoritarian control is that it remains 
imperfect with varying degrees of cultural and economic freedoms 
which contrasts with the more rigid and omnipotent totalitarian 
example. This may allow a greater propensity for the creation of a 
less subservient media which will be particularly evident in times of 
a transition from an authoritarian state to a more liberal 
orientation. Whilst historically classified as authoritarian, the 
South African regime under a process of democratization may well find 
3 
its control and usage' of the medi~ diminished and fundament~lly 
altered. 
The State monopoly of the South African Broadcasting Corporation 
(SABC) has meant that those in control of the broadcast media have 
largely been National Party sympathizers who, in many cases, are 
directly appointed by their respective controlling and responsible 
political superiors. 
A feature of the historical development of broadcasting therefore, is 
the influence of personalities. As Chapter Three will indicate, the 
views of Gideon Roos, Dr. Jan Schutte and above all, Dr. Albe~t 
Hertzog, played an enormous role in formulating broadcasting policy. 
Hertzog 1 s views on television, contained in this Chapter, will also 
indicate the gross authoritarian paradigm which dominated the 
broadcast media. 
The introduction of television, as outlined in Chapter Foor marked a 
turning point in the broadcasting history of South Africa. As shall 
·be seen, the authoritarian (and largely ethnocentric) legacy of 
Hertzog, Schutte and the Broederbond provided the ruling National 
Party with the ideological foundation to utilize this new medium to 
promote itself as the only legitimate political force within the 
country. 
·chapter Four deals in depth with the various techniques in which the 
State-run SABC is able to manipulate the broadcast hours in order to 
ensure compliance from its broadcast services. This is achieved 
through an effective monopoly of formal television newscasts which. 
favors the National Party over the other political actors in South 
Africa. 
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Detailed reference will be made to authoritari~n guidelines in formal 
newscasts/Public Affairs, documentary and general programme 
production, as well as to research undertaken during the past four 
general election/referenda campaigns which statistically prove 
favoritism·towards the ruling National Party. Mention will also be 
made of the overt governmental interference in broadcasting employing 
available documented evidence and interviews. In this regard, 
particular attention will be paid to the authoritarian nature of the 
PW Botha presidency and the resulting dismissal of Director-General 
Riaan Eksteen as a function of this. 
From this discussion of the authoritarian characteristics of 
broadcasting, Chapter Five moves to the numerous and compelling 
anomalies, contradictions and inconsistencies that exist within the 
broad spectrum of the broadcasting of politics in South Africa. 
It is the contention of this thesis that whilst acknowledging the 
manifest overt support for the National Party on the part of the 
SABC, the socio economic pressures and political realities and 
dynamics of South African society have resulted in the movement of 
the broadcasting system towards a less controlled media culture 
deviating from the Verwoerdian sponsored extremism of the Albert 
Hertzog period. 
Chapter Five discusses the latest trends in the broadcast media with 
special reference to internal programme changes in both radio and 
television on the part of the SABC. Here, programme subject matter 
will be analyzed to show a marked shift away from the past promotion 
of Apartheid to the transmission of 'integrationist~ programming and 
advertising. This is coupled with the movement towards English 
language domination compared with the language parity ideals of the 
5 
past. 
The key contradictions are the recently established 1 independent' 
radio and television channels of Capital, 702, Bop and M-NET. 
Considerable attention shall be focused on the way these operators 
contradict with the authoritarian legacy of the past and provide 
competition as well as an alternative media culture to that of the 
State-run enterprise. This has resulted in the SABC react to and 
compete with these services. The mix of public and private ownership 
therefore, considerably reduces the authoritarian content within the 
South African broadcast media. 
These contradictions are vital in the progression towards formulating 
a conclusionary analysis of the Broadcasting of Politics in South 
Africa. The historical legacy is vital in articulating the shifts in 
the contemporary era. The conclusion in Chapter Six will attempt to 
reconcile the contradictions inherent in the Eighties with the 
authoritarian heritage -and continuing authoritarian nature of the 
formal news bulletins and public affairs programming of the SABC. 
This is nece~sary in order to clarify whether it is still possible to 
categorize South Africa's broadcasting system mainly within the 
authoritarian models or whether a more pluralistic classification is 
applicable. -
The authorities have been motivated to liberalize for a number of 
contending reasons. These range from the increasing influence of the 
internal components of the mass media like the audience, advertisers 
and producers to internal political changes such as the reform 
policy of the National Party as well as the influence of the external 
political environment on South Africa. Both financial motivations as 
well as genuine political policy shifts are important in 
6 
understanding the reasons behind such liberalization. 
Whilst much of this thesis concentrates on the legacy of control of 
the broadcast media, the anomalies and disparities highlighted in 
Chapter Five will show the broadcasting culture liberalizing. In so 
doing, it is moving away from an authoritarian pattern towards a more 
pluralistic approach whilst still retaining key elements of ruling 
elite control patticularly under a State of Emergency. 
It shall be the view of this thesis however, that broadcasting has a 
critical role to play in creating a more peaceful post-Apartheid 
South African society. As shall be shown, it is tentatively beginning 
to play this role for any number of motivating reasons and will 
therefore tackle the South Africa~ socio-political realities from a 
more pluralistic rather than authoritarian approach. 
7 
CHAPTER ONE. 
I I . 
THE BROADCASTING 'ENVIRONMENT 
'' 
. : . . ·1 
) ,. 
Broadcasting represents constantly changing and adapting 
technological developments and innovations. These dynamics lead man 
to continually experiment and adapt to find comfortable media forms. 
The media may be seen as reflecting human society in a packaged 
product. Indeed, the popularity of mass forms of media such as 
television has seen much of the world's tastes converge in approval 
of uniform programmes.and has led to the creation of a "Global 
Village". [McLuhan in Marchant, 1988:6]. 
Broadcasting should be seen as one of the participating aspects of 
mass communications and follows upon previous examples such as print 
media (books}; the press (newspapers) and film. It is, in turn being· 
followed by new forms of electronic media such as cable; satellite; 
computer; telematic and video based transmissions [see McQuail, 
1987:8-17]. 
In a discussion relating to broadcasting, it will be necessary to 
define the terms used. The ever changing technology and increasing 
multiplicity of services and channels demand that clarity be secured 
in the language used. 
This thesis will analyze the political characteristics of the 
broadcast media in South Africa. The mass media is all important, 
according to Ranney, as it is 11 the basic medium through which 
political groups are formed and seek tci influence publ~c policy. 
Communication, in short, is therefore seen as the main catalytic 
agent by which the social and psychological characteristics of men 
are applied to the dynamic processes of political conflict". [Ranney, 
1971:246-247]. 
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CoD1Dunication Versus Political CoDIDunication: 
Having noted Ranney's reference to the importance of communication 
and therefore that of the media (including broadcast), it is 
necessary to seek clarity as to the differences in definition of 
'communication' as opposed to 'political c~mmunication'. Ithiel de 
Sola Pool defines communication as "any transmission of signs, 
signals, or symbols between persons". ~Encyclopedia of Social 
Sciences, 1968:91]. 
In contrast, de Sola Pool's definition of political communication, is 
directly relevant. He defines it as "the activity of certain 
specialized institutions that have been set up to disseminate 
information, ideas, and attitudes about governmental affairs". 
[Encyclopedia of Social Sciences:91]. 
Marchant (1988:1] refers to communication as a "key element in 
enabling man to influence and control his environment" thus 
indicating the considerable scope for control. It is therefore the 
influence of the ruling elite on the broadcasting services in their 
dissemination of political/governmental news that is characteristic 
of broadcasting in South Africa. 
Broadcasting Defined: 
It is necessary, however, to define quite clearly what is meant by 
broadcasting. Sydney W. Head [1985:11] has derived his definition 
from that contained within the legal system of the United States. He 
quotes the definition of broadcasting as being the "dissemination of 
radio co~munication~ intend~d to be received by the public, directly 
or indirectly by the intermediary of relay stations". 
9 
Head [1985:11] suggests that "the term radio in the above definition 
refers to the electromagnetic radiations used by both sound ( 1 rad~o 1 ) 
and vision ( 1 television 1 ) 11 • This refers to the combination of these 
two forms of mass media under the umbrella term of broadcasting or 
broadcast media. 
McQuail [1987:15] confirms that "despite their obvious differences 
and now wide discrepancies in content and use, radio and television 
can be treated together''. Indeed, August Ranney [1971:248] classes 
Radio and Television as part of the "media of political 
communication". 
It should be stressed that there are clear differences between radio 
and television. McLuhan details radio as a "hot" medium that enriches 
creativity, encour~ges communal ism and has a direct one sense 
orientation that )lends itself to instruction rather than to broad 
participation. 
Mcluhan[1964:317] sees television as a "cool" medium which is of 11 low 
intensity or definition, and, therefore unlike film, it does not 
afford detailed information about objects''. The television medium is 
also far less instructive and allows for greater viewer 
participation. Television is seen as blurring specialist kno~ledge 
leading to "myopia"[1964:335] and does not "excite agitate or 
arouse"[1964:337] but rather encourages indifference. 
Such a discussion _implies differing uses of these two mediums for 
differing effects. Here controllers and governments would be able to 
judge which medium would be most suited to which messa~e in relation 
to the desired and achievable effects. 
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Whilst these differences must be acknowledged, they manifest in the 
analysis of the effects of these two media forms. This dissertation 
does not cover the effects of the mass media upon society which may 
indeed be different depending on the media form utilized. This 
analysis rather discusses the broadcasting system which includes the 
radio and television services(channels) as the key components 
thereof. The issue in this dissertation is clearly the dyn~mic 
characteristics and relationship of the broadcasting system(radio 
and television) with the state. 
The Head def initJon referring to broadcasting as AM, FM and SW radio 
as well as television describes this aspect of the mass media in an 
unbiased, unemotional and unambiguous fashion and directly relates to 
the topic of analyzing South Africa's broadcasting system. This also 
clearly confines this thesis to a discussion of radio and television 
(the broadcast media) rather than-the other forms of mass media 
(print). [see Appendix C: Figure 2]. 
The Broadcasting System and its Parameters: 
Having defined broadcasting, it is necessary to look at the meaning 
given to the classificatory term, "Broadcasting System". 
Head [1985:11] defines this as "all the legal broadcasting services 
in a given country or territory". This includes all services whether 
government or privately owned as well as the state operated external 
services. 
It is here that the South African case study presents a unique 
problem. Within South Africa, the most dominant purveyor of 
broadcasting services is the South African Broadcasting Corporation 
(SABC). However, other important broadcast media actors exist with 
many located in the nominally independent homelands and self-
11 
governing territories. 
This thesis will accept the internationally acceptable description of 
the territory of South Africa as recognized by the United Nations -
namely that where the homelands (independent or otherwise) are seen 
as being part of the land mass of South Africa and not as separate 
independent nations as defined by the South African government. 
Furthermore, all the radio and television services of Bophuthatswana, 
Ciskei, Transkei and Venda are listed in the authoritative 11 World 
Radio and TV Handbook 11 [1987:167-170 and 401-402] as being 11 regions 11 
of South Africa just as Georgia or Kazakhstan are regions of the 
Soviet Union. 
Apart from these services depending upon a largely South Afr1can· 
listenership and view~rship, they also receive most of their 
advertising revenue from South African companies thus making them 
doubly dependent. It is for these reasons that reference shall be 
made to all broadcasting services of South Africa and the homelands 
as an integral whole. 
This obviously contradicts the official South African government 
policy which is enforced by legal codes granting independence to many 
of these tertitories .. However, it is important to note that the 
major broadcasting services that do operate or transmit from the 
homelands are largely independent commercial radio stations that 
compete for the same market as that of the SABC and will be analyzed 
equally and concurrently with the non-homeland (SABC and M-NET) 
services. 
Whilst mention shall be made of services aimed at Black audiences, 
particular attention will be focused on the broadcast media serving 
12 
mainly White viewers. The focus of this thesis is the political 
control of broadcasting by the National Party, itself a function of 
White political expression. It is evident that the White electorate 
has the final say regarding constitutional matters as a result of the 
Constitution Act of 1983 thus pointing towards the use of the media 
to influence this sector of the populace. 
It should also be noted that the broadcasting system is to be 
analyzed according to its historical development. The system itself 
has changed and continues to be dynamic since the monopoly of the 
SABC has been broken allowing new participants to broadc~st. The 
investigation of this thesis will focus from the inception of 
broadcasting in the ea_rly 1920',s to the system that has devel!Jped 
during the premiership of PW Botha. 
The Attributes of Broadcasting: 
Having clarified some of the terminology that is to be used, it is 
important to note some of the salient features of the broadcasting 
medium for it is these very distinct and unique attributes that 
influence the political environment in which the broadcasting systems 
operate. 
Sydney W. Head [1985:4-6] distinguishes seven attributes of 
broadcasting that are vital in this discussion. 
1. The "ubiquitous" nature of broadcasting. Here, "broadcasting has a 
unique ability to instantaneously surmount both natural and 
artificial barriers, both physical and human obstacles to 
communication". [1985:4]. Head goes onto explain ~he ability of 
broadcasting to enter every home and so reach an exceptionally wide 
audience which is likely to encourage political intervention and 
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control. 
2. Head [1985:5] highlights the 11 immediate 11 nature of broadcasting 
where it can be continuously available and has 11 the potential to 
always be there, immediately on tap whenever needed 11 • An extension of 
I 
this attribute is explained by McQuail [1987:15] who sees 11 the main 
genre innovation common to both radio and television as being their 
direct account or observation of events as they happen 11 • 
.. Marshall McLuhan [1964:298] also refers to this characteristic of the 
broadcast medium as being 11 a kind of nervous information system where 
news bulletins, time signals, traffic data, and, above all, weather 
reports now serve to enhance the native power of radio (and now 
television) to involve people in one another 11 • 
3. Head [1985:5] mentions the 11 continuousness or voracity that gives 
broadcasting a voracious appetite 11 necessitating a considerable 
programme production output to fill broadca~t hours at considerable 
cost. This m~ans that much of the programming emanates from the 
wealthier industri~lized states a~ they have the markets and 
therefore the financial backing with which to produce. 
McQuail argues that this has seen a 11 centre-periphery 11 distribution 
pattern emerging as well as 11 the association of national television 
with political life and the power centres of society, as it has 
become established as both popular and political in its functions 11 • 
This highlights not only the existence of possible governmental 
control, but also the debate surrounding •media imperialism•. 
4. The 11 flexibility 11 of the transmitter networks that can either be 
used for centralized relay (national programming) or can transmit 
variad regional services are also an important characteristic. 
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5. Another vital feature is the 11 voluntariness 11 on the part of the. 
publ·ic to share in the broadcast medium by purchasing themselves, 
part of the equipment needed to receive the appropriate messages. 
Head [1985:6] suggests that because the public share so directly in 
the software of reception, "they feel a sense of entitlement that 
they do not feel about newspapers, magazines or films and politicians 
and bureaucrats who violate what audiences consider their rights, do 
so at their peril". This encourages a greater degree of participation 
on the part of the public in voicing their opinions of the broadcast 
medium. 
6. An important characteristic which is very relevant to this thesis 
is the need for regulation affecting broadcasting as stations have 
the ability in ter~s of their technological characteri~tics to 
interfere with one another. It is not only for this reason that 
governmental interference takes place as official intrusion may be 
for 11 social as well as political reasons 11 • [Head, 1985:6]. 
Mc Quail [1987:16] succinctly explains this feature by suggesting 
that the 11 high degree of regulation, control or licensing by public 
authority was initially out of technical necessity, but later from a 
mixture of democratic choice, state self-interest, economic 
convenience and sheer institutional custom 11 • This particular aspect 
shall be discussed in the chapters to come. 
7. Head's final point is the most relevant to this discussion. Here, 
he sees the combination of all the previous attributes outlined which 
are in themselves unique within mass communications as enabling the 
broadcast medium to exert 11 social control 11 • This has been exploited 
by government and Head argues that 11 it is enough, however, that 
governments perceive broadcasting as being able to exert social 
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control. They regard it as potentially too powerful to be left 
unregulated 11 • [Head, 1985:6]. 
McQuail [1987:20] goes on to explain this relationship between the 
mass media and the power structures of a country and differentiates 
between 11 political factors (power-related) and normative factors 11 
(having to do with social and cultural values) 11 which also provides 
judgment as to the moral quality of programme content. [see McQuail, 
1987:20-21]. 
In dealing with the category of political factors , one is looking at 
characteristics of the mass media that are directly applicable to the 
So~th African case study - namely the existence of outside 
governmental interference and regulation of the media as well as a 
more covert propensity on the part of the media body itself to self-
regulate and control from within. The broadcast medium's relationship 
with power is also important when assessing the political domain in 
which it operates. McQuail suggests [1987:20] that 11 the more the 
medium operates in the political sphere, the more centrally it is of 
interest to power holders or contenders 11 • 
National Broadcasting Orientations and Systems: 
Importantly, for this study, is the cate~orizations of national 
broadcasting systems as formulated by Head and Stirling [1982:3]. 
They quote Anthony Smith as saying, 11 every society has to reinvent 
broadcasting in its own image, as a means of containing and 
suppressing because broadcasting can be a very dangerous force, 
especially to governments th~t want to control what their citizens 
hear and see 11 • 
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With this in mind, it is possible to see the rationale behind the 
very definite link between bro~dcasting and the character of the 
political system operational within a given country. Head and 
Stirling have, in addition, formulated broad categorizations into 
which national broadcasting systems fall. These categorizations are 
vitally important in gauging, in broad terms, the overall 
characteristics of different broadcasting systems. Head and 
Stirling [1987:8] argue for the existence of three basic 
11 orientations 11 - namely the 11 permissive, the paternalistic and the 
authoritarian 11 • 
The Permissive Orientation: 
The permiisive orientation (the United States is used as an example) 
implies minimal g6vernmental interference that is not dissimilar to 
the free-market system that is the mainstay of the United States 
economy and involves "voting with the dial (with) consumer autonomy, 
emphasizing what people want rather than what some may think they 
need". [Hea9, 1985:59]. 
This American broadcast media are dominated by private operators 
reliant upon advertising for funding and are therefore driven by a 
profit/free-enterprise motive. Unlimited freedom is constrained by 
the acceptable social norms operational in that society and laws 
prohibiting the screening of offensive material are upheld by the 
Supreme Court. The use of public air-waves by broadcasters also 
demands regulation resulting in all stations requiring a broadcast 1. 
license from the federal government. The key to the permissive 
approach in this system, remains the First Amendment to the 
Constitution which guarantees 11the freedom of speech and the press 11 • 
[Wright, 1975:49 al~o see 48-57 and Head and Stirling, 1987:8]. 
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The Paternalistic Orientation: 
The paternalistic orientation of the British system, by comparison, 
suggests that while the popular needs of the population can, and will 
be catered for, there is a distinct need for 11 programming of a more 
cultivated nature 11 • [Head, 1982:5]. In Britain, the BBC have 
historically undertaken to broadcast a significant proportion of its 
broadcast hours at a mental level above that of its average listener. 
Such a policy has been encapsulated in the words of the first 
Director General of the BBC, Lord John Reith, who stated that 11 few 
knew what they wanted (referring to the listeners), fewer what they 
needed 11 • [Head, 1982:5]. 
Head quotes Sir Brian Young, former director-general of the 
Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) as saying, 11 it (paternalism) 
makes services generally available, paid for equally by all 
consumers; not all programs pay their way; the system is used 
impartially, exercising some control over what may give offense; it 
encourages native writers and producers; it prevents domination by 
either government or advertisers; and it regulates both the amount 
and the content of advertising". [Head, 1985:59]. 
In Britain, the public service BBC is financed entirely by license 
fees as no advertising is carried. The BBC competes with the IBA 
which itself operates two television networks (ITV and Channel 4) as 
well as a multitude of local radio stations. The BBC may well_ provide 
special interest and minority groups with programming as this is in 
line with its mission to provide a public service. Comments Halloran 
. and Croll [Wright, 1975:44], 11 The BBC is a publ.ic service 
institution. I~dep~ndent Television would claim to be both public 
service and commercial 11 • 
18 
. Both' these examples of· ~ermissive and patetnal systems may be seen· 
within the normative categorizations of the Free press or libertarian 
theory which are hallmarks of democratic nations. [see Chapter Two]. 
The Authoritarian Orientation: 
Head and Stirling's third category is most important for this study. 
It is that of the authoritarian orientation. Broadly speaking, both 
the Soviet Un.ion and newly developing third-world nations fall into 
this category [see Chapter Two]. 
Head [1985:59] broadly categorizes all systems authoritarian that 
have as their fundamental tenet, 11 still more insulation from both 
consumer preferences and market forces, with arbitrary 9overnment 
regulation exercised in the name of the people but with little 
concern for individual preferences that do not coincide with official· 
doctrines''. Head [1987:11] also argues that in this orientation, 
governments 11 h,arness the communication services directly to implement 
their policies". This represents a broad categorization of 
authoritarianism. 
Indeed, the control of the media by respective governments is the key 
to classification. Whilst authoritarianism pertaining to this thesis 
is explained in detail in Chapter Two, it is necessary to add that 
all control systems can be roughly classified under this category. 
The evidence presented in this thesis indicates a considerable degree 
of control on the part of the ruling government over the broadcasting 
services of South Africa. It is therefore from this paradigm that the 
question of broadcasting in South Africa will be tackled. 
However, a detailed analysis may discover permutations of these 
orientations resulting in the necessity to look for other sets of 
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classification. An example of this are the disparities in Soviet 
authoritarianism as opposed to that presented in the Third 
World. 
Head's analysis also fails to differentiate between authoritarianism 
and that of the more extreme totalitarian example. This category 
would attempt to control in almost every detail the broadcasting 
system of its respective nation. An authoritarian regime may leave 
the door open for certain freedoms in particular those associated 
with market and economic forces. [see Curtis, 1978:61-72]. A regime 
may also desire to control totally but may be prevented from doing so 
if its administration is inconsistent and its finances irregular. 
This may see a state impose authoritarian controls rather than 
totalitarian. 
Where necessary, attention has been drawn to variations of the 
authoritarian paradigm in order to clarify national broadcasting 
orientations as they pertain to national political systems. In 
Chapter Two, a normative authoritarian model will be proposed as a 
basis for this study. 
The Pluralistic and Mixed System Trends: 
Head [1987:13] has himself stated that the three orientations 
outlined 11 exist nowhere in the world in pure form. Permissive systems 
impose some regulations, paternalism bows at times to popular demand, 
and even authoritarianism finds it expedient to conduct audience 
research to find out what people really want 11 • In Chapters Two and 
Five, these disparities will be highlighted. 
·The classificatory difficulties highlight the Pluralistic Trend in 
Broadcasting [Head and Stirling, 1987:13-15]. Although Head argues 
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that 11 relatively few countries have truly pluralistic systems 11 , the · 
characteristics of such a model remains crucial to this thesis. 
Pluralism mea~s that coupled with competing broadcasting services 
that are an established norm, 11 there is an existence of multiple 
motives as driving forces with a national system (including) usually 
the profit motive (commercial component of the system) and the public· 
service motive (non-commercial component) 11 • In particular, 11 all 
audiences must be drawn from the same finite population; and, whether 
large or small, each subaudience captured by one service becomes, 
momentarily at least, unavailable to other services 11 • [Head, 1985:90-
91]. 
It should also be noted that this system may also be related to the 
11 mixed 11 system where 11 two or more entities with contrasting programme 
motives compete, typically pitting a public service component against 
a commercial component 11 • [Head, 1985:86], These terms are of vital 
importance in analyzing the South African broadcasting system. 
Within this paradigm, competition is the norm with differing media 
actors or institutions having differing motives in promoting 
themselves to a particular audience. Examples of the pluralistic and 
mixed trends may be found within the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada 
. ) 
and Australia and their close relationship coupled with the dynamics 
of South Africa make these terms largely interchahgeable. 
. . 
Head's analysis and categorizations are a vital element of this 
thesis. They not only identify the relationship between the broadcast 
media and the respective national p9)itical system, they als~ provide 
\ 
a broad framework from which this study can be approached. The Head 
analysis forms the backbone of broadcasting classification whilst the. 
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Fagen, Siebert/Schramm and McQuail contributions outlined in Chapter 
Two crystallizes the analysis further. 
As indicated, the national political system tends to dictate 
broadcasting policy. Indeed, South Africa, with its strong centrality 
of government and tense political situation finds its broadcast 
medium of great interest to the power holders within the country and 
subject to covert and overt forms of control. 
The 11 Gatekeeper 11 Concept: 
This political culture of a particular country may be exposed by the 
actions of the mass media and more specifically, the broadcast media. 
As indicated, government intervention will be· at the heart of this 
thesi~ when the symbiotic rel~tionship between the South African 
administration and that of the State-run broadcasting service, the 
SABC, is discussed. 
Characteristic of broadcasting, the mass media in general and 
specifically applicable to South Africa must be the "Gatekeeper" 
concept for.mulated by Austrian psychologist Kurt Lewin. This referred 
to "individuals or groups of persons who govern the travels of news 
items in the communication channel". [Bittner, 1977:10]. 
Bittner expands upon this definition and defines this concept as 
"any person or formally organized group dir~ctly involved in relaying 
or transferring information from one individual to another through a 
mass medium". [1977:10]. This theory will be utilized when discussing 
the controllers of South Africa broadcasting where selected 
individuals strongly influence the message of the broadcast media. 
In terms of the characteristics of broadcasting, Lewin 1 s "Gatekeeper" 
concept is also useful in highlighting the ability of a gatekeeper to 
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not only limit information but also expand on otherwise unheard of 
sets of information. Similarly,. 11 information may be reorganized or 
reinterpreted to provide a new slant" and it is precisely these 
characteristics that will influence the discussion surrounding the 
broadcast medium in South Africa. [see Bittner, 1977:10]. 
This importance of the 11 gatekeeper 11 in regulating the flow of 
information within a particular society can be furthe~ related to the 
system functions_ in the Almond and Powell [1980:8-10] model of the 
political system. Here it is suggested that political communication 
(and the media through 11 political socialization 11 ) are regarded as an 
important determinant of "whether or not the system ('po 1itica1) wil 1 
change or be maintained over time, whether competitive parties and 
the legislature will be predominant in policy making, or whether they 
will be replaced by a single authoritarian party or a military 
council 11 • [1980:10]. The role of the 11 gatekeeper 11 is therefore of 
par~mount importance in gauging the extent of control within a 
particular broadcasting system. 
The broadcast medium in South Africa enjoys similar characteristics 
or attributes to those outlined earlier in this chapter. However, the 
broadcast medium is largely the area where most of the population 
(the White sector) receive their political information. 
Broadcasting, therefore encourages 11 the political socialization of a 
people, in helping to shape people 1 s political attitudes, beliefs and 
behaviour - in short, therefore, a nation•s political culture 11 • 
[Kuhn, 1985:2]. 
The object of this thesis is one of placing South Africa•s 
broadcasting system in the context of normative theories of the mass 
media and broadcasting through a detailed assessment of the 
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characteristics of broadcasting in South Africa. This will be 
followed by an in depth case study of the South African situation 
with an analysis of the special features that contribute towards its 
own dynamic orientation. 
The function of this chapter has been to clarify some of the 
terminology that shall be used as well as highlight the attributes of 
broadcasting which makes it such a unique and politically sought 
after institution. After all, ,throughout the Third World where a coup 
d 1 Etat is a means of changing government, one of the first state 
structures to be captured is the means of mass communication 
whether radio or television. 
As shall be seen, these generalized attributes or characteristics of 
broadcasting are as applicable to South Africa~ as they are to 
broadcasting systems the world over. From the Third to the First 
Worlds, broadcasting systems encounter similar attributes that are 
dealt with in varying ways depending -On the political orientation of 
their respective leadership. This. leadership will define in a given 
country (and South Africa is no exception) the terms of regulation of 
the services offered and in detail, the extent and nature of the 
services in question. It is this dynamic matrix that will be 
investigated. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
. COMMUNICATION THEORl.ES 
\ 
. i 
/ 
.' 
In order to understand the features of broadca~ting in South Africa 
as a function of the national political system, _it will be necessary 
to look at some generalized theories of mass communications and the 
press that can be applied to ideologically bound sets of nations or 
states. This is to be undertaken with the express view of 
highlighting the theoretical paradigm from which the South African 
case study will emerge~ 
The emphasis in this chapter shall be on the role of authority in the 
domain of the mass media. It is important to understand the essential 
key elements of the authoritarian communications orientation as it is 
this paradigm that has been the most influential in determining the 
characteristics of the South African political dynamic since 1948. 
In Chapter One, the characteristics of broadcasting and particularly 
the potential for control and manipulation of this form of mass media 
through a 'gatekeeper' was stressed. This is all important in dealing 
with the South African situation as it is essentially the 
'gatekeeper' or 'communicator' that will be analyzed through an 
empirical study of the South African broadcasting system. Over the 
past forty years there has b~en a marked move towards centralized 
political control. This is a function of the domination of the 
institutions of power by the National Party which has increasingly 
taken on the role of 'gatekeeper'. 
However, the question to be asked is whether it is possible to 
classify the South African example into a clearly definable set of 
characteristics thqt exemplify centralized control or whether too 
. many contradictions and inconsistencies exist which mitigate against 
the categorization within one paradigm? 
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Harold Lasswell - The Importance of the 11 WH0 11 : 
Cassata and Asante [1979:65-75] clearly explain the four key 
"components of the communi.cations process" namely, the "source 
(communicator), message, channel, receiver (audience) and the effect 
or consequence component". Related to this is the key communication 
model of Harold D. Lasswell [Schramm and Roberts, 1914:84-99] whose 
"WHO says WHAT, in which CHANNEL, to WHOM and with what EFFECT 0 is 
perhaps the most widely referred to model. 
Lasswell 1 s model looks at the WHO representing "communicating 
organizations - their natures and functions; the WHAT representing 
the nature of the content of the message whether it be informative, 
educative or entertaining; the CHANNEL representing print media, 
audiovisual media or automatic data processing; the WHOM representing 
the nature and receptivity of the audience and the EFFECT 
representing the nature of the effect or response of the audience and 
the ways in which it affects the communicator''. [Cassata and Asante, 
1979: 65] .. 
This model, therefore, reflects a whole process - one that Lasswell 
himself preferred to view "as a whole in relation to the entire 
social process". [Las.swell in Schramm and Roberts, 1974:85]. 
Certainly, it can be stated that if the WHO has a particular goal in 
mind this will affect what he says, the medium he uses, as .well as 
the selection of a particular audience with upon which he wishes to 
impact. Whilst within the broadcasting medium it is the 
characteristics of the WHO that are important, the means and methods 
utilized bear equal study. 
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With broadcasting's propensity for centralized control, manipulation 
and regulation, it is the communicators (the ruling National Party 
within South Afr1ca) that enjoy power as "the modern instruments of 
mass communication give an enormous advantage to the controllers.of 
printing plants, broadcasting equipment and other forms of fixed and 
specialized capital". [Schramm and Roberts, 1974:89]. 
Lasswell [Schramm and Robertst 1974:98] lists three distinct social 
\ 
functions of communication and whilst He does not directly relate 
these to the political development of states, these factors can 
nevertheless be extended and looked at within the political context. 
Lasswell explains firstly that there must be a "surveillance of the 
environment (which) discloses threats and opportunities affecting 
_, .. ~---·..,,-; 
the value position of tile community and the component parts within 
it II o 
Lasswell [Schramm and Roberts, 1974:87] sees "diplomats, attaches, 
and foreign correspondents as being representative of those who 
specialize in the environment". This function essentially "informs 
and provides news" detailing essential news and dangers pertaining 
to everyday lives. [see Severin, 1976:213]. Broadcasti~g's close 
relationship with its respective controllers clearly suggests that 
the 'surveillance of the environment' will be conducted by the regime 
at hand. 
It is also important to note the contribution of Lazarsfeld and 
Merton who suggest that mass communi~ations can encourage."status 
conferral" where "news reports about individuals often enhance their 
prestige. By focusing the power of the mass media upon certain 
people, society confers upon them a high public status". [Wright, 
1975:15]. 
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Within the realm of broadcasting such "status conferral" will depend 
upon the permissive or authoritarian characteristics of the WHO that 
defines the benefit from such exposure. Head [1985:101] suggests that 
within authoritarian societies, "leaders enjoy access limited only by 
their own appetites for public appearance and can exploit 
broadcasting to create personality cults, magnifying their images to 
heroic if not supernatural dimensions" . 
... Lasswell [Schramm and Roberts, 1974:87] secondly states that "there 
will be a correlation of the components of society in making a 
response to the environment" which is undertaken by "editors, 
journalists, and speakers". This essentially refers to the "selection 
and interpretation of information about the environment'' and includes 
"the editorial and propaganda content of the media". [Severin and 
Tankard, 1976:213]. Here too, if the editors and journalists of the 
broadcast medium are either directly appointed by or sympathetic to 
the state, their orientation will be that of the regime in question. 
The third function of communication is most relevant to this study. 
Lasswell [Schramm and Roberts, 1974:87] states that there is a 
"transmission of the social heritage from one generation to the next" 
where those involved in this process are the "educators in family and 
in school". Here the media "increases social cohesion by widening the' 
base of common experience". [Severin and Tankard, 1976:213]. 
This can be extended to South Africa where the dominant ideology of 
the ruling National Party is exercised through the influence of 
Christian National Education. This has been strongly criticized for 
\ 
providing school children with a world view that represents that of 
the ruling elite. This may be coupled with the ideology promoted 
through the broadcast medium which does not contradict that which has 
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been historically taught in White schools and serves to reinforce the 
component elements of the educational syllabus. 
Schramm [1973:29] succinctly. clarifies this point by saying that 11 in 
our time, much of the task of surveillance is taken over by the news 
media; much of the co-ordination by government, political leaders, 
political reporters.and analysts, and pressure groups; and much of 
the transmission of heritage by the schools 11 • Acknowledging this 
~entral role played by government institutions, this factor becomes 
even more outstanding when 11 the rulin~ element is afraid of the 
internal as well as the external environment 11 resulting in even 
further centralized control 11 • [Lasswell in Schramm and Roberts, 
1974:99]. 
Lasswell himself has stated that 11 in every society, values are shaped 
and distributed which are the ideology in support of the network as a 
whole. The ruling elites view one another as potential e~emies 
(with) one ruling element especially alert to the other, and relies 
upon communication as a means of preserving power 11 • [Severin and 
Tankard, 1979:214]. 
It is important to stress that this process through its particular 
regime, will inevitably affect the world and domestic view of the 
political environment that is all important in the communications 
process. A ruling elite that feels threatened and is therefore 
unstable will take a particular course of action in attempting to 
maintain its position of control and authority. 
The elite's interpretation of the political environment may be such 
that it acts upon its own irrational or rational fears and 
perpetuates this through its domination of the mass media and 
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specifically, the broadcist medium. This can be directly related to 
the South African case study where the broad~asting institutions 
created, maintained and supported by the ruling elites (the WHO - the 
National Party) disseminate a particular message. 
In addition to Lasswell's basic model, Charles Wright [1985:20] has 
added a fourth function of communication~ namely that of 
"entertainment". Wright particularly highlights the "dysfunctional" 
effects of popular cult~re and states that the transmission of this 
"fails to raise public taste to the level that might be achieved by 
less extensive forms of entertainment such as the theatre, classic 
books or opera". 
Criticisms of the Lasswell Model: 
There exist considerable criticisms of the formal Lasswellian model. 
Fauconnier [1975:43] sites Westley, Maclean and Gerbner as saying 
that the Lasswel 1 model "takes insufficient account of the 
interdependence of, and. the interaction among the basic factors he 
lists". 
Marchant [1988:55] argues that the "process of communication is still 
one-way and although the elements are described, no attempt is made 
to identify their dynamic relationship". Marchant adds that "the 
importance of situational variables is ignored (for example in what 
situation?) as is the intention of the communicator (for example with 
what purpose?)". Indeed, the intention of the communicator i.s vitally 
important and will be articulated according to the political 
orientation of the WHO. 
Lasswell 's theory of the "WHOM" in his model has also been adapted 
according to Martin [Agee, Ault and Emery, 1986:50], in that "no 
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longer were communication specialists concerned about who says what 
to whom, since this is immaterial if the 'whom' in the paradigm is 
unable or unwilling to receive ihe message. The question that is now 
asked is, 'Who needs to receive what messages from whom?' and answers 
dealt with the seeking and avoiding of information rather than the 
transmission of instruction or urging of opinion change''. 
However, within South African broadcasting, the WHOM (the White 
audience) are all largely able to receive the message although not 
necessarily the content. With the existence of a virtual formal 
news/public affairs monopoly in broadcasting, there is therefore 
little chance of avoiding state interpreted information even for 
those who do not wish to receive it. Whilst some may attempt to avoid 
or ignore the broadcast message, there remains a potential effect on 
the political system (positive or negative) that is initiated by the 
WHO. 
The real merit of the Lasswellian model is according to 
Fauconnier[1975:43] to be found in its "brevity, or to put it more 
strongly,· its degree of concentration". The Lasswell model 
precipitated the development of further models which often contained ( 
reference to the WHO (or the Source or the Communicator) as the 
starting point from which to proceed. These included the more 
detailed Gerbner model (1956); Bruce Westley and Malcolm Maclean 
(1957); Berlo (1960) and that of Melvi~ De Fleur (1966). Other 
important models include those of Shannon and Weaver; Riley and Riley 
and Vora. [see Cassata and Asante, 1979:66-71; Marchant, 1988:55-57 
and Fauconnier, 1975:43-49]. 
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De Fleur - Med;a as an Elements of' the Sodal Svstem: 
De Fleur's contribution fills many of the gaps identified in the 
Lasswell model. De Fleur [Fauconnier, 1975:108] sees the mass media 
as "social systems, that is a complex of stable repetitive and 
patterned action that is in part a manifestation of the culture 
shared by the actors, and in part a manifestation of .the 
psychological orientations of the actors". 
De Fleur [Schramm and Porter, 1982:27} also suggests that the 
"communication act is the means by which a group's norms are 
expressed, by ~eans of which social control is exerted, roles are 
allocated, co-ordination of effort is achieved, expectations are made 
manifest, and the entire social process is carried on". This 
indicates the all pervasive nature of the communications process and 
the essential link between the characteristics of Lasswell 1 s WHO 
which enables a ruling elite to define the social system as they see 
fit. 
De Fleur [Fauconnier, 1975:109] refers to the "low taste content of 
the media" which includes dramas and films of a pornographic, violent 
and suggestive nature which 11 contribute to a lowering of taste, a 
disruption of morals or a stimulation of socially unacceptable 
conduct". 
De Fleur has argued that the 11 mass media were social systems when 
seen in relation to a specific external system, namely, the totality 
of the social and cultural components of American society ... and 
contain elements that recur so often that they may be regarded as 
repetitive phenomena, the function of which is to ensure stability, 
the balance of the social system". [Fauconnier, 1975:108 also see De 
Fleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1982:172-181]. 
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However, it is importa·f_lt to note De Fleur's identification of the 
"components of the social system'' that effect upon the media. These 
components are structurally linked in relation to one another and 
have a direct influence on the media orientation. De Fleur's. 
[1982:174] components are: 
(a) Audiences 
(b) Research organizations 
, (c) Distributors 
(d) Producers and Their Sponsors 
(e) Advertising Agencies 
(f) Control Subsystems (legislative bodies) 
De Fleur [1982:176] also highlights the wider "external" factors 
which will also influence the media. Here "the general social, 
political, economic and cultural conditions'' remain important. 
The influence and function of these component elements, according to 
De Fleur resuits in the move towards the broadcast of ''low-taste 
content programming appealing to 'what the audience wants• rather 
than 'what the audience should have', determining the financial 
motivation as paramount. [see De Fleur in Fauconnier, 1975:111]. 
The key issue here is the tolerance by the WHO of these·conditions in 
the influence on the mass media and on broadcasting in particular. It 
may be assumed that within a permissive broadcasting system, such 
components have the upper hand. This is clearly shown in De Fleur's 
explanation of the American model where the function of the low-taste 
content in the media is "to maintain the financial stability of a 
deeply institutionalized social system that is tightly _integrated 
with the whole of the American economic institution". [De Fleur and 
Ball-Rokeach, 1982:180]. However, within the broadcasting 
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authoritarian paradigm the centralized control of the State may 
limit the influences of such participants and result in increasing 
'gatekeeping'. Alternatively, the dominant ideology of the State may 
clash with the prof it motivations of the aforesaid components leading 
to contradictions within the broadcasting system. Anomalies may also 
emerge as a result of the authorities tolerance of the increasing 
influence of such component elements as independen~ from the ruling 
elites. 
With this in mind, there can be little doubt that the values 
articulated through the promotion of a particular social system will 
be transported to other countries through the internationalization of 
the mass media. With American programming dominant, values of free 
enterprise beliefs, the legitimacy of the profit motive, the virtues 
of controlled capitalism and the v~lues concerning freedom of speech 
are carried in such programm1ng. [see De Fleur and Ball~Rokeach, 
1982:178]. 
These issues are directly relevant to the South African case study 
where the increasing influence of these component elements on the 
electronic broadcast media highlight ·the ·permutations of the South 
African model. Again this analysis necessitates a returns to an 
attempt at classifying national systems from where the influence of 
variables may contradict with the accepted models. 
The Role and Effects of Political Co11111unication: 
Richard Fagen [1966:17] has redefined the Lasswellian model by 
theorizing that 11 every act of human communication involves a SOURCE 
generating a MESSAGE which travels through a CHANNEL to an AUDIENCE 11 • 
It is precis~ly these factors that together form part of the 
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communications process. 
Fagen has criticized Lasswell for not clearly differentiating between 
communication in general and "political communication". Fagen 1 s 
[1966:20] point of departure is that "communicatory activity is 
considered political by virtue of the (political) consequences, 
actual and potential, that it has for the functioning of the 
political system". The key question to therefore ask is what is the 
character or nature of the political system? An answer will clarify 
both the characteristics of political communication and that of the 
WHO pertaining to their control over broadcasting. 
What is important about Fagen 1 s definition is that even if 'the 
political consequences are not fulfilled, there remains the initial 
intention on the part of the communicator to initiate some sort of 
response whether active or passive indicating the wide parameters of 
political communication in the broadcast medium. Fagen 1 s definition 
of political communication touches upon the cornerstone of this 
discussion; namely the nature of the political system as key to the 
functioning of the communications process. 
Similarly, Fagen [1966:20-21] agrees with Hyman that "the package of 
manifestly non-political mass communication presented to audiences in 
the less developed countries nevertheless has important consequences 
for political change" and goes onto suggest that 11 by watching even 
such vulgar fare as the English-lang~age horror, love and adventure 
films widely circulated in Asia and Africa, the new citizens of these 
nations come to develop skills and attitudes of political relevance''. 
Importantly, Fagen [1961:21] goes onto add that "the possible 
consequences of manifestly nonpolitical artistic communication are 
well understood by absolutist rulers who strive to control cultural 
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life lest the tastes and habits of independence and self-expression 
formed there carry over into political life". 
Here again, it is the use of the communication media by the rulers as 
well as their ideological orientation that is of importance. In the 
South African case, the question to be asked is whether the ruJers 
and their ideology engage in such activities or do they allow an 
element of conflicting ideology and the promotion of an alternative 
social system to be broadcast? [see De Fleur, 1982, 178-181]. 
Related to broadcasting, this discussion suggests that the 
controllers of the broadcast media in all countries (communicators) 
have some strategy in order to influence their populace. If the 
authorities wish to maintain the political status quo whether it be 
within the realm of a democracy or dictatorship, they will do so by 
making sure that their dominant ideological values are those 
predominant in their broadcast medium. 
There are however, important variables that would indicate that some 
societies may find it particularly difficult to maintain such a rigid 
ideological orientat~on and may have to submit to popular demand, 
financial considerations or simple practicability thus tolerating a 
degree of alternative views within a society. 
The theories of Fagen and De Fleur could explain the use of a strong 
moral ideology present in American situation comedies where bad 
language and immoral behavior is expressly shunned. This would seem 
an indication of a society using one of the most powerful forms of 
media to maintain certain set norms and values. Head [1985:299] has 
also affirmed the value of this notion by saying that "even the 
flimsiest entertainment many convey information and implicit 
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endorsement of value~". 
Similarly, the extensive coverage given to sport (particularly in 
Eastern Europe) may provide an almost hypnotic form of programming 
providing viewers with an outlet to counter the ideologically 
isolated position many of these countries adopt. This may also be 
true for South Africa where the expense undertaken in live sports 
broadcasts may indicate a desire on the part of the authorities to 
satisfy in entertainment the needs of a politically dissatisfied 
population. 
This would concur with the views of Lazarsfeld and Merton [Severin 
and Tankard, 1976:217] who have described the "narcotizing" of the· 
viewer or listener where "the mass media are among the ~ost 
respectable and efficient of social .narcotics, and increasing dosages 
may be transforming our energies from active participation to passive 
knowledge". 
It is important at this stage to emphasize that one should not over-
estimate the effects of the mass media on society as this study 
contains many contradictions. In terms of the aforesaid models which 
concentrate upon the communicator as provider of information or 1 the 
message•, one should b~ wary of extending too much credit to the 
manipulators in their success in the effects that they wish to 
achieve through the media. 
In this regard note should be made of McQuail 1 s [1987:252] "three 
phase 11 approach to the 11 history of media effect research and theory". 
-
McQuail sees the aforementioned research as going through three 
distinct phases leading from "all powerful media 11 (1900-1930) where 
the media was thought to have extensive influence to the Katz, 
Lazarfeld and Klapper pronouncement (1930-1960) of a 11 minimal 11 effect 
37 
of the media which decreased its importance. The third contemporary 
phase argues that the media may indeed still have an important 
" effects and 11 be an instrument for exercising social and pol,itical 
power". [McQuail, 1987:254]. 
These phases suggest a very definite shifting nature ~f the study 
showing much uncertainty regarding the effects of the mass media [see 
McQuail, 1982:254-255]. For the purposes of this study, it is 
important not to be too dogmatic surrounding the effects of mass 
communication. It is not the intention of this particular work to 
make a judgment on this question (indeed, it would be almost 
impossible), suffice to highlight the difficulties in drawing a 
testable conclusion. 
It should be noted that with reference to South Africa, the effects 
of mass communication remain untested. The key element to emphasize 
is that effort is continually made to influence through the media and 
in particular through the centrally controlled broadcasting 
institutions. Whether this has any effect as in the case with 
influencing voter trends is yet to be measured effectively. All that 
is possible in the South African case is to empirically study 
examples of bias and propaganda and hypothesize on their intended and 
unintended effects. 
In accepting Fagen 1 s definition of political communication and 
subsequent discussion, one can agree with Gabriel Almond [Fagen, 
1966:22] that "everything in politics is communication~ All of the 
functions performed in the political system - political socialization 
and recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation, rule-
making, rule application, and rule adjudication ~ are performed by 
means of communication. Political communication is the way in which 
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information flows through the society and through the various 
structures that make up the political system 11 • Almond highlights the. 
mass media (and therefore broadcasting)as an influential component 
element of the communication structures. [see Almond, 1966:169-170]. 
This suggests that the broadcast medium particularly within 
authoritarian societies is constantly ~mitting a political message 
due to the usage of semiotics (the science of signs). This relates to 
public affairs or news type programmes where codes ( 11 highly complex 
patterns of associations we all learn in a given society and 
culture 11 ) help us to interpret the world around us. Umberto Eco has 
suggested that 11 codes and subcodes are applied to the message in the 
light of a general framework of cultural references, which constitute 
the receiver's patrimony of knowledge: his ideological, ethical, 
religious standpoints, his psychological attitudes, his tastes, his 
value systems, etc. 11 • [see in Boyd-Barrat and Braham, 1981:149]. 
Furthermore, Berger has classed political ideology as one of the.main 
areas where codes are used for specific purposes. [see Boyd-Barrat 
·and Braham, 1987:150] In the South African case, codes may be used to 
reinforce the status quo where a regime feels threatened or under 
pressure. It is not however, the intention of this thesis to delve 
into this area of study; suffice to emphasi2e the possible methods 
employe9 in political communication. 
The key element here and in the South African case study is the 
political orientation of the regime in question. There would seem 
little doubt that the more centralized the political system is, the 
more likely the regime will control the broadcast medium. This study 
reflects upon the characteristics of broadcasting in South Africa as 
a function of the nature of the national political system and it is 
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for this reason that the communicator (the WHO) is all important. 
The Government and the Med;a: 
The relationship between the government and the communications media 
is of direct relevance to the South African case study. Through this 
relationship, one can study the normative delineation of 
communication and test the characteristics of broadcasting against 
that of the political system with a view to discovering the extent of 
control within the broadcast medium in South Africa. 
f 
Siebert [Schramm, 1949:138-144] suggests that the government has four 
neutral roles or "activities" within the communications media. 
Firstly, the government can act as a restrictive agency preventing 
the spread of "obscenity, libels on persons or of material tending to 
produce internal disorder". Secoridly, it can act in a regulatory 
capacity that encourages all involved in the broadcasting free market 
to "act as gentlemen" enabling competition to enjoy a fair hearing 
and "obeying minimum rules of conduct and do not engage in 
subterfuge". 
The government can thirdly "act as a facilitating agency that 
encourages and provides information to the public and importantly, 
funds the communicati~ns media". The fourth role of government as 
exemplified through the example of public broadcasting in the United 
States, encourages government participation alongside private 
broadcasting stations for the benefit of providing "additional 
information and ideas for the public". [Schramm, 1949:138-144]. It 
may be said that these roles of government are ideal and largely 
regulatory and should rather be seen as a model for government 
intervention in the media. 
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Such a scenario makes a comparison and analysis of the 
characteristics of respective governments necessary. Wilbur Schramm 
[1973:152-153] succinctly explains the differing values and 
perceptions perceived on this issue by explaining that 11 it is evident 
that different societies are defining freedom differently. The United 
States is concerned with political freedom from the hand of 
government. The Soviet Union is concerned from certain economic and 
social class controls, and freedom within a set body of doctrine 11 • 
The key issue, as Schramm [1973:152] mentions, is that of 11 control 11 
where 11 every nation promises its people freedom of expression, _yet 
each one controls its mass media to a greater or lesser extent as, it 
controls all its social institutions 11 • This will. affect the neutral 
posits outlined by Siebert and turn them into subjective tenets in 
which the ruling elites appropriate the broadcast media for their own 
ends. 
The nature of 11 control 11 necessitates an analysis of the 
characteristics of the Laswellian 11 WH0 11 to gauge the differing 
national systems pertaining to broadcasting. Rogers [1986:100] cites 
Czitrom as saying that 11 mass communication in the decades since 
Lasswell's sentence (model) has largely ignored the 11 who 11 , that is 
the investigation of which individuals and institutions own and 
control the mass media 11 • It is precisely this aspect of 
communications study that is relevant to the discussion of a national 
broadcasting system in South Africa. 
The National Political System: 
With the political communications system and flow dictated to by 
the source (WHO), it is important to view the role of the dominant 
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rulers in defining the characteristics of the national political 
system. Fagen's [1966:23-24] examination of 11 the comparative study of 
national political systems 11 is vitally relevant to this discussion as 
11 organizing communications and political life 11 take place within the 
paradigm of a national political system. 
Fagen [1966] has extensively investigated the 11 WH0 11 behind 
communications policy. Once the 11 WH0 11 has been defined through 
understanding HOW the WHO gets to be the WHO, one is able to 
differentiate the actions of different WHO's in formulation of 
policy. Furthermore,, by reformulating the Laswellian question to read 
11 Who should be able to say what, in which channels, to whom, for what 
purposes? 11 , Fagen calls for an explanation of the national political 
system which will answer the above question. Fagen asks six key 
questions which defines the characteristics of the four main 
classification paradigms - namely Classical Democracy, Compromise 
Democracy, Autocracy and Totalitarianism. 
The six questions to establish a working model formulated by Fagen 
are: 
1. How are the Leaders Chosen and Changed? 
2. Who Defines Political Problems and Alternatives? 
3. Who Participates in Making Public Policy? 
4. What is the Scope of Allowable Criticism? 
5. How do Citizens Become Informed about the Politically Relevant 
World? 
6. Who May Choose to Isolate Himself from Politics? 
[Fagen, 1966:24]. 
The analysis of these six questions is vital to the understanding of 
the concept of a controlled mass media within the permutations of 
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Fagen's categorizations, namely - Autocracy and rotalitarianism as 
opposed to Classical and Compromise Democracy. It shall be necessary 
to look at the answers to the above questions in some detail to 
provide a foundation upon which to categorize broadcasting within 
South Africa. 
Essentially, within an autocracy, the leadership or the WHO is 
appointed "without the masses being brought into the process of 
choice in an.x standardized way 11 • This may be done through "coup, 
assassination or forced retirement" and is an irregular occurrence 
largely "precipitated by death, schism, or other unscheduled events". 
[Fagen, 1966:28-29]. Similarly, the totalitarian choice of leadership 
is "perpetuated without reference either to the wishes of the 
ci~izenry or to a prearranged schedule of replacement in office". 
[Fagen, 1966:31]. In essence this contrasts with "free and periodic 
elections" that characterize both Fagen 1 s compromise and classical 
democracy. 
Needless to say, the characteristics of those chosen to control 
indicates 11 who defines the political problems and alternatives". 
Within the .authoritarian model it is the task of the elite and is 
that of the ruling party in the totalitarian system. Fagen suggests 
that within the compromise democracy, groups acting in unison can 
have some influence in this area whereas within the classical 
democracy, every citizen may participate. 
The answer to Fagen 1 s third question in the controlled paradigms 
falls again within the ambit of the appointed elite or bureaucratic 
officials who will rarely submit to formal public participation. 
Within a classical democracy, issues can be regularly voted upon in a 
"one man one vote" election or referendum and the compromise 
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democracy would indicate that again it is groups that have some power 
to influence authority. 
The scope for criticism varies in the paradiijms before us. Within the 
autocracy, there is little room for critical remarks with the 
ultimate sanction being physical punishment and fear. In a 
totalitarian society the available scope is virtually non-existent 
but within the democracy categories a wide degree of criticism is 
tolerated. The compromise variation, relying as it does upon group 
effectiveness in challenging authority, utilizes the press as 11 a 
fourth branch of government" and a "watchdog" which by implication, 
according to Fagen enables "the media to be as well insulated from 
government as possible". [Fagen, 1966:28]. 
Information within the classical democracy is found through the 
interaction of the citizen and his environment. Within the 11 complex 11 
compromise category, information should be made available to those 
who seek it by the government but, to a greater extent is provided by 
the mass media. The controlled categories differ importantly. Within 
the autocracy it is the government's role to provide what it deems 
necessar~ with the mass media controlled through censorship and 
restriction ensuring subordination and compliance. 
The totalitarian model indicates a willingness on the part of the 
authorities to provide every citizen with as many details regarding 
their predetermined role in society as possible. The media in these 
models are tightly controlled to provide the necessary informatio~ ~r 
lack thereof in the pursuit of their ultimate ideologies. The citizen 
is indoctrinated to believe and inculcate the state id~ology with 
little or no alternative source of information. 
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The answer to Fagen 1 s final question indicates that within the 
classical democracy, the society is tailored to the individual needs 
of the citizens where they are expected to participate to their 
fullest extent but do not suffer any sanction upon withdrawal. The 
compromise variation allows unquestioned opting out whereas within 
the autocracy, the citizen is not expected to become actively 
involved on a challenging basis in the first place and therefore will 
be left to do as he pleases 11 as long as he causes no trouble for the 
regime 11 • [Fagen, 1966:30]. 
What then is the link that Fagen provides between these 
categorizations and the discussion relating to authoritarianism 
within the broadcast media? Important in Fagen•s approach is his 
explanation of the source of the flow of communications that can vary 
from society to society. The WHO in the society - namely the answer 
to Fagen 1 s first question sets the scene for the development of 
various national characteristics in the information flow process. As 
can be seen, the WHO is most dominant in the autocratic and 
totalitarian models outlined. 
Fagen•s importance is in highlighting the permutations between 
democratic and non-democratic systems and in presenting an 
uncomplicated and clearly defined structure of four models. However, 
these models can only be rough guidelines for classifying such 
systems as considerable overlapping exists. 
For the purposes of this argument we must see authoritarianism as a 
category where regimes are categorized by 11 repression, intolerance, 
encroachment on the private rights and freedoms of citizens and 
limited autonomy for nonstatist interest groups. It is the 
predominance of certain types of political institutions and 
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procedures and the distinctive behavior of their rulers that 
I 
distinguishes authoritarian from democratic regimes 11 • [Perlmutter, 
1981:8]. 
Within the spectrum of political authoritarianism as related to 
communication, Fagen [1966:66-67] sees the vital factor as "implying 
some limiting of the scope of communication (where) there are always 
channels, both horizontal and vertical, which are purposely closed to 
certain groups, individuals, and types of content". 
These categorizations of Fagen have been added to by many authors. 
McQuail [1987] analyses the control theories under the headings of 
11 Authoritarianism 11 and "Soviet Media Theory 11 whilst _the democracies 
are termed the 11 Free Press Theory 11 • The emergence of newly developing 
countries particularly post-colonial in the third-world has seen the 
emergence of the Social Responsibility Theory which attempts to 
11 reconcile independence with obligation to society". [see McQuail, 
1987: 116). 
Further th~ories outlined by McQuail include the new 11 Democratic-
participant11 theory [1987:121-122] and the 11 Development 11 [1987: 119-
121] media theory which has arisen out of the "varying 
inapplicability" of the older more established theories thus 
indicating a need to combine the tenets of these theories to explain 
diversity, contradictions and inconsistencies that may exist in a 
dynamic political sphere. This should be noted with reference to the 
South African discussion later in this chapter. 
The Authoritarian Media Theory: 
Having spoken about the communicator as an all-important figure in 
determining the characteristics of the communications and therefore 
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the broadcasting system, it is necessary to spell out the 
authoritarian concept of the media and relate it to the other 
political genres of media culture. In terms of the case study 
relating to South Africa, it is necessary to highlight the given 
characteristics or tenets of media authoritarianism in order to find 
an acceptable model pertaining to broadcasting in South Africa. 
Siebert, in his classic contribution to 11 Four Theories of the Press" 
[Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, 1963:9-37] has stated that the 
authoritarian model is one that has been followed, and is still 
followed in many societies, "even where it has been abandoned (as) 
it continues to influence the practices of a number of governments 
which theoretically adhere to libertarian principles". [1963·:9]. 
According to Siebert, this concept has "determined the mass 
communication pattern for more people over a longer time than any 
other theory of press control". [1963:10]. 
Siebert [1963:10] sees this model as one 11 under which the press, as 
an institution, is controlled in its functions and operation by 
organized society through another institution, government 11 which 
again emphasizes the importance of the WHO in defining the respective 
models. 
Both Siebert [1963] and Schramm [1973] have quoted Plato on 
authoritarian theory. Schramm [1973:153] refers to Plato's basic 
tenet that "the state was only considered safe under the gui~ance of 
wise men". Siebert [1963:12] says that "Plato conceived the ideal 
society as one in which the state established and enforced the unity 
of political and cultural goals (which meant) rigorous -control of 
opinion and discussion". Siebert goes further to state that "Plato 
wanted to 'co-ordinate' the life of the citizens under a strict 
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cultural code that banned all modes of art and even of opinion not in 
accord with his own gospel 11 • This can be seen as a basis in the 
formation of authoritarian theory as it is the WHO - namely the STATE 
that acts to control. 
Siebert [1963':13] also talks about the Hobbes view that 11 the power to 
check the individual in the interest of all was essential 11 • Siebert 
claims that the ideas of Hobbes has been instrumental in the 
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implementation of authoritarian theory in many societies. 
Indeed, the Hobbes contribution can be seen as a very persuasive 
justification for the execution of the authoritarian model. To 
repeat, the state is seen as the crucial element within the 
organization of human-kind where according to Hegel 11 freedom meant 
freedom of the individual to know that he is not free but that his 
actions are determined by history, by society and above all by the 
Absolute Idea which finds its highest manifestation in the state 11 • 
[Siebert, 1963":14]. 
The views of Hegel, Hobbes and Plato all set the scene for the 
characteristics of authoritarianism to emerge within modern society. 
The ascent of Fascist authoritarianism in Italy and Germany in the 
1930's saw the State again playing the pivotal role. The definition 
of the state in terms of the ideological precepts and designs of the 
human rulers at the helm (the WHO) dictated the characteristics of 
the truth that was to be propagated to the masses in the mass media. 
Having looked broadly at the philosophy behind authoritarian society 
and media's role therein, it is necessary to look in greater depth 
at the controlled operation of the media within such systems. 
Siebert [1963:18] suggests that it is the WHO that have defined 
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within their own logic, the effect they wish to achieve in 11 the 
accomplishment of predetermined objectives 11 • The es sen ti al idea is 
that the state would control any condition that hampered the lithe 
attainment of national ends 11 and would aggressively appropriate the 
media for achieving its ends. [1963:18-19]. 
McQuail [1987:112] suggests that authoritarian theory lioffers a 
justification for submitting the media to those who hold power in 
society, whether legitimately or not''. Succinctly put, Hachten 
[1987:16] states that lithe basic principle of ~uthoritarianism is 
quite simple: the press is always subject to the direct or implied 
control of.the state or sovereignli. 
Authoritarian theory is also related in some ways to other theories 
of the press. Whilst ·it is not the object of this thesis to cover all 
the available permutations of world press theory, it should be noted 
that classic authoritarianism should not be confused with the Soviet 
Theory of the press. 
Whilst -centralized control makes this theory the closest alternative. 
to authoritarianism, the Soviet system encourages the media to be 
used in 11 agitation for the accomplishment of a world revolution 11 and 
retains a perfect monopoly over the media. This, most importantly, 
conflicts with a certain amount of privatisation of the media within 
other authoritarian countries where the press can theoretically 
remain outside of government [Siebert, 1965:27-29 also see Cassata & 
Asante, 1979:78]. 
Schramm [1963~14Q] states that 11 in authoritarian systems outside the 
Soviet countries, the media are typically part of the business 
system, and, to that extent, less exclusively an instrument of the 
government. The older authoritarian media were iri bondage to the 
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state, whereas the Soviet media are in and of the state". Schramm 
[1963:139-144] further suggests that in~typ~cal authoritarian 
countries, the press is restricted negatively to retain the status 
quo whilst within the Soviet model, it is given a positive role to 
pursue change. 
Finally, Schramm [1963:141] states that "the Soviet mass 
communications are integrated into the total communication system and 
into the total government, in a way that authoritarian systems never 
were. The Soviet system is a planned system; the older ones, 
controlled systems". It should also be noted that the Soviet and 
authoritarian models exclude as far as possible the infiltration of 
foreign news/political media. 
In terms of the discussion relating to broadcasting, it must be 
clearly stated that the characteristics of the USSR broadcasting 
system must make it authoritarian along with other totalitarian, 
dictatorship or third-world regimes. Schramm [1963:139] has stated 
that "from our point of view, at least, the Soviet system is an 
authoritarian one - indeed, one of the most closely controlled 
systems in history". Hachten [1983:63] states that the 
Soviet/Communist model should be seen as a "variation of traditional 
authoritarianism" precisely because of its strong centralized control 
characteristic. 
Siebert (1963:29] fairly obviously states that the theory furthest 
from authoritarianism is that of the Libertarian model. A similarity 
does exist with the newly developed Social Responsibility theory of 
the press. Here, "both agree that the press should not be permitted 
to degrade the culture of a nation, and both postulate that when 
definite goals for society are determined (by different methods, 
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however), the mass media should not be permitted to interfere 
irresponsibly with the accomplishment of these objectives". 
The key d~fference between the aforementioned theories highlights one 
of the fundamental concepts of authoritarianism. Within this theory, 
it is argued that the press does not have a responsibility in 
deciding the designs of the state which necessarily means that it is 
the authorities' duty themselves, and not that of the press, to 
accoinp 1 iSh this. Socia 1 Responsibility 01n the other hand, does 
advocate that the press must continue to inform the public to the 
best of its ability as it is still "the public who make the ultimate 
decisions 11 • [Siebert, 1963: 29]. 
Siebert [1963:35] also relates modern day authoritarianism to the 
control of the broadcast media. He suggests that two factors that 
dictate state media policy. Firstly, "the general principles of 
authoritarianism provide a solid basis for regulation. Radio and 
television must further the interests of government and must help to 
advance tbe cultural and political objectives of the central 
authority''. The second factor, according to Siebert, is the ~eed for· 
governmental or tentral intervention in the allocation of 
electromagnetic waves "of which the supply was limited and were the 
property of the state" thus obliging the state to manage". 
In relation to broadcasting, Siebert [1963:53] continues to add that 
a key characteristic of an authoritarian state is a state monopoly of 
broadcasting where ·"the operation and programming of both radio and 
television rest with an ·official government agency which is 
responsible for carrying out government objectives''. 
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Further control of the air-waves is also necessary as broadcasting is 
not determined by national boundaries and there remains a potential 
on the part of authoritarian nations to regulate and control by 
either 11 jamming 11 incoming broadcasts or regulating the possession of 
receiver equipment 11 • [see Sieberf, 1963:36]. 
McQuail [1987:111] sees the authoritarian theory of the press as one 
where 11 the press is subordinated to state power and the interests of 
a ruling class 11 • He states that this theory 11 can also refer to a much 
larger set of contempprary press arrangements, ranging from those in 
which support or neutrality is expected from the press in respect Of 
government and state, to those in which the press is deliberately and, 
directly used as a vehicle for repressive state power''. Here on~ can 
see the vast range of national systems that could contain a range of 
weak to strong authoritarian characteristics within their 
communications or media systems. 
These comments should be read with the six main principles of the 
authoritarian theory of the press as outlined by McQuail [1987:112]. 
They are: 
1. Media should do nothing which could undermine established 
authority or disturb order. 
2. Media should always (or ultimately) be subordinate to established 
authority. 
3. Media should avoid offense to majority, or dominant, moral and 
political values. 
4. Censorship can be justified to enforce these principles. 
5. Unacceptable attacks on authority, deviations from official policy 
or offenses against moral- codes should be criminal offenses. 
6. Journalists or other media professionals have no independence 
within their media organization. 
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From these tenets it is apparent that the 11 established authority" of 
the state is of paramount importance; but that it is ultimately the 
respective rulers that define the subjective parameters of the state 
that must be upheld without fail. There exists a distinct effort on 
the part of the authorities to stem criticism of the their regime 
resulting in close control over the broadcast media. 
Hachten [1987:63] states that whilst the press usually operates 
outside the "ambit of the government, "under the Authoritarian 
concept, there is always the constraint of potential censorship, if 
not actual prior restraint itself. Editors and reporters never know 
for sure just how far they can go without triggering official 
disfavor and intervention. They must maintain the .status quo and not 
advocate change or alternate leadership". 
Problems with the Classificatory Approach: 
As shown, the broadcast media lends itself to some form of 
governmenta 1 interference. Even within so-ca 11 ed 11 Libertarian 11 
societies there exists governmental control of the airwaves and as , 
Siebert [1963:65] suggests in relation to radio, 11 obviously not 
everyone could establish a radio broadcasting station without 
producing ~omplete chaos on the air-w~ves. Regulation was necessary 
if only for the allocation of frequencies". 
Any tendency to regulate must have an inhibiting effect on the 
services provided as it is the WHO who remains sole arbiter. This 
brings the broadcast media under governmental influence in some of 
the recognized libertarian societies like France (RTF), West Germany 
(ARD & ZDF) and Australia (ABC) although there is now a movement 
towards pr i vat i s at i on res u l t i n g i n th.es e 11 pub 1 i c 11 s er v i c e s 
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encountering new threats to their continued viable existence. [see 
Raymond Kuhn, 1985:1-14]. 
Siebert [1963:67] himself questions libertarian influences on 
broadcasting by citing examples of democratic governments subsidizing 
broadcasting institutions directly. This is done primarily because of 
the tremendous financial outlay that is needed to finance these 
media forms. Siebert therefore asks the crucial question, 11 How can a 
medium dependent on state funds remain immune to government 
influence?". 
McQuail [1987:112] has also raised the important issue of clarifying 
exactly where authoritarian characteristics are to be found. He 
states that it is fairly obvious to determine authoritarian elements 
within repressive or·dictatorial societies. However, McQuail states 
that "it would be a mistake to ignore the existence of authoritarian 
tendencies in relation to the media in societies that are not 
generally or openly totalitarian 11 • He-adds that there are instances 
in all societies where media freedom may need to be curbed such as in 
cases of "terrorist insurgency or threat of war". [1987:112]. This 
again highlights the adaptability of authoritarian techniques to many 
differing situations for a multitude of reasons. 
These deviations become a crucially important issue in an attempt at 
judging the viability of such national classifications. Kraus and 
Davis [1980:113] suggest that the categorizations discussed earlier 
are "inadequate for several reasons". They feel that these categories 
"assume that it is possible to anticipate the social consequences of 
the transmission of any form of information (and) unless 
totalitarian or authoritarian governments can anticipate all such 
consequences, it is not possible for them to plan and to administer 
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communication systems effectively 11 • To prove their point these 
authors quote a study of the Soviet communications system undertaken 
by Markham which 11 indicates that it is hardly as ~fficient in 
mobilizing citizen support as was imp,lied by early theorists 11 • 
[ 1980 : 113] . 
Kraus and Davis [1980:114] argue further that most mass communication 
systems are increasingly controlled by a 11 centralized media 
bureaucracy'' because of the expansion of new technology resulting fn 
excessive financial outlay requiring specialized operators. This 
11 severely limits access to the media by non-professionals'' which 
would in even 11 traditionally libertarian or social responsibility 
systems be viewed as threatening to the efficient operation of the 
media bureaucracies 11 • 
This argument suggests that within the idealistic and theoretically 
pure def,initions of Fagen, Schramm, Siebert and McQuail, 
centralization of control is evident even in libertarian categories 
resulting in ~ome similarities with authoritarian societies. Where 
controls al.ready exist 11 centralization. of facilities and 
professionalization of personnel can increase the ability -0f 
government to monitor and control the media system''. [Kraus and 
Davies, 1980:114]. 
Kraus and Davis [1980:114] suggest that a vure libertarian 
communications system currently do~s not exist. They cite the 
libertarian example of the, United States where 11 the Radio Act of 
1934, which instituted the Federal Communications Commission, 
established the government's right to ensure that the broadcast media 
are operated in the public interest 11 and that 11 codes of ethics 
\ 
adopted by American journalists recognize the 'social responsibility' 
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of the press 11 • 
Altschull [1984:108] believes that in terms of Schramm's labeling the 
Soviet press as an 'instrument' and the American press as a 
'service', Schramm is 11 minimizing the similarities between the two 
systems and exaggerating the differences 11 • He finds a broad spectrum 
of common ground when he says, 11 In truth, the media of both the 
Soviet Union and the United States are instruments, supporting the 
interests of those who publish them. It is equally true that in both 
countries the media· represent a service to those who read newspapers 
and magazines and tune into radio and televi~ion 11 • [1984:108]. 
Indeed, Altschull highlights considerable cross-cutting journalistic 
similarities which occur in the media emphasizing the difficulty of 
dogmatically adhering to normative categorizations. [see McQuail, 
1987:123-124]. 
In dealing with the question of authoritarianism, it is important to 
remember the McQuail provisos as mentioned earlier. Fagen too 
[1966:33], argues that 11 typologies such as this (his four major 
categorizations) prove to be of limited usefulness when fine. 
distinctions between real systems must be drawn 11 and is indeed true 
within the authoritarian paradigm. 
It is important to take note of the criticism of the labeling process 
of Schramm, Siebert and Peterson. However, as has been noted earlier 
in this chapter, no attempt has been made to dogmatically declare 
that these theories are perfect or absolutely consistent. Indeed, as 
has been acknowledged, considerable overlapping occurs between the 
theories as even Siebert [1963:67] will concede. 
What is essentially forgotten in the aforementioned criticisms is 
the basic thesis of Schramm, Siebert and Peterson [1963:2] outlined 
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in the introduction to their volume. They state, "The thesis of this 
volume is that the press always takes on the form and coloration of 
the social and political structures within which it operates". 
Here the political structures themselves cannot follow their 
normative description perfectly due to internal dynamics due to the 
elements of political development that cause considerable societal 
dynamics.[see Fagen, 1966:119-135]. The WHO defines the "political 
rules of the game" [Fagen, 1966:66] which in turn, affects political 
communication and the broadcast media. 
Indeed, the justification for any system by the WHO of the model will 
be biased in favor of himself at the expense of any alternatives. It 
is also true that the bias of the WHO will tend to clo~d his 
perception and understanding of not only his alternatives; but of his 
very own system. 
The WHO in a society may regard their system as the only available 
option and may perceive the alternatives as 'too ghastly to 
contemplate'. Similarly, an alternative WHO operating from a 
different political paradigm and therefore a differing media system 
will take a contrary view. It may be obvious to highlight these 
aspects of the study; but the need to understand different 
perspectives of application of a political and communications system 
where more than one WHO or actor may be right in terms of his 
definition remains an important addendum to the aforesaid arguments. 
There can be no harm in attempting to categorize theories of the 
press through respective national political systems especially since 
one is analyzing basic political philosophy as a departure point for 
separating the function of the press in particular societies. It is 
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however, vitally important to acknowledge the imperfections that this 
analysis highlights but at the same time attempt to resolve these 
imperfections. 
These imperfections may be explained in part by Kraus and Davis· 
[1980:114]. They state, 11 Recently, economic theorists have noted a 
convergence of communist, socialist and capitalist economic systems. 
Not surprisingly, this convergence can be found to extend to 
communicati().(I systems, particularly if only the technological 
features of these systems are compared. We are faced with the problem 
of understanding media systems which appear to be developing in 
accord with the evolution of the technologies that underlie them. 
This is a problem faced by those who seek to understand communication 
systems, no matter what the historical or ideological origins of 
those systems. We are repelled by and yet resigned to the thought of 
our technology 'running wild', propelling us into an uncertain future 
such as that envisioned by Orwell for 1984 11 • 
Kraus and Davis [1980:114] highlight two other important points. The 
11 convergence of communist, socialist and capitalist economic systems" 
by implication necessitates a mixed economy and results in the 
infusion of a multitude of philosopnies under one national political 
system thus reflecting upon the communications system. This means 
that the clearly identified parameters of Siebert/Schramm 
(originally published in 1956) must be adapted to take into account 
subsequent global changes of decolonization, the emergence of new 
nation-states and the ongoing transformation of political control 
within many third-world countries. 
Similarly, the reaction to expanding technology and resulting new 
forms of media and media penetration by the four groups of theories 
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in Siebert/Schramm is also admittedly limited due to the date of 
completion of their work. [Kraus and Davies, 1986:114]. 
However, in defence of Siebert/Schramm it must be noted that their 
basic philosophy of the four theories remains useful. Their work 
should be seen as a basis for modern day classification and 
categorization. These categories should be regarded as starting 
points for further investigation into particular national 
communication systems rather than being an end goal. 
It is necessary to build upon the basic characteristics as outlined 
by Siebert/Schramm to include new variations (as McQuail has done) in 
attempting to understand a particular national broadcasting system 
where it coincides or differs with the existing models. However, even 
these permutations of models may be insufficient in atte~pting a 
classificatory exercise. The models themselves may be flawed as soon 
as they are confronted with empirical reality suggesting that an 
integrative approach utilizing many tenets from differing models may 
be the most useful method to such a~ analysis. 
Theoretical Paradigms and the South African Case Study: 
These criticisms are of paramount importance in defining a model that 
relates to the politics of broadcasting in South Africa. Extensive 
\ 
emphasis has already been placed on the inconsistencies that do exist 
when trying to define models within national political systems. It is 
therefore important to highlight that national broadcasting systems 
may exhibit a definite mix of characteristic elements of the 
authoritarian as well as of other systems. 
Fagen [1966] and McQuail [1987] are useful in providing the key 
issues with which to work. Whilst Fagen's six questions are dealt 
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with in Chapter Five, McQuail provides a clear assessment of the 
normative authoritarian theory which should be applied to South 
Africa. 
The South African model contains a diverse variety of component 
elements. This is largely due to the existence of alternative media 
cultures and structures. It is vitally important to acknowledge that 
whilst the state run and,supportive broadcasting network may well 
dominate the broadcast media within South Africa, strong elements of 
the press (print media) are highly critical and are often supportive 
of policies and initiatives of political organizations such as the 
banned African National Congress (ANC). 
Therefore, contrary to the authoritarian orientation, the media 
(specifically the print media) may well engage in activities that may 
11 undermine the established authority" [McQuail, 1987:112] of the 
ruling National Party (the WHO in Lasswell's model). This occurs in 
spite of considerable press restrictions which are further enhanced 
during times of a State of Emergency. 
Whilst restr1ctions placed on the media may well be authoritarian in 
nature, the print media's operations would indicate continued 
opposition to the ruling elite thus flouting authoritarian theory. 
This could classify South Africa as working towards Apter and 
Rosberg's 11 consociational 11 paradigm indicating a certain degree of 
political competitiveness within the body politic. [see Fagen, 
1966:66]. 
This characteristic indicates a contradictory situation. Whilst the 
ruling elite have often accused the press of undermining the 
established authority, the State controlled electron~c broadcast 
media (the SABC) largely reflects the thinking of the ruling elite 
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and is indeed politically subordinate to it. 
Historically, the control over the broadcasting media has seen this 
sector of the media clearly comply with the ''dominant, moral and 
political values" '[McQuail, 1987:112] albeit amidst controversy and 
some inconsistency dependent upon the prevailing political and 
ideological orientation of the ruling elite at the time. 
The State enjoys considerable centralized control of broadcasting and 
almost unlimited access to it. The broadcasting service of the SABC 
retains a tight control over the available criticism of the 
authorities through news reporting that clearly favours the ruling 
Nati~nal Party. This is enhanced by the monopoly granted to the SABC 
in respect of formal television news. The, apparent control of 
broadcasting has increased since the National Party victory in 1948 
although prior to this, the United Party also used the broadcasting 
media (radio) to further their own ends. These controls can be 
e{juated with the tenets of the authoritarian model. 
However, it is apparent that not all criticism is stifled although 
,this is limited to that approved by the broadcasting gatekeepers. 
Here too, the tolerance level of criticism i~ unpredictable and the 
threat of sanction through the disruption of career prospects is 
constantly prevalent. 
It should also be noted that although such controls remain, recent 
additions to South Africa's broadcasting culture has been the 
emergence of 1 independent' broadcasters utilizing both th~ radio and 
television mediums. This allows for considerable competition and an 
increase in De Fleur's "Low-taste content" programming in order to 
satisfy as broad an audience as possible as this programming 11 sells 
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big" financially and in viewership. [De Fleur arid Rokeach, 1982:178-
179]. 
These factors are further complicated by the existence of financial 
rewards which when submitted to through high advertising revenue from 
popular programmes, conflict with the dominant ideology of the ruling 
elite. These variables must be related to the De Fleur [1982:173-176] 
social system components that clearly affect the media orientation. 
The ascendancy of the profit motive allows De Fleur's component 
elements to increasingly influence broadcasting as advertisers, 
producers, distributors and audiences become paramount. The 
toleration on the part of the WHO to this scenario may also indicate 
a genuine liberalization albeit for mixed (profit and polit~cal 
policy) motivations. 
This may result in the broadcast of alternative political 
orientations (albeit within the confines of a multitude of 
regulations) to appear thus heavily contradicting with the 
aforementioned authoritarian theory which subordinates the medium to 
the dominant elite. 
This also enabl_es programming representing alternative social systems 
[see De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1982:172-176] to be shown. Such 
programming (predominantly American) may well conflict with the 
dominant ideology of the WHO representing a break from the historical 
subordination of the media within the authoritarian model. 
It is fairly cleat within the authoritarian model that journalists 
themselves have little or no independence within their media 
institution. However, the South African model suggests that some 
freedoms wo~ld occur as long as they do not conflict in any I 
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substantial way with the dominant ideology. In this respect, 
broadcasting in South Africa may rather follow the Development Media 
and Social Responsibility Theory which suggests that "journalists and 
other media workers have responsibilities as well as freedoms in 
their information-gathering and dissemination ta·sks 11 • [McQuai 1, , 
1987:121]. 
Here, journalists are bound by their responsibility not to promote 
the aims or p.plicies of banned organizations yet are increasingly 
free to discuss issues without advancing the particular views of any 
political party or movement other than the ruling National Party. The 
South African authorities have historically argued that such 
responsibilities are justified in maintaining law and order, 
preventing perceived undemocratic Black majority rule and preventing 
a Communist take-over or "Total Onslaught". Nevertheless, the 
existence of broadcasting competition has enabled journalists to 
broaden their scale of reporting and tackle issues that have been 
historically taboo. 
It may also be argued that the broadcast media also carries out the 
development media tenet that 11 accepts and carries out· positive 
development tasks in line with nationally established policy". 
[McQuail, 1987:121]. Within the South .African context, the 11 positive 11 
and 11 policy 11 principles are clearly subjectively defined by the 
ruling National Party who, through their right of intervention, are 
able to use the media to support particular socio-political 
initiatives whether they be reform or repression oriented. 
Similarly, so, the SABC may be seen as historically 11 giving priority 
in their content to the national culture and language". [McQuail, 
1987:121]. Again this refers to the National Party's definite 
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ideological bias in favor of Apartheid and its derivative forms. 
Indeed, the Mission of the SABC states that (a) 11 the SABC operates a 
quality broadcasting service which takes into account the wishes and 
needs of the various language and cultural groups in South Africa in 
I 
' -
order to inform, educate and entert~in them constructively 11 and 
(b) 11 disseminates a positive message about South Africa and its 
peoples 11 • [SABC Annual Report, 1988:1]. 
This conflation of systems is born out by McQuail [1987:109] He 
states that his analysis is one of ''a set (or sets) of more general 
principles that can be used to classify different national cases 
{whilst) ~ach national society is likely to have a detailed or 
distinctive version of normative theory 11 • McQuail sees this as 11 ideas 
of how media ought to or are expected to operate 11 • 
In a similar vein, McQuail states that 11 it should be emphasized that 
virtually no actual media system is governed by any one 'purei theory 
of the press, nor does practice always follow what seems the 
appropriate theory very ~losely. Most systems reflect the working of 
different (even inconsistent) elements from- different theories 11 • 
[1987:110]. This point is vitally important when attempting to 
analyze South Africa's adaptation to a particular paradigm or 
classification. 
Again it is important to stress that the South African case study 
needs to be analyzed in .terms of Head and Stirling's [1987:8-15] 
broad categorizations of 11 permissive, paternalistic ,authoritarian or 
pluralistic (mixed) theory 11 • [see Chapter One]. However, whilst the 
authoritarian categorizations discussed in this chapter clearly 
correspond with Head, Head's pluralistic and mixed models which 
contain a mix of public and private ownership should be emphasized 
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when looking at South Africa due to the emerging diversity of 
broadcast media ownership recently established. 
From this discussion, it is therefore evident that the definite 
characteristics put forward by the theorists mentioned are but 
guidelines in defining key elements of national broadcasting systems. 
Within the South African broadcasting system, it can be seen that the 
inconsistencies that occur leads to a conflation of the theoretical 
paradigms which could see the broadcasting system as moving from the 
historically defined authoritarian realm [see Chapter Three] to an 
increasingly liberalistic model involving some developmental 
tendencies mitigated by an overriding minority ideology. Fagen 
[1966:67] has argued that "the mix of channel 1 openn~ss 1 and 
1 closedness 1 in any real system is so complex that it is difficult to 
characterize in unilinear fashion". Indeed, this would highlight the 
South African broadcasting system example. 
The South African example would suggest that whilst the centralized 
authoritarian control r"emains powerful, i.t is increasingly be_ing 
influenced by emerging component elements of the social system as 
outlined by De Fleur [1987:173-176]. The WHO continues to define and 
set the media agenda but is increasingly faced with internal and 
external factors that diminish his importance. The mixture of models_ 
operating within South Africa indicates a distinct move away from the 
normative authoritarian model. 
An argument may be presented that would allow such a pluralistic 
model to develop within the parameters set by the State and 
ultimately controlled by the State. This may be seen as merely a 
perpetuation of authoritarianism under a liberalistic guise and· may 
be articulated by Postman who would suggest that television is used 
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to "distract, delude, amuse and insulate us from society". [Marchant, 
1988:49]. 
However, this thesis reveals the move from gross authoritarianism as 
outlined theoretically within this chapter to a more pluralistic 
approach where the power of the state is genuinely diminishing in 
line with the contradictions presented to the aforementioned McQuail 
tenets. 
Having gained a theoretical knowledge of the functions of the media 
and authoritarian press theory as applicable to communication 
systems, it shall now be necessary to apply this knowledge in more 
detail to the case study of South Africa. The historical legacy of 
authoritarianism will be clearly detailed {n Chapter Three with a 
view to later assessing possible variations upon this paradigm which 
may move broadcasting to a more pluralistic and therefore liberal 
orientation. 
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CHAPTER THREE ·. 
THE HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN SOUTH Ai=RICA: 1920-1976 · 
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Broadcasting in South Africa has developed over a number of clearly 
defined stages. With the development and utilization of new 
technology it was soon realized that broadcasting would be of great 
value to those who were able to control and ha·rness its power. 
This chapter outlines the historical development of broadcasting in 
South Africa. This is discernible from four clearly defined periods 
that move broadcasting from its primitive origins to being used by 
the ruling National Party as an adjunct to their policies. T~is 
chapter highlights the creeping control and eventual domination of 
gross authoritarian characteristics of the broadcast radio medium. 
The analysis of this historical legacy clearly shows considerable 
authoritarian influences from which the contemporary era should be 
discussed. 
Politically, South Africa has seen the racial legacy of the past 
transposed into the governmental actions of the twentieth century. 
Broadcasting ~as used by Jan Smuts during the Second World War and 
was later to be a battle ground in the National Party's bid to secure 
control over South Africa and extend its authoritarian influence over 
the institutions of the State. 
The development of broadcasting should be seen within the historical 
legacy of South Africa and in particular, the development of the 
Afrikaner as a cohesive political force. The Great Trek was the 
culmination of conflict with the British missionaries at the Cape and 
led to lithe self image of the Boers as a chosen people like the 
ancient Israelites - with England in the role of the Pharaoh, the 
highveld as the promised land, and the Africans as the Canaanites". 
[Fredericksen, 1981:173]. Orlik [1978:55] refers to this set of 
historical events as the emergence of lithe intense racial-ethnic 
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struggle which had begun between the descendants of the Dutch - the ' 
Boers or Afrikaners - and th~ English settlers 11 • 
The conflict with the British culminated in the Anglo-Boer War which 
served to 11 sharpen Afrikaner/English polarities and stimulated a 
national consciousness among the Afrikaners 11 [Giliomee and Adam, 
1979:83]. This was further enhanced by the rapid industrialization 
after the discovery of diamonds in Kimberly and gold on the 
Witwatersrand which apart from seeing an 11 elaboration of the racial 
order and the development of the state racial apparatus 11 [Greenberg, 
1980:392] also saw the subsequent control and exploitation thereof by 
largely English speaking interests coupled with a considerable 
demographic shift of poor Afrikaners to the cities. 
Broadcasting developed within this unique historical context. Radio 
broadcasting had begun in the early decades of the twentieth century 
with invention spurred on by the needs for expanding communications 
as a vital necessity in the First World War. Radio communications 
were beginning to augment and in some cases replace traditional modes 
of communication like the pres~ and the written word (postage) ~s an 
effective means of communication. It should also be noted that the 
infant motion picture also played a role in early forms of mass 
communication. 
In particular though, broadcasting developed due to 11 the emergence of 
social conditions favourable to the development of mass 
communications, leading to the habit media consumption." [Head and 
Stirling, 1987:39]. This included increases in audience sizes through 
urbanization and the resultant growth of cities as well as the 
availability of electricity and_other scientific inventions. 
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Another important factor was the increase in business activity as ~ 
function of industrialization which resulted in greater wealth 
accumu 1 at ion and the ab i,1 ity of growing sectors of the pub 1 i c to 
purchase consumer goods. There can be little.doubt that-these 
features and those presented in Chapter One meant that the need to 
convey information and advertise through broadcasting encouraged its 
development. [see Head and Stirling. 1987:39]. 
3.1 FROM THE DEVELOPMENT OF BROADCASTING TO NATIONALIST CONTROL·-
1924 - 1948: 
The Emergence of the African Broadcasting Corporation: 
The dominance-of the English speaking sector of the population was 
already apparent in early reports surrounding broadcasting in South 
Africa. Whilst it was initially amateurs who were the operators of 
radio in South Africa, it was the Johannesburg based Associated 
Scientific Technical Societies, who first a~plied for a license and 
then launched the first professional broadcasting company in South 
I 
Africa known as 11 JB Calling 11 on July 01, 1924. [Indaba, August 
1986:8]. This was closely followed by stations in both Cape Town and 
in Durban. 
Programme content was innocuous with live broadcasts comprising 11 a 
couple of announcers, an engineer and a station orchestra" [Indaba, 
August 1986:8]. All three services also carried advertisements. 
' I 
However, the success of these three pioneering stations was short 
lived. 
This was largely due to license piracy which resulted from 
, 
legislation being "inadequate in enforcing the payment of listeners 
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social and political control resulting in his requests being turned 
down. 
Schlesinger ran into further difficulties, with the existing low power 
transmitters which operated the original radio stations thus 
preventing rural listeners from receiving his transmissions. The most 
vehement objections to the service of the ABC came from the Afrikaans. 
, speaking community. They objected to the largely English programme 
content which tended to reinforce the cultural values of the British 
and American model upon which the Schlesinger service was based. 
Objections were also directed at the news bias which reflected the 
views of the English press. [see Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:29]. 
Already at this early stage in the broadcasting history of South 
Africa problems arose as a result of the existing linguistic 
pluralism. 
These events took place within the period of the rise of Afrikaner 
Nationalism and the ensuing Afrikaner ethnic mobilization. Here 
considerable emphasis was placed on the economic inferiority of the 
Afrikaner or Poor Whites who were moving in their thousands away from 
the rural areas to the towns and cities. Giliomee [1979:151] states 
that Hertzog and the National Party saw these events as a basis for 
their "civilized labor policy" which resulted in the employment of 
thousands of Afrikaners in the public service. 
This period also saw the resulting creation of the "Afrikaner 
/ 
Economic Movement" which established distinctive Afrikaner financial 
institutions and interest groups with a view to promoting their 
welfare. Importantly, these events resulted in the Afrikaner 
leadership realizing that "ultimately only political power would 
effectively ~nhance the Afrikaner•s economic position 11 which saw the 
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National Party emerge out of the Pact_ Government and Fusion as a 
political force. [see Giliomee, 1979:159 and O'Meara, 1983:1-17]. 
The climate of heightened ethnic awareness saw any institution that 
favoured one sector of the White population against the other become 
an easy target for criticism. The ABC was visible as "an unabashadly 
prof it-seeking monopoly which catered almost exclusively to the 
monied and largely English· speaking populace of a few large cities''. 
[Orlik, 1978:56]. Such dissatisfaction became apparent during the 
process of urbanization where the urban centers were largely the 
power domain of the English speakers thus relegating and alienating 
the rural Afrikaans listener. 
It was therefore under pressure from the Broederbond in 1931 that the 
ABC introduced an hour per week of Afrikaans programming. [Hayman and 
Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:29]. However, by 1936 Afrikaans language 
programming amounted to only 6% of total programming with 80% of 
listeners bei~g English speaking. [Dewar McKormack in SABC 50th 
Anniversary Television programme, August 1986 also see Indaba, 
August, 1986:9]. 
Dissatisfaction with Broadcasting - The Reith Report and the SABC: 
Giliomee [1983:88] cites the rise of the Afrikaner Nationalist 
movement coupled with the accompanying psychological message of "save 
the poor whites and assure the future of the Afrikaner nation and the 
white civilization". This can be.related to the feeling on ·the part 
of Afrikaners that their language was in some way threatened and 
needed to be kept separate from English until it ·had reached some 
form of equality in protection and status. [see Hayman and Ruth 
Tomaselli, 1989:29-30]. 
72 
In terms of broadcasting therefore, it was felt that some form of 
state regulation and control was necessary in order to redress the 
language inequafities of the English and Afrikaans services as well 
as allow an Afrikaans service (unique and locally self-created) to 
develop while not being threatened by broad financial/commercial 
considerations. This feeling existed even though Schlesinger had 
managed to dramatically increase listenership and turn the service 
into a 11 commercial success". [Hachten and Giffard, 1974:202 also see 
Indaba, 1986:8]. 
However, it was not only Afrikaners that sought more substantial 
state control at this juncture. English speakers also sought some 
form of governmental regulation that would permit the broadcasting of 
high cultural content.programmes which ordinarily would not form .part 
of a commercial radio station. Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli [1989:30] 
suggest that "the English fraction was motivated towards this 
change by the assumptions of liberal idealism, which placed control 
through government above control via capital; whereas the Afrikaans 
fraction was motivated by a desire for greater control over and 
access to broadcasting than they had hitherto enjoyed". 
The resulting pressure from all sides culminated in 1934 with Prime 
Minister Hertzog appointing Sir John Reith the Director General of 
the British Broadcas{ing Corporation, to (in the words of Reith) 
"look over the situation in this country respecting broadcasting and 
have conversations with my Government as to policy for its future 
development". [Orlik, 1978:56]. 
Reith was acutely aware of the power of broadcasting and endeavoured 
to highlight the strength of its applied power for humanitarian 
purposes as well as tactfully highlight its equal power if used for 
73 
I 
non-~ltruistic endeavours. He stated in his report that 11 as the 
assegai is to the native hand, so the rifle is. to the assegai and 
even more so is Broadcast, rightly institutionalized, rightly 
inspired, rightly controlled, to any other instrument of power - but 
in the sureness of Wisdom and Beauty and. Peace 11 • [Rosenthal, 
1974:154]. 
The essence of Reith's recommendations were that 11 the service should 
be. taken over and developed by a public corporation established by 
statute, and that the State ownership implicit therein should not 
entail State control or intervention in any way other than in 
accordance with the terms of the Statute. It is essential to the 
system that it is not controlled by the Government and that members 
elected to the board should have no definite or active political 
associations". [Morris, 1976:84]. 
Reith had therefore proposed a model that was largely based upon the 
British experience which resulted in criticism from Nationalist 
parliamentarian, Paul Sauer, who objected to 11 the insufficiently 
South African flavour of the ex i st,ing undertaking, and to its 
excessive subservience to the BBC .as a precedent 11 • [Rosenthal, 
1974:156]. This type of criticism bade ill for the fledgling South 
African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) that came into existence on 1 
August 1936, the day the Broadcasting Act, No. 22 of 1936 was passed 
in parliament and commensurate with the dissolving of the.ABC. 
Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli [1989:31] suggest that Reith's report 
contained fundamental flaws. By basing his model on the British 
example, he failed to take into account the domestic political 
conditions that were dev~loping over that particular period. His 
report was formulated virtually within a vacuum indicating that he 
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was not fully aware of the emerging and apparent antagonisms 
developing between the English and Afrikaans language groups. 
This oversight resulted in difficulties surrounding the equal 
programme distribution of English and Afrikaans and the resulting 
conflict over allocation of transmitters for a separate Afrikaans 
station. This problem had emerged out of the unworkable and 
cumbersome bi-lingualism that Reith had suggested for the existing 
service due to the lack of available funds for a distinct Afrikaans 
service. [see Orlik, 1978:56]. 
These difficulties were further exacerbated (unintentionally) by the 
utilization of two short-wave transmitters to relay Afrikaans 
programmes. However, poor sound quality hampered enjoyment of these 
services resulting in Afrikaans listeners who preferred not to 
struggle to receive adequate reception (and those thousands who were 
moving to the cities), being forced to return to the existing medium-
wave transmissions that retained the characteristics of the old ABC. 
The lack of .change within the new SABC was due to the fact that most 
of the ''ABC's staff members had become part of the new organization 
and the character of the programmes had not been altered'' [Orlik, 
1978:56] _with as much as 80% of the programmes on this station being 
broadcast in English. [Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:37]. Indeed, 
this conflict was articulated during this period by the Schoch 
Commission Report investigating the broadcasting services which 
''severely reprimanded the SABC management for not paying suffici~nt 
attention to the needs of the Afrikaans group''. [Hayman and 
Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:42. see also 41-46]. 
Broadcasting under Jan Smuts - The Second World War: 
These events brought to the fore fresh and more vehement criticisms 
from the Afrikaners who at the time had been culturally stimulated by 
the re-enactment of the Great Trek in 1938 in which radio had played 
-an important narrative role. [see Indaba, August 1986:9]. Publicly, 
this dissatisfaction was articulated in parliament through the 
National Party who complained in 1939 about 11 the political speeches 
of British statesmen". [Orlik, 1978:57]. 
The ruling United Party defended the use of such material ''due io 
their intrinsic international importance (whereas) pronouncements by 
domestic politicians were largely vehicles of local and partisan 
interest and broadcasting of these would inject an unwanted element 
of Party propaganda into the transmissions''. [Orlik, 1978:57]. This 
explanation is important in that the N&tional Party was to use 
similar justifications against attacks on its own use of the media. 
This highlights a~egree of control continuity that later saw United 
Party influence replaced by that of the National Party. 
The difference of attitudes between these two parties is clearly 
apparent. Smuts regarded South Africa in a macro perspective as 
playing a pivotal role within the Commonwealth compared with the more 
isolationist (micro) approach of Malan who believed Afrikaner 
interests to be of paramount importance. [Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 
1989:37-38]. 
This highlighted important 1weltanschauung 1 disparities which caused 
considerable tension in the taking of sides during World War Two. 
With the Afrikaner orientation was towards Germany and the English 
towards Britain, this eventually "provoked a realignment of various 
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sections of the hegemonic alliance, culminating in a change of 
government in 1948". [Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:40]. 
An indication of the polarization that existed is visible from an 
incident on September 4 1939. The Afrikaans staff at the SABC had 
' 
expected General Hertzog to declare neutrality in the war but was 
later outvoted in parliament. These staff members had all come to 
work at Broadcasting House with some kind of weapon (mostly 
revolvers) expecting that if the sign was going to be given by_one of 
the Afrikaner Nationalist cabinet ministers, they would take up· arms 
and take over the entire service. [Dewar McCormack in TVl programme 
commemorating the SABC's 50th anniversary relayed on 26 August 1986.] 
During the war years broadcasting again reflected the political 
climate of the day ~nd the orientation of the dominant political 
party causing continued dissatisfaction amongst the Afrikaans 
speaking SABC staff members. [see Orlik, 1978:57]; 
Major reasons for this was "Jan Smuts's use of the SABC to push the 
Allied cause, employing radio campaigns to sign up soldiers for a 
South African army that had lost many men at the battle of Tobruk in 
1942" [Pollak, 1981:71]; the broadcasting of "political speeches of 
-
British statesmen" [Orlik, 1978:57] and general government 
announcements which many Afrikaans announcers (who were not 
sympathetic to the Allies) saw as "distasteful". [Hayman and 
Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:38]. 
This resulted in much discontent and a contrary reaction on the part 
of certain pro-British factions who established a quasi-clandestine 
pirate radio station, Radio Freedom, to broadcast anti-Nationalist 
sentiments. This in turn, was countered by Zeesen Radio broadc~sting_ 
from Germany whose pro-Nationalist broadcasts were promoted by a 
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South African, Erich Holm [see Orlik, 1978:58 and Orlik, 1974:142] as 
well as a pro-Nationalist statiori broadcasting from Vryburg. [see 
Indaba, August 1986:9]. 
Ironically though, recruitment largely affected the English speaking 
staff members who heeded the call to the frontiers only to be 
replaced by Afrikaners who were determined to restore the language 
inequalities between the English and Afrikaans radio services. This 
resulted in 11 the ground being thoroughly prepared for an Afrikaner 
take-over in Broadcasting". [O~lik, 1978:58 see also Orlik, 
1974:142]. 
3.2 THE EARLY YEARS OF NATIONAL PARTY RULE - 1948-1958: 
Giliomee [1983:95] cites a number of conditions that made the 
National Party victory in 1948. ·He suggests that "the successful 
development of an ethnic strategy'' resulted from "demonstrations of 
South Africa's (and the Afrikaners) subordinate political status, 
economic conflict, t~e spread of communications, innovative 
leadership and ideological elaboration''~ Indeed, to a degree~ the 
political ·development of broadcasting as outlined has been a 
reflection of some of these characteristics and would indicate the 
close correlation that broadcasting has with the politics of the day. 
With the Afrikanerization of the ruling elite in 1948, at a time when 
the SABC was already largely Afrikanerized, the scene was set for 
''the Nationalist bureaucratization of the SABC" resulting in an 
extension of the control of the country to that of the broadcasting 
services. [Pollak, 1981:71]. 
This ~atershed saw the beginning (albeit somewhat tentative 
initially) of a new brand of authoritarian cultural intervention 
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spearheaded by the Broederbond. One of their main aims was 11 the 
/ 
taking control of such a powerful propaganda medium" (the SABC) which 
was already characterized by its "monopolistic authority" resulting 
in the replacing of the Smuts ideological bias with another. 
[Wilkens and Strydom, 1978:126]. 
Emerg;ng Broederbond Control: 
It is also important at this juncture to highlight the importance of 
the secret Afrikaner Broederbond. Thompson and Prior [1982:150] 
describe this organization as existing to "ensure Afrikaner 
solidarity and group cohesion in all aspects of Afrikaans social 
life 11 • Members of the organization infiltrated state institutions and 
ideologically guided them the way of the brotherhood. 
With this in mind, the Broederbond may be seen.as 11 a self-
perpetuating association of Afrikaner elite 11 which "places zealous 
Afrikaner Nationalists in key positions 11 [Thompson and Prior, 
1982:151] such as within the SABC for the purpose of ideologically 
guiding such corporations in the Nationalistic mould. 
With a predominantly Afrikaner government installed, it was not long 
before the Board of Governors of the SABC changed its socio-political 
nature. Broederbond control was difficult at first with the new 
chairman of the SABC Board, Dr. S;H. Pelliser (also a senior 
Broederbonder) encountering difficulties in finding an appointee for 
the position of Director General. As Wilkens and Strydom [1978:1~6] 
state, this position was the only position of real power and to find 
a fellow Breeder qualified on merit for the job was difficult. [see 
also Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli 1989:46]. 
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Expansion at the SABC - The Gideon Roos Era: 
This resulted in the appointment of Gideon Roos as Director General 
of the SABC in 1949. Roos had considerable experience in broadcasting 
and was highly respected for his radio coverage of the symbolic Great 
Trek of 1938. Indeed, Roos did not adhere to the political line of 
his superiors and 11 insisted on scrupulously fair reports and comment, 
not favouring ohe party over another 11 • [Wilkens and Strydom, 
1978:127]. 
Although he was an ardent Nationalist he nevertheless saw the role of 
the broadcaster as 11 a reporter, and not a prop~gandist 11 • [Harrison, 
1981:207]. Roos's stand on neutrality was such that 11 he would not 
allow the SABC to be used as a propaganda machine for the National 
Party11• [Wilkens and Strydom, 1978: 127]. 
The emerging control exercised over the SABC was clearly based on the 
need to further strengthen the fledgling Afrikaner state. In 
broadcasting, the transmitter network was extended to provide more 
adequate short-wave coverage for rural, largely Afrikaans speaking 
listeners. Other key elements of the broadcasting network (i.e. 
studios and carrier links) were also expanded to 11 enable the SABC to 
develop in several directions, matching the ideological needs of the 
hegemonic group which was now becoming dominated by the Afrikaner 
fraction 11 • [Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:49]. 
These developments are of crucial importance in their relevance to 
the structure of SABC broadcasting today. The SABC began to embark on 
a plan to manage, contro1 and above all centralize its progamming 
from Johannesburg. Secondly, a degree of regionalism was cultivated 
although still within the bounds of the central administration in 
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Johannesburg and thirdly, a more substantial choice of programmes was 
offered to listeners of differing racial and language groups. These 
factors combined to characterize the dominant ideology of the time 
which had as its aims, "to cement Afrikaner unity, and achieve parity 
with the English group and to 'divide and rule' the black 
population". [Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:49]. 
The National Party victory had thus provided the necessary 
ideological backing in order to justify an adaptation of broadcasting 
'I 
policy according to these aforementioned principles. Multi-lingual 
regional services were able for.the first time to place Afrikaans as 
a language on an equal footing with that of English as most mass 
communication within South Africa had historically been in the 
English language medium. Such a national broadcasting network may 
have gone some way in alleviating Afrikaner fears of English 
dominance over the air-waves and of society in general. 
Changes were manifold during this period. These included the 
cessation of relaying BBC news in 1950 and the subsequent 
establishment of an in-house (and regional) news gathering service 
that came into being in the latter half of the fifties. A major 
change for financial reasons as well as being an attempt to redress 
the major language disparities was made through the introduction of 
the commercial Springbok Radio in 1950 where greater parity in 
English and Afrikaans language broadcasts was sought. 
Another important development was the passing of the Broadcasting 
Amendment Act of 1951 which "empowered the SABC to supply programmes 
over wires as well as by radio, and thus to introduce~ re-diffusion 
service for Africans''. [Survey of Race Relations, 1951-52:75]. This 
resulted in a cable/subscriber service being successfully launched in 
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Orlando, Johannesburg. [see also Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:51-
52 and Hachten and Giffard, 1974:202-203]. 
This was coupled with an expanded black language service on other 
channels as a forerunner to a more permanent and audible Black radio 
channel. This development was described by the then Minister of Posts 
and Telecommunications, JFT Naude, as ''being a very good thing, when 
we would be able to broadcast the rediffusion services to the larger 
locations throughout the country; then one can enlighten the Natives 
there; then one can tell him what is being done for his benefit and 
what is going on in the country 11 • [Hansard, 1954:4986]. 
Such sentiments were echoed by Nationalist politicians suggesting 
that 11 more use of the radio should be made in combating Communist 
propaganda amongst the natives''. [Hansard, 1954:4976]. Thi~ need was 
further emphasized through the development of audible short-wave 
broadcasts to South Africa of anti-Nationalist stations such as 11 the 
Voice of Free Africa" and broadcasts from Radio Cairo and Moscow. 
[see the "Propaganda Debate 11 in H~nsard, 1958:2394-2399 and Hansard, 
1958:3540]. 
During this period there was a consid~rable expansion in programming 
for the Afrikaans service. New music programmes were created and 
ethnic identification and unity wa~ promoted through SABC coverage of 
major symbolic events like the opening of the Voortrekker Monument 
and the Day of the Covenant observances. These broadcasts therefore, 
enabled the SABC to "counteract the tendency for the regional and 
class divisions in Afrikanerdom to make themselves felt, in a time of 
rapid economic development". [Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:55]. 
Debates in parliament also highlight~d the importance attached to the 
inclusion of English speakers in the ruling Afrikaner e1ite. 
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Nationalist parliamentarian, Mr. B. Coetzee, highlighted the fact 
that whereas unilingual English speakers "receive their political 
information only from that point of view (English newspapers)", 
bilingual Afrikaans speakers receiYe their information from both 
English and Afrikaans newspapers. He suggested that "the only way to 
break down this political iron curtain is by means of radio". 
[Hansard, 1955:7478]. 
During this period the SABC came in for considerable criticism from 
the opposition United Party (UP). Although there was muted criticism 
of the mounting political bias, the UP observed in 1955 that "the 
news service is not as good now as it was when we had the BBC 
service" and went onto explain the prominence given to the speeches 
of cabinet ministers. This admonishment concluded by addin~ that 11 a 
good deal of the news we get is not reliable''. ·[Mr. P.A. Moore in 
Hansard, 1955:7470]. 
Jhis anger was instrumental in the revival of the anti-Nationalist 
"Freedom Radio" in 1956 which in turn led to Nationalist attempts at 
jamming its reception. [see Hansard, 1956:6461]. Orlik [1978:60] 
quotes a source describing the rebirth of Freedom Radio as a "stir of 
hope" with "many thinking people clinging to the Freedom Radio as a 
possible but inevitably-to-be-hunted-down-and-suppressed hope of 
emancipation" .. 
In parliament, there was much censure of the technical quality of the 
radio transmissions with the United Party again suggesting that "our 
radio system at the moment is possibly the worst equipped in the 
world, at any rate the worst equipped on the continent of Africa" as 
a result of "trying to run the corporation on a shoestring". [Mr. 
H.O Frielinghaus in Hansard, 1956:6399]. 
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This was possibly due to the philosophy of Director General Roos, 
whose adherence to the ''Reithian ideal of the independence of 
broadcasting from the goveinment of the day" resulted i.n an 
estrangement with the government. In Roos's efforts at impartiality, 
he attempted to make the SABC as financially independent as possible. 
This manifested itself in reduced governmental assistance for the 
SABC, considerable financial difficulty and an increasingly tenuous 
position for Roos himself. [see Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:56-
57]. 
The circumstances were to herald major changes in the management of 
the SABC in the late 1950's. These changes were to influence all 
aspects of the broadcasting mass media into the next two decades and 
highlight the importance of personalities in defining and carrying 
through, broadcasting policy. The influence of these personalities 
should be seen against the emerging authoritarian policies adopted by 
the then Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, who articulated the 
Apartheid policy and implemented much of the apartheid legislation. 
3.3 CHANGE AT THE SABC: CREEPING AUTHORITARIANISM - 1958-1968: 
The Rise of Albert Hertzog and Piet Meyer: 
In 1958, Albert Hertzog became the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs 
and a year later invited his close friend Dr. Piet Meyer who was also 
simultaneously Chairman of the Broederbond from 1960-1972, to become 
Chairman of the SABC Board. [see Wilkens and Strydom, 1978:130; and 
Hansard, 1962:7388]. 
Meyer is described in Giliomee and Schlemmer [1989:45-46] as one of a 
group of young Afrikaners who adapted the neo-Calvinist ideal of 
Kuyper which sought the ''mobilization of Afrikaners on the basis of. 
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race and culture and tried to bring the Afrikaners together' in ethnic 
institutions regardless of their religious beliefs and world-vi,ews 11 • 
Pottinger[1988:419] also refers to Meyer as a "Nazi sympathizer 11 • 
Both these men were seen as right-wing or 1 verkramp 1 [see Serfontein 
1970:29-30 and Davies, 1984:417] which indicated the ideological 
onslaught the SABC would face. Until now, this had been resisted as 
far as possible by Gideon Roos. 
It was evident that with the conflict that had emerged between Gideon 
Roos and the government in the pre-Hertzog/Meyer days, the atmosphere 
could only deteriorate further under these new personalities. This 
became even more apparent in attempts by Meyer to extend his 
-influence beyond that of his official position through a two~pronged 
attack that had as its aim, increased authority for the chairman and· 
the removal of Roos as Director General. In 1959, Meyer created a new 
post of •executive chairman'' which gave him 11 not only control of 
legislation in the corporation, but overriding administrative and 
executive powers 11 • [Wilkens and Strydom, 1978:128]. 
The Broadcasting Act of 1960: 
These events were coupled with the introduction of the Broadcasting 
Amendment Act, No.49 of 1960 that 11 gave the Board of Governors of the 
SABC iQcreased powers of control of its affairs and of the 
interpretation of its function" [Survey of Race Relations, 1959-
1960:260] through 11 the appointment of advisory councils and 
committees. The board was given a free hand to do any such thing 
which in the opinion of the board may be necessary or incidental to 
the att~inment of its objects 11 • [Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:59-
60]. 
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Governmental justification for the introduction of these amendments 
were based on a subjective interpretation of the Reithian philosophy 
to the effect that 11 Lord Reith had recommended that that the Board be 
placed in such a strong position ... because he' (Reith) felt that it 
should be a strong organization which could discharge heavy 
responsibilities resting upon it in a responsible manner''. [Mr. M.C. 
Botha in Hansard, 1960:5000. See also Hertzog in Hansard, 1960:7582]. 
Whilst Reith had accepted the considerable influence of broadcasting 
" and warned against its misuse, he nevertheless would not have 
approved of the development of such a close relationship between the 
SABC and the ruling elite. 
However, the key point to note in this legislation is the 
authoritarian power held by the Minister (Albert Hertzog) 11 to make 
all the executive appointments in the corporation and that in terms 
of the Act, the Governor-General, acting of course on the advise of 
the Minister, may remove from office any Governor who has not 
--
complied with the conditions of his appointment 11 • [Mr. D. Waterson, 
United Party MP in Hansard, 1960:4989]. 
This legislation therefore, would indicate the increasingly symbiotic 
relationship between the Government and the Board as well as their 
close relationship with the Broederbond. Here, increased power to the 
SABC Board simply reflected greater and more direct control by the 
responsible Minister thus initiating 'self-policing• and internal 
1 gatekeeping 1 within the SABC which saw government policy merge with 
that implemented by the SABC. [see Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 
1989:60. See also Hansard, 1960:4982-5011]. 
In practical terms though, the legislation of 1960 was largely aimed 
at establishing a Bantu Programme Control Board to administer the 
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African language services. This was seen by Albert Hertzog as a 
11 sensible policy to establish a service for the Native in South 
Africa which will inspire him, which will link him to our 
civilization, and which will make him favourably disposed towards the 
White man who is living with him in South Africa 11 • [Hansard, 
1959:7221]. 
The Emasculat;on of G;deon Roos: 
With this legislation in place, it was evident that the Government 
had the fullest confidence in Piet Meyer as Chairman of the Board and 
were able to support him financially which later resulted in a 
dramatic improvement in the finances of the SABC. Meanwhile, the 
position of Gideon Roos was being further emasculated as was any 
political independence the corporation may have had by Meyer who had 
subsequently become Chairman of the Broederbond. 
In 1961, Meyer appointed J.J. Kruger, a Broederbonder and confidant 
of Prime Minister Verwoerd, to the position of "cultural advisor 11 • 
His duties included 11 the writing of weekly political commentaries" 
[Orlik, 1978:60] under the title 11 The South African Scene" which 
11 provoked a public and parliamentary. outcry against the slanting in 
the SABC 11 • [Strydom and Wilkens, 1978:129. Also see Hoagland, 
1973:48-50 for detailed description of Kruger.] 
) 
Perhaps the most sinister description of Kruger's function within the 
SABC was that provided in parliament by Dr. Wilson of the United· 
Party. He described Kruger's role as 11 apparently there to sift 
broadcasts and news-services, so that they should have a pro-
Government and pro-republican slant 11 resulting in 11 pure and 
unadulterated Nationalist Party propaganda 11 • [Hansard, 1960:7568]. 
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Wilson [Hansard, 1960:7521] went on to highlight examples of pro-
National ist propaganda emphasizing the emerging shift away from 
impartiality and the use of a multitude of daily newscasts as "an 
' 
opportunity for mass indoctrination and the slanting of news". When 
faced with criticism of this programme, Director of Programmes, 
Douglas Fuchs said, "I think it needs to be made clear that 
impartiality is a fine thing, but are there no limits to its 
application"? [Argus, 21/10/1963]. 
Kruger's views were unconvincingly defended by Gideon Roos [see 
Wilkens and Strydom, 1978:129] by saying "just as in World War II, 
the duty to support authority transcends the confines of party 
politics ... the SABC is not involving itself in party politics, but is 
doing what is undoubtedly a duty 11 • [Survey of Race Relations, 1959-
1960:262]. Indeed this shows Roos 1 s loyalty t~ his position within 
the organization although as events were to unfold, his loyalty was 
insufficient for the ruling National Party. 
Roos had to suffer the further indignity of having much of his duties 
redistributed to new specialist appointees, the majority of which 
were Broederbonders such as Mr. J.N. van der Walt in administration, 
Mr. J.N. Swanepoel in finance and Mr C.D. Fuchs in programmes. [see 
Wilkens and Strydom, 1978:129]. This resulted in 11 Roos 1 s position 
being gradually whittled away to the point where it was the Board of 
Governors that held the real power with its chairman, rather than the 
apolitical Director-General, the real head of Broadcasting". [Orlik, 
1978:61]. 
Roos resigned from the SABC - his position falling away with Meyer 
assuming ultimate responsibility - on Republic Day 1961. He had been 
in charge of only the commercial and external services which were of 
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secondary importa~ce due .to the lack of development of a FM service. 
Upon resigning, Roos is quoted (in his own words) to have told Piet 
Meyer that 11 he (Meyer) would destroy a 11 I had built up, I did not 
want to be a member of a demolition squad. The SABC should serve all 
the people. It should have no editorial policy of its own 11 • 
[Harrison, 1981:207]. 
The Sunday Times of April 16 1961, in commenting on Roos's 
resignation stated that 11 the Government and the Broederbond have won 
their four year struggle to get rid of Mr. Gideon Roos. With his 
departure, the last obstacle has been removed for the control of 
broadcasting in South Africa to fall completely into political 
hands 11 • [Wilkens and Strydom, 1978:128. See also Hayman and 
Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:62]. 
It was an ironic choice of day to resign as it had been the Republic 
referendum that had exacerbated National Party control of 
broadcasting. The establishment of the Repu,blic on 31May1961 saw 
yet further reason on the part of the Nationalists to use 
broadcasting for their own ends and is admitted in a speech in 
parliament ·by Nationalist MP, Andries Treurnicht who stated that 11 our 
new system of government will definitely make its mark on, the 
SABC ... and we should like to see the SABC propagating that concept (a 
republic) in South Africa and in our whole national life 11 • [Hansard, 
1961:5723]. 
It should be noted that in this time period there were a considerable 
amount of other senior staff resignations from the SABC that included 
Colin Neilson, Percy Baneshik and Frank Douglas with the Jan Burger 
column in the Cape Times [31/10/1961] concluding that 11 in the process 
of deciding what is good for South Africa, the SABC has lost its 
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Director General, several senior administrative men as well as a 
whole corps of announcers and programme makers". 
Burger goes on to ask 11 if the SABC is impartial, why were all these 
men of one political persuasion? Why did the great smelling out start 
immediately after the Nationalists had appointed a propaganda chief 
(Kruger) for the SABC?" Indeed, E.G. Malan quotes Michael Fox on his 
resignation as saying, "I am distressed at the trend of staff 
administration and the manner in which news is presented 11 • [Hansard, 
1962:7310]. 
The Practice of Gross Authoritarianism: 
There can be little doubt that the demise of Roos.coupled with the 
aforementioned resignations paved the way for the ruling elite to 
assert their own ideology to a considerably greater degree. With 
Verwoerd as Prime Minister, it was obvious that the ideology would 
filter through the state controlled mass communications system. 
Indeed, the late fifties through to the middle sixties was a time of 
the concretization of the Afrikaner Nationalist 1 s policies which 
included the development and demarcation of the Homelands as well as 
the practical application of separate development. Verwoerd 1 s 
authoritarian style of governing was therefore certain to extend to 
the powerful mass medium of broadcasting. However, this_ was not 
without some protest from the public with the Black Sash launching a 
petition campaign aimed at highlighting the emerging political bias. 
[see Hertzog in Hansard, 1962:7389 and Orlik, 1978:62]. 
News policy best highlighted this new shift with official SABC 
directives that "the broadcasts of messages likely to cause 
despondence and alarm should not be broadcast" nor should news that 
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11 is likely to incite or inflame public opinion". [Cape Times, 
31/10/1961]. 
The head of the SABC news services, Mr. Gert Fourie stated 11 we do not 
broadcast threats to protest, strike or boycott. Such news as there 
will be a general strike by Natives in a week's time must not be 
broadcast. We wo~ld be helping in the commission of a crime'1 • [Cape 
Times, 31/10/1961]. These sentiments further highlighted the control 
paradigm into which the news programmes of the SABC were increasingly 
' ' 
falling. 
In further highlighting SABC news policy, Harvey Tyson [Argus, 
14/10/1963] quotes Piet Meyer as saying 11 that news was being 
presented objectively, impartially and fully, always bearing in mind 
that it must show a South African character. We feel that it is our 
duty to keep the public informed of the ~angers that beset us from 
inside and outside our borders 11 • Tyson argues that these statements 
suggest that 11 the news is not to be broadcast as news. It is shaped 
to show a South African character. It is selected dutifully to inform 
us of the dangers that beset us 11 • [see also Race Relations Survey, 
1962:49 for the SABC attitude to-Helen Joseph as example]. 
Harvey Tyson articulated the very definite ideological shift within 
the SABC when he stated that 11 an actual change in principles; in 
policy, and in practice can be noted clearly and more or less 
objectively. And the SABC certainly has changed! How much in the 
space of five years will surprise most of us - for we have 
unconsciously leant over to accommodate a new kind of broadcasting 
done in the name of 11 patriotism 11 but for the sake of a political 
cause 11 • [Argus, 07 /10/1963]. 
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Tyson's remarks mainly applied to news broadcasts and those of the 
·aforementioned J.J. Kruger. However, programmes entitled, ~The 
Infiltration of Communist Doctrines in. South Africa and its 
Subversive Activities"; "The Challenge of our Time" which according 
to the SABC would deal with ''values which distinguish our way of life 
and set it above that presented by communism" and a later series 
called "Know Your Enemy" all contained similar characteristics. News 
commentaries presented by Ivor Benson [see SABC Annual Report, 
1963:6] were also slated with Benson being accused in the press of 
"misrepresentation and of using the medium for propaganda purposes". 
[Survey of Race Relations, 1963:280 and 1965:49]. 
The SABC justified these programmes as being an essential element of 
"promoting and encouraging the survival and heritage of our Republic" 
and saw them as "exhaustive, balanced and truthful" and en stir i ng that 
"broadcasting is not abused to undermine the safety of the country or 
to promote the revolutionary intentions inside or outside the 
country's borders". [Survey of Race Relations, 1963:279]. Indeed, if 
such a justification exist~ for the aforementioned programmes, it is 
clear to see the close relationship between the defining of the enemy 
of the State and that propagated by the SABC indicating the extent of 
the symbiotic relationship that existed. 
This shift in news poli~y away from the attempted neutrality of Roos 
should be seen as the real beginnings of the autocratic 
categorization of the formal news broadcasts by the SABC. The 
manipulation and interpretation of the news as per the ruling elite 
was put into motion in this era and continues in the contemporary 
era. 
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In particular, this shift may be seen as the awakening of the ruling 
elite to the fact that a medium as powerful as that of broadcasting 
was able to a large extent to provide the electorate and specifically 
the English speakers with a clear alternative and counter to the 
views propagated by the liberal English press. This occurred at a 
time of increased political tensions caused by the aforementioned 
Verwoerdian policies. 
In particular, the continued attempts to win over new English 
speaking converts to the the Nationalist cause seemed a priority for 
M~yer. In the 1963 SABC Annual Report, Meyer reports that uthe chief 
attribute of the SABC's programmes throughout the year ... was the 
rapid elimination of previous tensions between the English and 
Afrikaans speaking groups ... with the SABC reflecting in its 
programmes the increased parity of thought, action and sentiment of 
these two equal cultural components of one White Christian-Western 
African nation, bound together by the same loyalty, outlook, aims, 
·ideals and aspiration~, in respect of their only fatherland, the 
Republic of South Africa 11 • [1963:5]. 
Meyer's speeches to the Broederbond [Wilkens and Stryd~m, 1978:134] 
held in secret further emphasized the need for the ucomplete 
political nationalizing and eventual cultural Afrikanerizing of our 
English-speaking co-citizens 11 with the objective being upolitically 
of permanent value, ensuring the continued existence of the 
Afrikaner, only if it is coupled with the Afrikanerizing of the 
economyu. 
Indeed, according to Lipton [1985:304], Meyer argued that uthe 
Afrikaners were the only true South Africans, and that the English 
must be Afrikanerized before they can be accepted as equalsu. These 
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sentiments highlighted the world view of Meyer as ethnocentric in the 
extreme. This necessitates authoritarian controls in order to bolster 
and maintain ideological dominance. 
Technological Developments: 
The middle sixties also saw an imporiant technical shift in the 
services offered by the SABC. Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli [1989:64-65] 
reports that for some time "there had been a perceived need to 
disseminate the dominant ideology in selective 'discourses' through 
separate channels for various language groups (with a system) which 
could segregate the audience according to· the categorizations of 
race, ethnic group and language which characterized the apartheid 
ideology" .. It was therefore timeous that such political goals could 
be achieved' with the utilization of new technology such as the 
development of high clarity but localized Very High Frequency 
(VHF)/Frequency Modulation (FM) broadcasts .. [see Hayman and 
Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:64-67 and Orlik, 1974:143-145]. 
With the introduction of FM broadcasts that encompassed not only 
regionalized multiple Black language services such as Radio Xhosa in 
the Cape and North Sotho in the Transvaal, but also regional services 
for Whites such as Radio Good Hope· (Cape) and Highveld (Transvaal), 
the authorities were able to "provide South Africa's Black population 
with multicultural and pervasive programming via low-cost 
transistorized FM portables''. [Orlik, 1974:144]. 
This new technology which was characterized by low operational costs, 
battery power as opposed to electricity and lack of short-wave 
capabilities resulting in listeners being prevented from receiving 
many short-wave broadcasts that were increasingly broadcasting anti-
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Nationalist programmes~ This enabled the Nationalists to pursue their 
double iri~entions of promoting Apartheid and preventing the 
audibility of foreign short-wave broadcasts. [see Hayman and 
Ru_th Tomaselli, 1989:65]. 
Radio Bantu ~nd the other Black services were est~blished throughout 
the 1960 1 s and were administered by a "Bantu Advisory Board" that 
consisted of prominent Breeders [Morris, 1976:86]. This was seen by 
Heribert Adam [1971:106] as 11 one of the most powerful tools of social 
control over the urban African apart from legal impositions 11 which 
even resulted in the SABC establishing a number of additional 
services to "remote groups in South West Africa". 
It should also be noted that the political content of these services 
were mainly directed at promoting the 'homelands' concept and 
entailed broadcasting programmes like "Today in the Transkeian 
Parliament" as well as programmes that "demonstrate the 'might of the 
White man' as in space flight~- and moon landings". [Adam, 1971:107-
108]. 
However, whilst these services largely concentrated on entertainment 
programming, the political views presented were those of the 
government. Butler [1977:82] found that even though there is a strong 
pro- 1 homeland 1 bias, the service was, and is so tightly controlled 
that even homeland leaders were rarely themselves interviewed. 
It was therefore apparent that with the positioning of syIDpathetic 
staff, the adaptation of new technology and the differentiation of 
channels, the SABC was well on its way to furthering the policies and 
ideology of the ruling elite. 
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Indeed, it had become more public in its objectives as its 1965 
Annual Report stated,_ "To a neutrality urge which could jeopardize 
the security and well considered interests of the country and the 
people, the Board of Governors conceded nothing more than might be 
expected from a South African institution occupying the strategic 
position of the SABC. It is firmly convinced that the Corporation is 
obliged to serve this country and its population groups in spite of 
limited but vociferous movements serving aims that undermine and 
ultimately destroy the happiness, prosperity and future of our 
'I 
country 11 • [1965:4]. 
The 11 Current Affairs" Programe: 
The above view was perhaps most pervasively argued through the 
"Current Affairs 11 programmes of the SABC that had been broadcasting 
since the early sixties. The programme was of five minutes duration; 
was presented by 11 an anonymous speaker 11 [Survey of Race Relations, 
1966:32] and was broadcast during the prime-time early evening and 
morning hours·on both the English and Afrikaans radio services. 
Written by the Editor of the pro-Nationalist Vaderland newspaper, 
this programme is described as 11 indulging in personal abuse of 
opponents of apartheid both in South Africa and abroad" [Ainslie, 
1966:164] and engaging in "deliberate distortion and an actual 
untruth''. [Mr. E.G. Malan in Hansard, 1966:2410 and 2408-2410]. 
The SABC, in its Annual Report of 1965, referred to this programme 
as the "leading article of the air" and justified its existence by 
I 
claiming that "it stands to reason that in the same way as newspapers 
have the right and the duty to reflect everything that goes on in the 
radio world, and to do so critically, so also the radio has the right 
and the duty to reflect everything that happens in the newspaper 
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world and to do so critically 11 • [1965:35]. 
This obvious reference to the South African English language press 
was clarified in a debate in parliament where Albert Hertzog 
suggested that these newspapers ''had over the years published slanted 
news ... and.the 'Current Affairs 1 programme could bring home to the 
English-speaking people of South Africa the true facts in regard to 
the news''. [Survey of Race Relations, 1966:63. See also Hansard, 
1966:2477-2480 for text of Hertzog's speech.]. 
These sentiments clearly indicated the admission on the part of the 
ruling elite to use broadcasting in combating the English press. 
Indeed, the use of the 11 Current Affairs'' programme may be seen as the 
most outstanding example of the creeping authoritarianism that was 
pervading the SABC. The 11 Comment 11 programme reflected purely the 
views of the ruling party and allowed no right to reply thus 
highlighting the development of the 11 top down 11 approach to news and 
public affairs broadcasting. 
External Broadcasting - Radio RSA: 
It should also be noted that the broadcasting controllers did not 
just stop with domestic programming. Although engaging in somewhat 
primitive 11 external 11 short-wave broadcasts in the early sixties, 1966 
saw the launching of a full external service known as 11 The Voice of 
South Africa". [see Indaba, August 1986:14]. 
There had already been speculation in 1965 that the service would be 
another pro-Nationalist vehicle with the United Party highlighting 
this in parliament. [see Hansard, 1965:6477]. Ainslie [1966:163] also 
predicted that this service ''is unlikely to contribute to peace in. 
Africa, for the SABC is now an unashamed mouthpiece of ~he extremist 
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Nationalist Secret Society, the Broederbond 11 . 
However, it should be noted according to 0(lik [1974:146], that at 
this juncture, 11 Radio RSA 1 s offerings remain largely apolitical save 
for the clearly labeled. 1 Comment 111 and pro-Western/anti East Block 
stories 11 . Ju 1 i an Hale a 1 so remarked on the discrepancy between th.e 
biased radio coverage within South Africa as opposed to-the more 
11 moderate 11 tone of the external service. He explains this apparent 
contradiction by saying, 11 internally the racist line must not be 
allowed to flag. Externally, the best impression to give is one of 
sweet reasonableness •.. a tactical opportunistic policy of soft-
sell11. [Hale, 1975:87]. 
By the late s~xties, Piet Meyer had been able to install many of his 
close confidants (all Broederbond members) to positions of authority 
at the SABC. Especially prominent were the past Directors General, 
Jan Swanepoel, Dr. Jan Schutte and Steve De Villiers which further 
entrenched Broederbond control. 
Indeed, the Broederbond already had considerable direct influence 
over the SABC as was highlighted through the public defence of the 
secret organization over the airwaves in 1963 following press 
criticisms. The Broederbond and above all, right-wing Afrikaner 
Nationalists had succeeded in whittling away any vestiges of 
neutrality from the Roos era and had replaced this with an 
authoritarian style that purely promoted the ruling ideology. [see 
Serfontein, 1979:215 and Wilkens and Strydom, 1978:276-277]. 
3.4 THE TELEVISION DEBATE: THE END OF THE HERTZOG ERA - 1968-1976 
It is important to note that the late sixties was a period of intense 
in-fighting within the ruling National Party. With the battle of the 
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1 ve\ligtes 1 and 'verkramptes' gaining momentum, political change 
seemed forthcoming. Indeed, as has been shown; when political change 
· occurs, it is filtered through to the broadcasting institutions due 
to the symbiotic relationshi·p between them. 
Objections to the Introduction of Television: 
Therefore, with the SABC described as containing the 11 most 
reactionary elements of the NP 11 and being 11 a major base for the 
extreme right in the Afrikaner Nationalist class alliance'' [Davies, 
1974:416], it is not surprising that objections to the introduction 
of television were motivated by ideological considerations. Indeed, 
other than the broad characteristics of the corporation as 
highlighted, the key issue that emphasized the role of the 
personality and his world view within the SABC (and the resulting 
authoritarian broadcasting orientation) was that pertaining to the 
introduction of television. 
Debates in parliament in the early fifties note that there was 
already at.this stage considerable resistance to the introductfon of 
television. Hertzog's predecessor, JFJ Serfontein stated in 1954 that 
11 television in the union cannot be regarded as a necessity and the 
view is held that its introduction should be postponed until capital 
that is at present required for more urgent works of national 
importance, can be made availible for the undertaking". [Hansard, 
1954:4983]. 
However, in 1963, Albert Hertzog's objections [Hansard, 1963:6525] 
were based on his views that "the child who looks at television 
throughout the day gradually becomes retarded (and) no longer is the 
leader in his area; he feels inferior and at best is only a follower. 
99 
It is very important to us in South Africa that the White nation 
should be the leaders and remain the leaders". 
Hertzog also feared that the Bantu would "crowd around the few sets 
which there are and they will witness the commission of crimes; they 
will learn how to evade the police" [Hansard, 1963:6526] and that 
"television has become, in the Western world, the greatest destroyer 
of the family". [Hansard, 1964:6611]. 
The question of the introduction of television dominated 
parliamentary debates on broadcasting during the latter half of the 
sixties. Indeed, television became one of the most polarized 
political issues in debates between the National Party and the United 
Party that even led to the the UP using as a slogan on one ~f its 
election posters, "If you want TV, Vote UP. 11 • [Hansard, 1966:2468]. 
Governmental resistance continued with television being referred 11 in 
its present form (as) a threat to religion" [H.D.K. Van Der Merwe, 
in Hansard, 1967:5279]. Albert Hertzog [Hansard, 1967:5296] even 
invoked - his fear of the effect of Blacks viewing commercials as this 
would 11 create a situation ... where the Black man is going to be 
dissati~fied and is going to blame the White man for his 
dissatisfaction ... that will make the position of the White man in 
South Africa extremely difficult" and would "mean the end of the 
White man in Africa 11 • [Hertzog in Adam, 1971:108]. 
Hachten [1979:62] therefore states that there were three main reasons 
for the delay and resistance to the introduction of television. These 
were 11 a threat to the Afrikaans language and culture because of the 
expected heavy dependence on American and British-produced programs; 
the potential psychological and political impact of television on 
urbanized blacks ... and the possible undermining of traditional values 
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and morals of Afrikanerdom and its Dutch Reformed Church". Similarly, 
Heribert Adam [1971:106] succinctly argues that the delay of 
television was ''an attempt to preserve an isolationist puritan 
Afrikaner way of life in the cultural sense, but to maintain the lag 
in political information on which its domination largely rests". 
It should also be noted that whilst the Calvinistic 1 Weltanschauung 1 
[see the McCrone's isolationist 'Frontier' theory, 1957] predominated 
in providin~ anti-television motivations, Hachten [1979:62] 
importantly points out that existing technology was insufficient and· 
only with the establishment of microwave relays and an FM network in 
the 1960's did South Africa "have the telecommunications 
infrastructure to broadcast nationally". This saw a lack of 
technology quite timeously complementing ideological reasoning. 
The National Party Split - Hertzog's Resignation: 
Given these facts, it was evident that with the downf~ll of Hertzog 
resulting fro~ the split in Afrikanerdom in 1969, change was in the 
air. Not only did arch right-winger Hertzog resign from th~ National 
Party and the SABC; he also went on to form the Herstigte Nasionale 
Party (HNP) with a number of other right-wingers who were expelled 
from the National Party in opposition to the limited reform of 
certain areas of petty-Apartheid legislation. His insistence over the 
previous decade that television should not be introduced in South 
Africa went with him. 
What was surprising, in view of the apparent close bond between 
Hertzog and Piet Meyer, is that Meyer himself, remained in his 
position of SABC Director General. Indeed, it would seem that Prime 
Minister Vorster concluded a number ·of deals with both the 
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Broederbond and Meyer with Davies [1984:418] suggesting that the deal 
would be aimed at ''skillfully using the arch-verkrampte Meyer and the 
SABC in an extended witch-hunt against the HNP 11 which in turn could 
have resulted in Vorster returning the favour by allowing Meyer to 
stay on in his position. 
It should also be emphasized that at this time, Meyer had 11 entrenched 
himself with yes-men and Broeders .•. leaving nothing undone to secure 
the Broederbond's position for ever and ever in the SABC 11 [Wilkens 
and Strydom, 1978:131-132] which left E.G. Malan of the United Party 
to comment in parliament that "the SABC is an organization which is 
dominated by the Broederbond hierarchy. It is heedless of control. It 
is reckless in its irresponsibility. It is a gross example of a 
monopoly gone berserk 11 • [Hansard, 1969:2836]. 
Television Approved - The Meyer CoD1Dission: 
With the downfall of Albert Hertzog, public pressure on the 
government for the introduction of television continued to mount. 
This was precipitated by the fact that about 600 million viewers 
(outside South Africa) watched the moon landing in 1969 
[Argus:28/07/1969] as television ha~ become an established norm in 
more than 100 countries world. [see Hansard, 1971:8245]. 
Threats that the United Party would use this issue in the 1971 
General Election [Argus:28/07/1969] may have also influenced 
government thinking. Hachten, however, states that the about-turn 
came as a result of 11 the Nationalist government and the SABC becoming 
convinced that they could control the new medium for their own 
purposes, both by avoiding its negative features a~d by using it as a 
political tool 11 • [Hachten and Giffard, 1984:209]. 
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Piet Meyer was appointed by th~ State President as Chairman of the 
Commission to look into the feasibility of the introduction of 
television. Meyer was naturally also party to current Broederbond 
thinking that the introduction of television would be useful 11 if a 
sympathetic Nationalist Government introduces such a service (rather) 
than to leave it over for a possible, later non-National Government 11 • 
[Wilkens and Strydom, 1978:281]. This realization was also prompted 
by pressure from the Afrikaans press and prominent Afrikaners like 
Professor J.B. Du Tait and Dr. D.W. de Villiers who felt that the 
introduction of television was necessary. [see Argus:27/07/1969]. 
The fundamental belief of the Meyer Commission's report was that 
"Communication between people is essentially a fourfold process 
embracing entertainment, information, enculturation and creative 
enrichment of the mind 1n a variety of forms 11 .[1971:8]. Importantly, 
the Commission saw communication as a ·process of "education and 
instruction".[1971:8]. This implied an authoritarian media 
orientation where instruction would follow a 'trip - down' approach 
based upon the ideology of the ruling elite. 
The Meyer Report dispelled many of the earlier Herzog objections to 
the introduction of television. This was accomplished by the emphasis 
~f controlling the television service just as was done regarding 
radio. The Commission oelieved that "the main concern is not the 
medium but the way in which the medium is used and controlled by 
man 11 .[1~71:15]. In a further clause, the commission stated that 
11 television can be controlled just as effectively as and as easily as 
radio, for example. It all depends on whether society institutes 
effective control measures and always accepts responsibility for the 
exercise of such control.[1971:15] 
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With such control as the vital incentive behind the introduction of 
television, the Commission argued for the positive roles as reasons 
for the introduction of television. In the report; Piet Meyer 
suggested that 11 South Africa must have its own television service in 
order to nurture and strengthen its own spiritual roots, to foster 
respect and love for its own spiritual heritage and to protect and 
project the South African way of life as it has developed here in its 
historical context 11 • [1971:17]. These sentiments may be read as 
serving that of the ruling elite. 
The Meyer Commission [1971:17] further believed that television would 
11 develop into a positive force in the religious, spiritual, cultural, 
social and economic life of the country and all its peoples 11 • 
Television was also seen as a vital enhancement of education in both 
a school and tertiary environment. This would be applied within the 
environment of 11 a mu lt i-nat i ona 1 and multi- 1ingua1 country 1 i ke 
South Africa to advance the self-development of all its peoples and 
to foster their pride in their own identity and culture''. Again, 
whilst pubJic and technological pressures promoted the introduction 
of television, the Meyer Commission clearly highlights the possible 
uses of this media form to strengthen the prevailing apartheid 
ideology. 
The Commission states in this regard that 11 the television service 
should be founded on such principles as will ensure the Christian 
system of values of the country, the national identity and the social 
structure of its various communities will be respected, preserved, 
. strengthened and enriched 11 • [1971: 15]. 
The desire to control this 1 new 1 form of broadcast media was echoed 
by the Broederbond who were far-sighted in their vision for a 
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television service that could be manipulated and restricted. The 
Broederbond placed an emphasis on controlling this new service to the 
benefit of 11 our Christian national outlook and lifestyle 11 • [Wilkens 
and Strydom, 1978:281]. The influence and power of the Broederbond is 
further highlighted by the fact that it was Meyer himself who 
reported back to the Broederbond before he reported to the Government 
or Parliament which is completely contradictory to established and 
accepted parliamentary procedures. [see Wilkens and Strydom, 
1978:281]. 
The question of television and the conditions for its implementation 
[see Wilkens and Strydom, 1978:279-280 and Hachten and Giffard, 
1984:209] that the then Minister of Posts and Telecommunication~, Mr. 
M.C. Van Rensburg laid down, were discussed in depth at Broederbond 
meetings. This resulted in their approval for a ''distinctive South 
African television service ••. that will not be a pure replica of 
overseas services, but one that will by definition prevent all the· 
excessive and undesirable effects of overseas systems on particularly 
the morals of the population and particularly of the youth of the 
country 11 • [Wilkens and Strydom, 1978:280]. 
As far sighted as the Broederbond was, so was prominent academic, 
Francis Wilson. In an article in the Cap~ Times of 15 May 1969, he 
warned of the dangers of the SABC television service becoming a 
public corporation as 11 it enables party politicians to appoint a 
like- minded man to a position of great power within the Corporation 
and then, when those of differing views question the tendentious 
manner in which the Corporation is being used, the Government can 
evade all responsibility by declaring that the matter is beyond their 
control and that it would be improper for it to interfere 11 • 
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Wilson [Cape Times, 15/05/1969] added that "this method has great 
dangers in that it throws what should be an impartial institution 
into the midst of the political arena where it can be buffeted by the 
prevailing pressure groups". Indeed, the SABC had taken on the very 
characteristics that Wilson outlined which seemed to provide the 
corporation with the sufficient security through its authoritarian 
control to embark upon the introduction of television. 
The go-ahead,for the introduction of a full television service was 
granted for January 1976. The authorities had moved from a position 
of outright mistrust for the medium to a position where they felt 
that it could be introduced to benefit their own ideological needs. 
Indeed, a Nationalist parliamentarian, Dr. J.C. Otto [Hansard, 
1971:8225-8226], justified the state controlled introduction of 
television by quoting Dr. Verwoerd as saying in 1960 that ''television 
cannot be kept out permanently, but its introduction must wait until 
we are able to counter any of the possible evils which are being 
experienced e1sewhere". 
Or. Otto went on to add that "for the sake of the maintenance of our 
national integrity and of the preservation of the identity of every 
national group, of our traditional values and of our Christian morals 
and our spiritual level, it is absolutely necessary that television 
be controlled thoroughly and judiciously". [Hansard, 1971:8225-8226]. 
Throughout the early seventies Meyer was at pains to point out that 
the television service would "show nothing permissive and would not 
be given over to immature reformers who want to shock the public" 
'[Cape Times:21/ll/1973] and would "maintain and strengthen Afrikaner 
identity". [Cape Times:12/07/1974]. 
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Similarly so, SABC Director General, Douglas Fuchs, said that the 
SABC would be a "bulwark against revolutionary attacks" and perhaps 
I 
gave a further indication as to how the television service would 
marry with the ruling ideology by saying that "television makes 
people more conscious of their differences; In our television service 
we will try to place the accent of an own identity on all our 
people". [Cape Times:13/07/1974]. 
Indeed, as Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli [1989:72] highlight, "the 
introduction of multiple channels and specialized programmes for each 
of those channels tends automatically to reinforce and insulate 
whatever differences there are between various class fragments, thus 
retaining overall control in the hands of the controllers of 
broadcasting in particular and the hegemonic alliance in general". 
The introduction of television, therefore, would indicate the· 
maintenance and perpetuation of the apartheid policy by converting 
the legislative differentiation of groups into distinct broadcasting 
entities. 
In a strong directive to the English programme directors at the SABC 
which may be seen as an attempt to offset any attempts at English 
independence from these tight controls, a SABC brochure entitled 11 A 
Guide for the Production Staff" unambiguously concluded with the 
instruction "It should be remembered that programmes should follow 
Government policy, SABC policy and departmental policy 11 • [Rand Daily 
Mail:14/01/1975]. 
The Continued Control Over Radio and Fears for Television: 
In the years leading to the official switch-on of the television 
service, the regular characteristics of the SABC's radio services 
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remained. In unprecedented criticism of the 11 Current Affairs 11 
programme in 1974, the editor of Die Vaderland, Dirk Richard, 
lambasted the 11 Current Affairs 11 programme for •ioversteppi ng the mark 
and ignoring the right of people to reply 11 [Rand Daily 
Mail:06/12/1974]. 
He questioned the integrity of the news broadcasts which 11 left the 
impression that the selection (of news items) is made for a definite 
purpose ... and it appears that the SABC places a protective sheet over 
what listeners want and decides what is good for them 11 • [Sunday 
Times:Ol/12/1974]. 
Indeed, such criticism represented the first signs of traditionally 
pro-government supporters finding fault with the overtly one-sided 
political views expressed through the media and represented albeit on 
a very limited scale, a movement away from the authoritarian 
Verwoerdian legacy. 
Amidst criticism from the English Academy [see Rapport:15/12/1974] 
that the SABC has not appoin~ed an English speaker to the board of 
the SABC, was the anomaly of a lack of language parity and the 
resulting bias in favour of English programming on the commercial 
service of Springbok Radio. 
This resulted in some of the most vehement criticism from the 
Afrikaans press [see Die Burger:21/0l/1975] with Piet Meyer 
suggesting that 11 Springbok Radio had been started as commercial 
service to make money to support the English and Afrikaans services 
and it had never been envisaged that the time devoted to English and 
Afrikaans would be an issoe 11 • [Cape Times:21/01/1975]. 
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Indeed, this could be seen as the practicalities of economics having 
an effect on the ideal of complete language parity through increased 
commercial revenue commens~rate with English rather than Afrikaans 
programming - a problem that was later to be encountered with 
television. 
Another factor may have been the desire on the part of the SABC to 
keep the English speakers happy through the predominance of English 
on this service in order to elicit some form of political compliance 
from them. It should also be noted that many of the radio programmes 
produced were written and directed by British expatriates with much 
of this output emanating from the Durban studios of the SABC and thus 
being produced in English. 
Anomalies aside, the criticisms of SABC radio services were extended 
to fears of the characteristics of the forthco~ing television 
service. Rene de Villiers [Cape Times:15/03/1975] suggested that 
11 the SABC was the only State broadcasting system in the non-
communist, non-totalitarian world that unashamedly had become the 
mouthpiece.and apologist of the Government 11 and as a result of this 
South Africa' could 11 expect a bronze ox-wagon outlook with Current 
Affairs in brilliant technicolour when television was introduced". De 
Villiers [Hansard, 1975:2624] also quoted prominent playwright 
Etienne Leroux as saying ''Television will probably be a mirror of 
what the· radio has been 11 • [see Hansard, 1975:6343-6347 for 
forewarnings regarding the television service]. 
Such fears became a reality when the views of Nationalist 
parliamentarians such Barend du Plessis are analyzed. He clearly 
stated that ''we shall deal selectively with this service of distorted 
images which are stampeding us and we shall put them in perspective 
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for our listeners (and viewers). Then they begin to interpret and 
give their comment. The SABC decided for itself that it has a task in 
this connection". [Sunday Tribune:20/04/1975]. 
Such was the mistrust that Brian Page of the United Party pleaded in 
Parliament for an assurance that the television service would be 
"technically sound, informative, unbiased and objective for all time 11 
[Argus:21/05/1975]. In reply, the director of news services of the 
SABC, Kobus Hamman, said that "objectivity will not be a major 
consideration ..• what we intend doing is reflecting the news fairly", 
[Sunday Tribune:l0/08/1975] which can be coupled with the 
governmental view that it was necessary to "interpret, rather than 
merely reflect" the news. [see B.J. du Plessis in Hansard, 
1974:5007]. 
It can therefore be clearly seen that television was set to take on 
the authoritarian characteristics that had made radio in South Africa 
a bone of contention. The ruling elite, through their complete 
monopoly and resulting manipulation of the technology of radio and 
television programming were able to institute a multi-channel 
approach to broadcasting which enabled them to promote their policy 
of Apartheid or separate development. This was made possible through 
thi development of broadcasting technology that allowed the 
authorities to build a broadcasting infrastructure whilst 
simultaneously entrenching themselves politically and occupying key 
off ices of the bureaucracy. 
The ruling elite were by implication proponents of the ideology of 
the day. They ther~fore engaged in promoting that ideology through as 
many means as possible of which broadcasting was a major component. 
Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli [1989:70-71] suggest that there was a 
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"conscious attempt to establish the new SABC programming policy and 
organization as representing the national interest". 
Most importantly, this •national interest• was and still is that of 
the ruling National Party interest and it was through broadcasting 
that the ruling elite attempted to "maintain the divisions of 
culture, race and class in accordance with the Nationalist 
governments policy, thereby benefiting the the hegemonic alliance as 
a wholeu. [Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:71]. 
The •national interest• was one of the ruling elite; but it was more 
specifically that of those controlling the SABC like Piet Meyer, 
Albert Hertzog and Douglas Fuchs. Indeed, David Harrison reports that 
Fuchs' (Director General from 1972 to 1974) views on broadcasting 
were that, 11 We are at war. We are involved in the politics of 
survival. The SABC cannot stand aside. We cannot cast doubt on the 
rulers of the country. No useful purpose can be served by causing the 
public distrust of our leaders• policies". [Harrison, 1981:208]. 
It is these views - the views of the controllers - that were. the 
predominant ones over the airwaves. The controllers had gained almost 
unlimited power. Their ideology·was that of the ruling politicians 
and their vision was one that promot~d Afrikaner Nationalism as the 
sole legitimate ideology to be adopted by all to the virtual 
exclusion of others. This then, is the .authoritarian legacy inspir~d 
by the nee-Calvinist ethic [see Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989:42-44] 
that came to be the dominant feature of the political characteristics 
of the SABC. 
Having studied the historical process whereby South Africa entered 
the broadcasting age; harnessed new tec~nology in support of the 
ruling elite and moved to a highly emotive and politicised debate 
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The SABC today remains by far the most powerful broadcasting 
service operating within South Africa. Its diverse services reach a 
daily audience of many millions who also rely on the many news 
broadcasts to keep them abreast of local and foreign events. 
Indeed, news listening and viewing provide probably the most 
convenient form of information gathering for most people and it is 
this area of the SABC that has continually faced an ever increasing 
barrage of criticism that has touched upon the entire management of 
the corporation and has strongly questioned the legitimacy of the 
.broadcasting authority. 
This chapter will highlight the continuing authoritarian influences 
maintained from the historical example in Chapter Three by the 
dominant State-run SABC. Television has enjoyed its own unique 
relationship with the ruling elite resulting in the identification of 
many characteristics employed by the ruling National Party in order 
to seek compliance from this relatively new service. It shall be 
important to note and contrast these influences with the wider 
broadcasting system to be discussed in Chapter Five. 
The news and public affairs division of the SABC has in the 
contemporary period devoted itself to the dissemination of the views 
of the National Party. Newscasts have continually reflected the views 
and opinions of Nationalist cabinet ministers and have given 
proportionately greater lengths of time to the ruling National Party 
in virtual exclusion of other alternative political viewpoints. 
Coupled with this was ideological interference in documentaries and 
other.entertainment programming with directives from the controllers 
ruling the activities of the corporation as per the views of the 
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ruling political party. Such authoritarian interference in these 
selected areas of operations culminated in the contemporary period 
with a virtual direct order from the State President to remove the 
Director-General of the SABC of his post. 
Whilst since the late f~fties, there had been considerable opposition 
to the introduction of television in South Africa, 1976 heralded the 
beginning of a full television channel. This was to be a key year in 
the restructuring and development of broadcasting since this .country 
was one of the last advanced economies to receive a fully operational 
television service. 
With the approval of the Broederbond [see Chapter Three and Wil~ens 
and Strydom, 1978:280] and after some months of test transmissions 
in 1975, a television service was launched on 5 January 1976. This 
service (later known as TVl) was set to become South Africa's 
flagship broadcast media channel. High viewership fig~res were punted 
in order to gain sufficient advertising revenue to provide a 
selection of top entertainment mingled amohgst steady doses of 
•public affairs• or news programming. This channel was later 
supplemented with the Black language services of TV2 and TV3 and TV4 
which utilized the non-broadcast hours on the TV2 and TV3 transmitter 
network in i985. 
Indeed, having seen the increased governmental control that existed 
over the radio services of the SABC in Chapter Three, it is apparent 
that there was a great deal of continuity into the television era. 
This was also due to the 1 Broederbondization 1 of the SABC which had 
begun in the sixties and had extended to the point where by 1977, 
there were forty-nine Broedets in the SABC and by 1978 11 at least four 
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of the nine members of the Board of Management were members of the 
Broederbond". [Harrison, 1981:207]. It s~ould be noted that with the 
public and press exposure of the aims and activities of the secret 
Broederbond society in the late seventies, its influenca diminished 
in the years following the introduction of television. 
Keyan Tomaselli and Graham Hayman [1989:153-154] suggest that there 
were three key reasons for the introduction of television. Firstly, 
the rapidly developing communications technology meant that in order 
for the SABC'to retain as much control of the broadcasting system as 
possible, it would be necessary to provide the country with its own 
distinct broadcasting service in order to maximize control on 
programme output. 
Secondly, there was a movement from primary to secondary industry 
that also saw the convergence of the English and Afrikaans economic 
groups which increasingly were one in defending the ideology of the 
State - a convergence that could be promoted through the judicious 
use of the te1evision medium. 
The third reason was the emergence of a technological revolution 
that saw world wide development and deployment of low cost consumer 
electronics that could simply not be ignored by the local 
authorities. [see Tomaselli et al, 1989:153-154]. This highlights the 
de~ire on the part of the authorities to ~emain in control over the 
technology as well as the message broadcast as far as possible whilst 
simultaneously bowing to popular p~blic pressure for the introduction 
of television. 
The initial television service was made up of one single bilingual 
station that broadcast for five hours per evening divided equally 
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between the two official languages. The only truly bilingual 
television programme was the extended sports coverage broadcast on a 
Saturday afternoon. It should be noted that the refusal to split the 
single television station into two separate language channels meant 
that both language groups were largely forced to watch programmes in 
their second language. However, this also meant that the lack of 
bilingualism saw two virtually independent services operate side by 
side and often duplicate programmes. 
As the basis for all its broadcasting operations, the SABC adhered to 
the Broadcasting Act of 1936 which is a statutory act and was 
repealed and replaced in 1976 with the introduction of television. 
The 1936 act had as its basis the promulgation of the SABC as the 
sole 11 transmitter 11 and 11 broadcaster 11 in South Africa. [see the SA 
Yearbook, 1981:761]; The broadcasting license was further updated in 
1979 and its clauses indicate the close relationship the broadcasting 
authority enjoyed with the ruling elite as it was largely their. 
monopoly service. 
The updated act 11 provides that with due observance of the Christian 
character of the Republic, the Corporation shall broadcast its 
programmes: 
(a) to afford all the national communities of the Republic of 
South Africa the opportunity of achieving full self-realization 
within their own cultural and social spheres; 
(b) with due regard to the prevailing conventions and customs of the 
different national communities, to encourage and promote cordial-and 
sound relations between those communities; 
(c) to disseminate information, to entertain and to educate; and 
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(d) to report newsworthy current events in the Republic and abroad 
clearly, unambiguously, factually, impa~tially and without 
distortion. 11 
[from The Government Gazette, Notice 1249, 15 June 1979] 
The above ~lauses can therefore be seen to be a direct manifestation 
of government policy and its desire to contiol broadcasting and took 
·into account the_ pluralist policy adopted by the ruling National 
Party. Over and above these clauses were others that related to the 
maintenance of acceptable societal standards and values which guarded 
against broadcasts that were ''blasphemous, contained distasteful 
details of torture and pornography 11 • [Dalling, 1973:179-180]. These 
terms are also based upon the conditions for the television service 
as outlined by the .offi~ial Report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
Matters Relating to Television. [see Hachten and Giffard, 1982:209]. 
More importantly, however, was the inclusion within the broadcasting 
license of the followjng clauses that were open to considerable 
interpretation by the controllers of the corporation - namely the 
ruling National Party. The SABC was unable to broadcast material 
that: 
11 (a) is contrary to any rule of law; 
(b) may inflame public opinion or may directly or indirectly lead to 
any contravention of the law or may threaten the security of the 
State; 
(c) may cause unrest or panic; 
(d) may hamper any Government department in the execution of its 
duties; or 
(e) is calculated to damage the Republic's image abroad 11 • [Dalling, 
1983:180]. 
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From these conditions, it is clearly visible that any ruling body can 
interpret such clauses according to their own subjective political 
bias. The practical application of these conditions (as interpreted 
by the broadcasting authorities) are a reflection upon the external 
and internal political environment. It was therefore only natural 
that with the extensive control that the ruling National Party 
enjoyed over the broadcast media, their interpretation would become 
the order of the day at the SABC. It should be emphasized that 
similar conditions also apply to the broadcasting media outside South 
Africa and specifically to the asc which is ~ot specifically party or 
ideologically oriented. 
Indeed, the difference here is the National Party's subjective 
application of such clauses compared to the relatively objective 
employment thereof in the United Kingdom. It should also be noted 
that the conditional go-ahead given by the Broederbond for the 
introduction of television (as outlined in Chapter Three) was bound 
to manifest itself in the rules and charter governing the style of 
broadcasting as we11 as in the content of the broadcasts itself. 
National Party domination of the SABC is maintained through the board 
of the SABC (comprising between 5 and 15 members) being appointed by 
the South African State President who is also the leader of the 
dominant National Party. In 1987, there were fourteen members of the 
board all appointed by the State President as well as a presiding 
Chairman of the Board and the Director-General. 
In addition there exists a Management Committee which currently 
consists of the Director-General, three Deputy Directors general in 
charge of programmes, technology and finance as well as the Director-
118 
in-chief of News who have all been appointed by the board. Whilst the 
board is largely responsible for determining broadcasting policy, the 
Management Committee 11 determines policy and general strategies an~ 
guidelines for achieving corporate objectives". [from "The SABC 
Today", pp25}. 
These appointees adhere to the philosophy ( 11 Mission 11 ) of the SABC 
which, according to the SABC Annual Report [1988:1] desires to 
"inform, educate and entertain the differing cultural groups 
constructively 11 as well as 11 disseminate a positive message about 
South Africa and it's peoples". Such terms as 11 constructively 11 and 
11 positive 11 are seen by many critics of the SABC as value judgments 
and the implementation thereof will largely be determined by the 
conceptual understanding of the controllers of the corporation as 
defined by their governmental superiors. 
These stipulations must therefore always be taken into account when 
dealing with the politics of broadcasting in South Africa because the 
justification for the bias in favour of the ruling elite is largely 
based on the provisions of the charter and until this is changed, 
SABC political content is likely to remain intact. 
4.1 THE EARLY YEARS OF TELEVISION: 
Emerging Characteristics: 
It was within this context that the SABC introduced its television 
service at considerable expense. The minister o~ National Education · 
Piet Koornhof, under whose auspices the SABC fell, disclosed that by 
the end of 1976 the creation (capital costs) of TVl were about R70 
million with operating costs for that year totaling R36 800 000. 
[Argus:ll/02/1976]. This meant that at the beginning of 1976, the 
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SABC found itself facing a large debt although this did not deter the 
authorities. 
Already at this early stage, the control of the ruling elite 
regarding news reporting and public affairs programming became 
apparent. The SABC refused to provide the National Union of South 
Africa Students (Nusas) with the 11 right of reply 11 to certain 
allegations made by an opposing student organization through the 
evening television news broadcast. This refusal was confirmed by the 
then public relations officer, Hein Jordaan who stated that 11 it was 
not the corporation's policy to allow organizations or businesses 
equal TV time to comment on news bulletins 11 • [Argus:l7/03/1976]. 
This implied a rejection of the liberal 11 right to reply 11 value that 
is institutional within the broadcasting media of Democratic nations. 
Further evidence of this was a refusal to allow opposition political 
parties time to state their case regarding the 1976 budget with the 
Minister of Finance having the sole say 11 since he had presented the 
budget 11 • [Piet Koornhof in Cape Times:Ol/04/1976]. 
It was evident from this early stage that the television service 
would be used for official announcements from governmental ministries 
via their respective Ministers. Vause Raw of the United Party 
reporting that in one night 11 he had counted 11 Cabinet Ministers who 
had appeared durin~ television news bulletins''. [Argus:24/04/1976]. 
This was born out in a survey conducted by the Weekend Argus 
[12/06/1976] which found that 11 SATV news bulletins devoted more than 
80 percent of their political coverage to speeches and statements by 
Cabinet Ministers 11 • 
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A further characteristic of the television service came through its 
use of dom~stically produced news background/documeniar~ programmes 
that were shown outside that of official news bulletin times. These' 
included topics that praised the 1 homelandsi concept and were 
described in a Rand Daily Mail ed.itorial as 11 probably the most 
important and insidious aspect of the SABC programming 11 • [Rand Daily 
Mail:15/06/1976]. These programmes were later to be classified as 
I 
11 public affairs 11 programming and became a feature of the extended 
nightly 11 Network 11 news broadcasts. 
These early characteristics indicated that the new television 
broadcasting service was to be used to maintain the dominant view of 
the ruling order. In the debate on the Broadcasting Act of 1976, the 
SABC was accused of moving away from parliamentary accountability to 
direct governmental influence and interference. Indeed, Nationalist 
M.P. Barend Du Plessis admitted the party political bias of the 
corporation by stating that 11 it was only natural that if the board 
of Governors was appointed by the ruling party, it would reflect the 
feelings of the majority 11 • [Argus:31/03/1976]. 
As highlighted earlier, the Broadcasting Act made provision for the 
board of the SABC to be appointed by the Prime Minister (or later 
State President) but once this had been done, the government deemed 
that the board and therefore the SABC as a whole was autonomous and 
acted in a fair and unbiased fashion not being a party political 
instrument. Opposition·spokesmen mistrusted this governmental 
interpretation of the character of the SABC and there were continual 
calls for the establishment of 11 an independent committee to act as 
judge which would report to Parliament via the SABC and the 
responsible minister 11 • [Cape Times:31/03/1976]. 
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Such requests came at a time when the government spokesman, Piet 
Koornhof, had declared that he would 11 never allow politics on 
television 11 and dismissed any chance of holding political debates as 
was done in other major Western nations. The Cape Times, in 
commenting on Koornhof's statement, declared that it was only 
opposition politics that would be suppressed on the SABC and that 
Koornhof 11 was expressing one of the common illusions of primitive 
societies. This is the illusion that to suppress conflicting opinion 
is to achieve approval of the criticized policy 11 • [Cape 
Times:OS/04/1976]. This highlighted the reluctance on the part of the 
SABC and their controllers to broadcast programmes with politically 
controversial participants. 
An early feature of television programming was a lack of immediacy in 
reporting. This was due to a vetting process that took place before 
the respective news and public affairs programmes were aired to 
enable any editing to take place. This resulted in a 11 palace revolt 11 
at the SABC during the early part of 1976 that saw 11 programmes being 
produced as close as possible to viewing time to stop cutting and 
shelving of scheduled programmes 11 • [Sunday Times, 11/04/1976]. 
The early years were also characterised by a marked lack of Black 
faces on television screens justified by the continual reference to 
the planning and implementation of a separate Black language 
television station. There were also technical interruptions of the 
television services which were often manifest during news broadcasts. 
Public censure was also leveled at the content of programmes and for 
many years, the daily press was besieged by letters of complaint as 
to programme selections and content. Ray Wilson, head of television 
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presentation at Wits University attacked the ~l~ck of novelty and 
originalityn in the television service along with n1ack of apologies 
for breakdowns, indeed sometimes no acknowledgment at all that 
anything is wrong, is prevalentn. [Rand Da_ily Mail:07/01/1977]. 
It should, however, be noted that the service was in its infancy and 
too high a level of programme sophistication could not really be 
expected although the technically superior German PAL colour system 
was successfully introduced. 
Television came to South Africa late resulting in comparisons being 
drawn between the new service and the already very firmly established 
British and American examples - a comparison which in retrospect is 
unfair especially in the light of the SABC securing some of the 
world's best television programmes such as nRich Man Poor Mann, ·nrhe 
World at Warn and ncivilizationn in its first year of operation. 
However, in a scathing criticism of SABC policy, a former SATV 
children's programme producer, Desmond Bishop, whilst acknowledging 
an initial lack of experience and inherent difficulties within the 
medium itself, nevertheless ascribes the failure of the television 
service to live up to high standards to the fact that nsouth Africa 
is a taboo-burdened society (and) where legislation runs out, 
intimidation does the restn. [Argus:l0/03/1977]. 
Bishop goes onto to cite four key characteristics of the SABC that he 
encountered during his short spell at the corporation: 
n(l) In order for the Government to exercise its power, almost the 
entire superstructure of the SABC is in the hands of the Afrikaans 
section; 
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(2) An unwritten rule rule exists in the English Variety Department 
that no Black face is allowed to appear on the box more than once 
every three weeks; 
(3) The entire superstructure gives the Afrikaans children's section 
access to these facilities while no English programme has yet 
succeeded in being adequately supplied; 
(4) I was told that it was wrong for the scarecrow to make friends 
with the birds. The farmer expected him to 'shoo• the birds away and 
by making friends with them, he was undermining the authority of the 
farmer". 
[from Argus:l0/03/1977]. 
These generalized impressions correspond with those of William 
Hachten [1979:63] who mentions the use of television by the National 
Party as "a propaganda instrument that espouses the political goals 
and aspirations of Afrikanerdom". He also refers to the tight control 
over the news and public affairs programmes and the "avoiding of 
what it (the government) considers the distortions of the English 
language press". 
Indeed, the advent of a monopoly television station broadcasting 50% 
of its news in English must have been a tremendous incentive for the 
government to provide the necessary funds for the implementation of 
television as it was finally able to counter the anti-Nationalist 
sentiments of the English language press which had for so long been 
an irritant. 
The new television service was also seen as one that would "promote 
and protect the language and culture of the 2.6 million Afrikaners 
against the inroads of Anglo-American mass culture". [Hachten, 
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1979:63]. The perceived negative influences of foreign JOP culture 
was orie of the reasons for the long delay in ~he implementation of 
television in South Africa. 
Indeed, the question is whether the SABC can really be said to have 
effectively achieved this and therefore shielded its viewers from 
this "media imperialism" that was seen as threat to the Afrikaner•·s 
~ 
"traditional values and culture"? [Hacliten, 1979:63]. Already within 
the first year of television the SABC screened some of the world's 
most popular television programmes - much of which was violent in 
nature (crime/police shows such as 1 Kojak 1 and 'Columbo'). 
John Van Zyl, then a senior lect~rer in charge of radio, film and 
television studies at Wits University criticized the use of non-
controversial material aired nightly. Also highlighted after the 
first year of television was the use of ·innocuous documentaries on 
the sea; bland anti-communist documentaries resulting in a lack of 
any meaningful discussion; the doctoring of certain programmes and 
the "pyramid of accessu on news bulletins where the SABC interviews 
certain selected individuals "that can be relied upon to trot out 
obligingly the familiar bogeymen of communism, corrupt black 
governments and 'hypocritical 1 Western politicians". [Wilkens and 
Strydom, 1978:282]. 
Van Zyl added that these characteristics indicate "that behind every 
educational programme lies the paranoia of the Nationalist - that 
discussion will lead to the questioning of authority, the Word. 
revealed if not made flesh". [Star:OS/01/1977]. Also highlighted 
against the background of news emanating from the Soweto unrest is 
that "the greatest strength of TV is the immediacy - the fact of 
125 
simultaneity - that something is happening now and you are watching 
it.and this is seldom exploited by SABC-TV. Not just because of 
technical reasons but for ideological ones. Actual news is dangerous, 
it cannot be predigested and controlled 11 • [Star:05/01/1977]. 
It is perhaps noteworthy that whilst for many years, the only live 
programmes broadcast were those containing sports coverage, the-SABC 
shied away from the transmission of live television programmes (other 
than formal news broadcasts) as they had a 11 real fear of the 
informal, the unpredictable, and the random. The broadcasters always 
want to be in control of things••. [Hachten and Giffard, 1984:213]. 
Van Zyl [Star:05/01/1977] also highlights the subtle introduction of 
propaganda in programming when 11 the broadcast authority intervenes 
between the viewer and the process and filters away the process or 
event 11 • It is here that the authorities impose their world view where 
the SABC 11 cushions the viewer against too much reality 11 whilst 
providing a service that is 11 good, safe entertainment 11 • 
[Star:05/01/1977]. Similarly, Hachten [1979:65] has also 
characterised the early years of television in South Africa as being· 
11 bland, innocuous and safe - clearly intended to safeguard moral 
standards 11 • 
Van Zyl [Wilkens and Strydom, 1978:282] detects 11 several built in 
features that comment visually on the words spoken by the 
newsreader 11 • These included graphical representations shown as 
' . . ·. 
backdrops to the news reader on the nightly 20h00 news bulletin on 
TVl. These took the form of the hammer and sickle on a map of Angola 
as well as the use of graphic caricatures of Jimmy Carter and Fidel 
Castro which strongly contrasted with the pleasant depiction of Prime 
Minister Vorster. This was coupled with the over-exposure of selected 
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news commentators lending a visible bias to the news which tended to 
confuse commentary and opinion with the actual hard news facts. 
Hachten reports that minor controversies that emerge within the 
policy making at the SABC reveal much surrounding the character of 
the organization itself. In 1978, suggestions were made that the 
nightly five minute epilogue be periodically given by a Rabbi only to 
be told by a spokesman for the SABC, Retief Uys, that "South Africa 
being a Christian nation, only members of Christian denominations are 
invited to take part in regular religious programmesi1 • [Hachten and 
Giffard, 1984:212]. 
This religious bias coupled with the same political indic?tes, 
according to Van Zyl, that the SABC "gives a weird picture of the 
world - a self-centered view of South Africa as a badly misunderstood 
and wrongly persecuted little nation that is a bastion of Christian 
democracy". [Hachten and Giffard, 1984:213]. 
4.2 OVERT AND COVERT CONTROLS ON TELEVISION OUTPUT: 
Unrest Reporting: 
It should also be noted that whilst a ~ew form of broadcast media had 
been launched within South Africa, so had a new political climate 
whith also influenced the controllers of broadcasting. The political 
unrest of 1976, "obliged radio and television to adopt new approaches 
towards informing the public wi~hout falling into the trap·- as has 
happened so often in other parts of the world - of being an 
instrument for promoting .unrest and panic 11 • [SABC Annual Report, 
1976:15]. 
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Guidelines adopted by t~e SABC included 11 not explo.iting the dramatic 
potential of isolated· incidents in a manner that would lead to a 
distorted pictur~ 11 • [SABC Annual Report, 1976:15]. This resulted in 
unrest news down-played on television newscasts with very few visuals 
aired. 
The SABC also felt that 11 the opinion of the silent majority should be 
solicited in areas affected by disturbances and that the voice of 
reason should be made audible and that inciting utterances should be 
'I 
avoided". [SABC Annual Report, 1976:15]. This meant that those anti-
government activists were to receive little or no airtime whilst 
Blacks who supported the Government in its desire to quell the unrest 
should receive prominence. · 
These guidelines were justified by the SABC in "helping to avert the 
inducement of panic and emotional tensions" as 11 the story told by the 
camera in dramatic fashion frequently distorts the truth and fails to 
promote real ·understanding of a situation" whereas the SABC strives 
for 11 a conscious effort to establish a spirit of optimism and trust 
in the future 11 • [SABC Annual Report, 1977:11]. Hachten· [1979:69] 
quotes Giffard as saying that as a consequence of this policy, 
"anxious South Africans, assured by the SABC that all was quiet, had 
to read their morning newspaper to "find that all hell had broken 
loose the night before". 
These conditions for the reporting of unrest meant that it became 
necessary for certain producers (particularly those in the television 
services) to provide self-censorship in order to continue working 
for· the SABC and have their material broadcast. 
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' Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli [1989:111] quote an unnamed producer working 
within the SABC documentary department during the Soweto unrest who 
suggested filming a programme that would look at the causes of the 
unrest as well as the feelings of the people of Soweto only to be 
told by the SABC management, "Just keep your nose out of it, it 1 s got 
nothing to do with you. We don 1 t w~nt that kind of television 
coverage". 
The characteristics of SABC coverage of the Soweto uprisings were 
similar to the disturbances between 1984 and 1986. Virtually no 
visuals of violence were shown on the main evening newscasts with 
State of Emergency regulations forbidding the entry of foreign camera 
crews into the troub 1 e areas. This, according to Freder i'ck se [ 1986: 8] 
may be due to an inst~uction from PW Botha issued in 1980 "not to 
feature reports of the onslaughts on South Africa by revolutionary 
elements as main news items". 
Internal Production 11 Gatekeeping 11 : 
Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli [1989:116] cite censorship exercised by the 
Organizers of the English Magazine department within the SABC who, 
whilst 11 not actively promoting a pro-:Government standpoint, act as a 
barrier preventing producers from recording ideologically sensitive 
material on the one hand, while absorbing consensual discourse from 
upper management on the other hand translating this into 
organizational practice". This occurred particulalrly in relation to 
the magazine programmes of "Midweek", 11 Women Today" and 
11 Spectrum 11 .[see Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:115]. 
This provided a guide for producers to produce work that would be 
favourable to their immediate superiors or would simply not be shown 
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at all. This was publicly exposed when dismissed producer, Kevin 
Harris, reported before the Steyn Commission saying that "any 
prospective programme conflicting with Broederbond or National Party 
ideology was not broadcast". [Race Relations Survey, 1981-1982:98-
99]. 
Whilst governmental interference occured unevenly throughout the news 
and actuality programmes of SABC television, Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli 
[1989:116-120] cite clear examples of 11 post production interference 11 
by management in SABC television documentaries which included 11 Black 
Education 11 , 11 Under the Southern Cross 11 and 11 The Miner". Further 
extreme examples of meddling were to be found in the Donna Wurzel 
produced edition of 11 Woman Today 11 entitled 11 Maids and Madams 11 as well 
as the Kevin Harris produced documentary on Baragwanath Hospital. 
This type of criticism indicates that even though producers may be 
expected to tow the line, it is evident that many of those that have 
been employed by the SABC are indeed politically alien to the 
National Party and due·to pressures placed on their creativity may 
find it difficult to continue working. Dave Dalling [Hansard, 
17/02/1978:1293] quotes a source close to the SABC as describing 
interviewers and producers at the SABC conducting themselves 11 with 
their hands tied behind their backs. It is a castrated service 
produced by castrated producers 11 • 
It should also be noted that such self-censorship and the possible 
variables within the political views of employees of the corporation 
manifest themselves in the production of television programmes 
dealing with topical issues that often have to be altered at the last 
moment in order to comply with the views of the broadcasting 
authorities. 
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One of the most visible signs of such activity took place in 1981 in 
an interview with the visiting former British Prime Minister, Ted 
Heath on the foremost news actuality magazine programme, 11 Midweek 11 • 
The discussion dealt at length with the topical (and controversial) 
topic of the Nyanga Squatters near Cape Town but was heavily edited-
just before the p~ogramme was due to be aired. This resulted in the 
prime-time evening TVl schedule being completely adapted in order to 
accommodate late editing. In this particular instance, it was 
established that the producer of the programme was himself, unaware, 
of the editing and resulting cuts that were to made. [Sunday 
Times:l0/09/1981]. 
It is evident therefore, that the covert and overt controls of the 
output of broadcasting across the programme production sphere and 
particularly within the news/public affairs programmes are 
authoritarian in nature. The directive on the nature and contents of 
the programme is set from above (the controllers or •gatekeepers') 
with little chance of the alternative viewpoint being aired. The 
appointment of senior programme directors that are .ideologically one 
with the state lends further control to this scenario. 
) 
However, the influence of individual staff members can not be 
discounted and whilst they themselves may not follow the official 
party political line, they nevertheless are forced to comply. At the 
same time, this highlight the conflict between the broadcasting 
authorities and the producers indicating that whilst control may be 
effective, the personal involvement of anti-establishment producers 
and journalists affect complete control and compliance and may create 
important anomalies. 
131 
Such anomalies were evident again in the 11 Midweek 11 and 11 Spectrum 11 
magazine programmes as well as in the arts oriented "Portfolio" 
programme.[see Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:121]. On radio, the 
"Radio Today" programme has constantly broadcast(allbeit somewhat 
• 
limited) alternative viewpoints. These elements of opposition leave 
the door open for an examination of the contradictions within the 
broadcast media regarding the extent and nature of control. [see 
Chapter Five]. 
4.3 GENERAL ELECTION AND REFERENDA COVERAGE: 
Since the inception of television, there have been four general 
election or referenda campaigns in South Africa. The first, in 1977 
which was just over one year since the introduction of televi5ion, 
saw the ruling elite exert considerable influence on the SABC and it 
was clearly discernible that election·coverage and manipulation 
thereof would be one of the most useful aspects of the broadcast 
media to the ruling National Party. 
When dealing with an election within a democratic society, the 
expectation is created that the voting public be free to elect and 
compose the government of their choice whether it be the same as 
before or totally changed. This implies that all participating 
political parties would be entitled to fair· and balanced coverage in 
order to provide the public with the most accurate picture possible. 
Indeed, Brian Page of the New Republic Party stated in 1981 that 
"after all, the idea of an election is that all parties have an equal 
chance and therefore should all be given equal time on television". 
,[Hansard, 18/09/1981:4186]. However, in the four national polls 
(including the 1983 Referendum) since the introduction of television, 
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the reality has shown otherwise. 
The 1977 General Election: 
This election saw a number of informal surveys conducted by various 
newspapers in order to gauge the the SABC party political coverage 
during the campaign. These surveys all concurred with the Sunday 
Times of 06 November 1977 concluding that over a one week period 
(October 25 to November 01) the "Government was given nearly five 
times as muc~ exposure as the two main opposition parties 11 • [Sunday 
Times:06/11/1977 also see separate survey in·The Star:23/ll/77]. 
The survey, monitored over 42 nights until the election found that 
the National Party received two hours, 24 minutes and 13 seconds of 
television coverage to the four combined opposition parties (PFP, 
NRP, SAP and. HNP) tally of 30 minutes and 55 seconds. [see The 
Argus:30/ll/1977]. 
A Rhodes University study undertaken by Marion Whitehead and Roy 
< 
Cockayne also showed that during 12 monitored newscasts, "the 
National Party received 81% of political time, other White opposition 
parties received 8.4% of political time, Government sanctioned Black 
bodies received 10.5% of political time and any other Black 
organizations 0% 11 • [see The Argus:22/02/1978]. 
The 1981 General Election: 
A similar picture was to emerge after the 1981 election. According to 
the Unisa ELEKOM 1 81 survey undertaken by Stephen Finn, the 
representation of political parties on television has been "given to 
the parties in direct relationship to their strength in parliament'' 
which would clearly benefit National Party dominance if one crudely 
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accepts that political bias equals political success. [see Cape 
Times:29/07/81]. 
Another survey conduited by the English speaking 'watchdog' group, 
the 'Fortypercenters' I showed that "the NP which.fielded 42% of the 
368 candidates received 66% of political time; the HNP which had 23% 
of the candidates received 9% rif political time; the PFP which had 
21% of the candidates received 19% of political time with NCP 
coverage minimal". [Sunday Express:29/03/1981]. This indicated that 
the time allocation was closely related to the existing 
representation of each respective political party in the previous 
parliament although the HNP coverage remains generous considering 
they had no public representatives. 
. . 
Against this background, surveys conducted in 1981 showed a clear 
bias towards the ruling National Party. The Fortypercenters survey, 
showed that during February of that ~ear, "the NP received 1200% 
more news coverage on TV than the PFP 11 • [Sunday Express:29/03/1981]. 
The survey [Argus:07/04/1981] also showed National Party 
representatives being given coverage not worthy of their news value. 
Opposition spokesmen were mainly seen complimenting the government 
thus providing the authorities with the argument that the opposition 
enjoyed considerable coverage. [see Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli, 
1989:87-89 and Sunday Express:29/03/1981]. 
Indeed, the key point here is the quality of coverage in that visuals 
of NP speakers will largely highlight their main point whilst that of 
opposition figures are likely to be edited o~ watered-down. Such 
bias, it must be said, was also apparent in the English and Afrikaans 
press with both groups strongly favouring their respective political 
parties. However; as a public corporation which should theoretically 
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be as objective as possible, the bias in favour of the NP was clearly 
visible. 
The 1983 By-Elect;ons and the Referendum: 
These characteristics are again evident when dealing with findings 
that analyze key by-elections and the constitutional Referendum of, 
1983. Greg Garden, in the Rand Daily Mail, found that in a two week 
period between April 18 and May 01 1983 (pre-Transvaal by-
elections), 11 the National Party commanded 79.1% of air time devoted 
to political matters''. [Rand Daily Mail:05/05/1983]. 
Garden reported extreme exposure to Cabinet Ministers where 11 Cabinet 
and Deputy Ministers were quoted or appeared on the television news 
94 times in the 14 days of the analysis with a new lo_w point in 
partisanship being reached in 8pm news news bulletin of Friday April 
29 when no fewer than 10 Cabinet Ministers were referred to 11 • [Rand 
Daily Mail:OS/05/1983]. 
Such use would seem to bear out the often used justification of 
Retief Uys, then spokesman for the SABC, who stated that 11 an absolute 
balance between political partie~ is not possible because 
newsworthiness is taken into account all the time. And it is a fact 
of life that it is the people in power who make the news 11 • [Rand 
Daily Mail:25/11/1977]. 
This official explanation_bears a very close resemblance to that 
provided by National Party speakers in parliament who justified the 
preponderance of Cabinet Ministers on television by arguing, 11 If a 
certain Minister or any other person appears on television more than 
once a week, we should not say that he is being given preferential 
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treatment. He appears there because he is topical and because he is a 
newsmaker 11 • [Mr. G.P.D. Terblanche in Hansard, 12/05/1977:7844]. 
Similarly, National Party parliamentarian Piet Du Pontes said that 
"the NP as the governing party determines the direction in which this 
country moves, and as such the statements and actions of its leaders 
are, after a.11, far more newsworthy than the, at times, extravagant 
statements and actions of basically irrelevant parties and their 
leaders". [Hansard, 17/09/1981:4166]. This clearly indicates the 
authoritarian view of broadcasting as perceived by the National 
Party. 
There can be little doubt that the ruling personalities (Cabinet 
Ministers) will receive prominence on television. This is likely to 
occur in many democratic countries as names do make news but the key 
element here is the confusion between objective news from the 
government of the day and the use thereof to promote that particular 
government. 
Indeed, this has been the justification since the inception of 
television for the bias shown towards the National Party. Whilst 
newsworthiness is subjective the aforementioned survey figures even 
allowing for the SABC's explanation, would indicate that 11 only a 
television service which is over-whelmingly an official service will 
provide such an accessible platform for Government views which are 
not tested or probed by informed viewers 11 • [John.Van Zyl in the 
Sunday Times, 16/07/1978]. 
This is particularly evident if one takes into account the fact that 
11 the constant parade of Government spokesmen on TV, whether formally 
propagatirig the National Party line or not, serves to reinforce their 
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authority in the public mind, and hence influence an election". 
[Marion Whitehead of Rhodes University replying to Hein Jordaan in 
Argus:25/04/1978]. 
It is worth noting Greg Garden's concluding remarks in referring to 
the 1983 by-election coverage. He says that 11 this content analysis of 
political representation on SABC-TV news was undertaken to remove -
once and for all - from the realm of conjecture, the extreme National 
Party bias of the SABC. The results are.even more stunning than even 
I would have ventured". [Rand Daily Mail:05/05/1983]. 
Statistics are again available for determining the bias in favour of 
a "yes" vote in the 1983 Referendum. In an extensive survey the week 
17-23 October, Garden found that total 11 yes 11 coverage amoun"l;.ed to 
65,7% of political television time with the 11 no 11 vote attracting 
34.3% of political time. [see also Appendix A: Figure 1]. The SABC 
further used news background programmes like "News Focus" to explain 
the constitution to their viewers. This task was entrusted to 
Professor SAS Strauss who himself had endorsed a "yes" vote in a 
nation-wide Sunday newspaper advertisement. [Rand Daily Mail: 
25/10/1983]. 
Other characteristics employed by the SABC was the 'first and last 
word' approach. According to figures released by UNISA's Department 
of Communications [from Dalling, 1983:182], when a multiple speakers 
from different political parties appeared on the nightly news, "the 
NP appeared first 80% and last 64% of the time" -as this 
characteristic was perceived to provide the voting audience with the 
most lasting impression of what the speaker had to say. Unisa's 
report goes on to show how both the views of the PFP and HNP surfaced 
only late in the campaign indicating the almost total subservience to 
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the National Party and relegation of opposition viewpoints. 
The 1987 General Election: 
The most detailed analysis of SABC-TV coverage of a general election 
came in 1987 with many and varied studies undertaken. Roger Hulley, 
the PFP Member of Parliament prepared a list of of what he referred 
to as "dirty tricks" employed by the SABC in their election coverage. 
· [Argus:l0/04/1987. Also see Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:87-89 and 
"I 
Stewart, 1987:139-151]~ 
These tactics are vitally important in explaining how the SABC is 
used to present a very definite bias on its newscasts and favour the 
ruling group. Indeed, many of these characteristics were not new to 
the 1987 Election but have over the years been use~1~xtensively and 
developed further to the detriment of not only the parliamentary left 
but also the right-wing political parties. 
Hulley cites the following: 
(a) News which is bad for the government is played down but is 
emphasized whe~ bad for the opposition. 
(b) Bad news locally is positioned with foreign disaster stories to 
make it appear less damaging. Hachten cites an incident during the 
school boycotts in Cape Town where no visuals were shown on the 
evening newscast but instead, viewers were treated to film of unrest 
in Miami. [see Hachten and Giffard, 1974:214]. 
(c) Items damaging to the government may be omitted altogether from 
news-casts. 
(d) News items can be chosen and emphasized to correspond with issues 
raised by National Party politicians. 
(e) Camera positions can be used to improve or reduce the image and 
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eff-ectiveness of the personality talking. 
(f) Lighting, use of filters and sound echoes can be used to enhance 
or affect the image of speakers. 
(g) Selectivity in the footage of respective audience members (such 
as the filming of empty chairs at public meetings) can indicate 
interest or boredom. 
(h) Selective editing can focus upon the strong sections of 
Government speeches whilst focusing on weak areas of the opposition. 
[see "Warning to the Public" by Roger Hulley in Argus, 10/04/1987. 
Also see Ruth Tomaselli in The Argus, 22 and 29 April 1987]. 
These were not the only "tricks" used in favouring the ruling group. 
In an intensive research project into the 1987 General Election, the 
Rhodes Department of Jour~alism under Gavin Stewart came to the 
following conclusions: 
1. The National Party received considerably more broadcast time than 
the other participating (parliamentary) political parties. This 
included the 11 Goldilocks effect" where when broadcasting the opinions 
of the three major political ~roupings, the SABC tended to allow 
National Party speakers the last war~. Gavin Stewart explains that 
"the first option seems •too hard 1 , the second option seems 1 too 
soft 1 and the final· option seems 1 just right'". [see Policom report 
of the Rhodes University Journalism Department, Commentary, 1987:8]. 
2. None of the political organizations (mainly extra-parliamentary) 
who opposed the elections .themselves, were given any broadcast time 
whatsoever. [Stewart 1987:08]. This can be contrasted with additional 
time given to State/Quasi-State speakers (other than National Party) 
which gave pro-Nationalist speakers 52.6% of the available broadcast 
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time at the expense of the PFP/NRP/Independents (18.2) and 
' 
Conservative Party/HNP/ (15.8). [Stewart in Van Vuuren at al. 
1987:143 - See Appendix A: Figure 2. Also see SA Barometer, Volume 1. 
No 3. 10 April 1987 and Volume 1. No 5. 8 May 1987]. 
3. Sources quoted on television were from acceptable political groups 
as defined by the SABC (only those parliamentary political parties) 
who saw the National Party as representing the centre position in 
South African politics indicating the clos~ working relationship 
between the NP and the SABC. [see Stewart in Van Vuuren et al, 
1987:148]. 
4. The SABC allowed the National Party to set the election agendft by 
giving it opportunity to criticize the opposition groups when and how 
it saw best. This applied throughout the campaign with preference 
given to speeches by Cabinet Ministers and access to the NP to 
promote items that would slur the opposition. [see Stewart in Van 
Vuuren et al, 1987:148]. 
Ruth Tomaselli of the University of Natal has highlighted the trust 
thAt White television viewers have for news-readers. She argues that 
this factor should be taken into account when one realizes that 
11 throughout the election, SABC-TV worked to mobilize voters to the NP 
through emphasis, selection, omission and misrepresentation (where) 
character assassinations of both PFP and CP candidates were carefully 
presented in quotations from government sources, thus excusing the 
SABC from blame 11 • [Argus, 05/12/1987]. 
Tomaselli [Argus, 05/12/1987] argues that Nationalist candidates were 
treated far more deferentially than their opposition counterparts and 
were ''allowed to use the interview as a platform from which they 
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~ 
could state their prepared argument without havin~ its basic premise 
challenged 11 as was the case with opposition candidates. Again the 
technique of 11 electioneering presented as news 11 was also used as well 
as its inverse where hews is presented as electioneering and affords 
a speaker a chance to drive home an electioneering point of view 
whilst reacting to a specific news event. [see Tomaselli in The-
Argus:22/04/1987]. 
The importance of SABC television in electioneering is outlined in a 
study by Conradie et al. [1987]. They argue that television usually 
focuses on various selected themes within an election campaign and 
11 it is usually therefore the television agenda that moulds the final 
election agenda among members of the public. In the case of the 
present study, this means that it can be concluded that that those 
individual themes highest on the television agenda (namely, reform, 
segregation/apartheid, the onslaught against the count~y and 
Government action against unrest] were also high on the public's 
agen.da while voting. It can also be concluded that the 
disproportionate television coverage given to the candidates of the 
NP could haye contributed to a view that the NP as being more 
important than the other parties 11 • [Conradie et al., 1987:162]. 
4.4 THE SABC AND THE EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY ORGANIZATIONS: 
It should be noted that since the 1983 Referendum and the resulting 
formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF), the SABC has seen fit 
to define the legitimacy of the political groupings within the 
country. The parameters of mainstream politics lies in those working 
within the system with those who reject it, largely ignored. Indeed, 
this shows almost a direct correlation between the Governmental 
attitude of the day to negotiate and accept the •acceptable' 
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opposition (albeit sometimes unwillingly) whilst denigrating and 
silencing the extra-parliamentary or 'unacceptable' opposition. 
Even before the introduction of television, Selier [Tomaselli, 
1989:89], explafos that in relation to the SABC, "the political 
process simply does not exist outside of the parliamentary context". 
Similarly, Stewart [1987:9] suggests that this indicates that ''th~ 
SABC accepts absolutely the National Party definition of political 
life in South Africa. 
Morris [1976:95] also asserts that the SABC subservience to the 
National Party is based on the predominant view that 11 the authorities 
give life, while anythin-0 that threatens this order is bad, 
irrational and is death to the system and the viewer". Needless to 
say, the ANC has born the brunt of suffering under the National Party 
definition as has most of the extra-parliamentary organizations. 
In this respect, senior television news director, Sakkie Burger ha~ 
said that 11 we want to create a climate where people of all 
persuasions can come together to talk - although we don't want the 
( 
African National Congress". [Financial Mail, 04/04/1986]. 
Ruth Tomaselli argues that that 11 the SABC has excelled in its 
stereotyping of the ANC as a demonic force and almost invariably, 
reports about the ANC are in terms of violence and terrorism. The 
process of demonization has been undertaken at all levels: in news 
reports on radio and television as well as in-depth current affairs 
programmes such as Network". [Graaf(ed), 1988:22]. 
Tomaselli goes on to explain the use of the morning "Comment'' radio 
programme [see Chapter Three] in labeling the ANC as "folk devils; 
142 
incarnations of evil and inhumanity who are withbut conscience in 
their single-minded det~rmination to overthrow the norms of civilized 
society". [Graaf(ed). 1988:22]. Regarding television coverage, 
Tomaselli explains the value of the language used in news broadcasts 
that 11 is controlled in such a way to favour definitions issuing from 
the state 11 • [Graaf(ed). 1988:26]. 
Coupled with this is the use of varying ''para-linguistic conventions 11 
which includes the use of linguistic codes maintaining and 
.. 
reinforcing the stereotype of the ANC as •terrorists• and 
•communists• rather than more legitimate' political actors. [Graaf 
(ed). 1988:26]. 
It is therefore apparent that the State-run broadcasting services 
have clearly attempted to portray the extra-parliamentary 
organizations in a negative light. It should be noted that promin~nt 
anti-apartheid figures like the head of the South African Council of 
Churches, Reverend Beyers Naude and UDF patron Reverend Alan Boesak 
were often associated with the ANC thus providing the SABC with a 
useful means of discrediting their opponents. These authoritarian 
characteristics .pawhich prevented those affected with a 'right to 
reply 1 to visible smears, were particularly evident during the mid-
eighties and subsequent State of Emergency. [see also Frederickse, 
1986:10-11]. 
4.5 DIRECT GOVERNMENTAL INTERFERENCE: 
A key element of authoritarianism in the public affairs and news 
programming of the SABC has been the manifestation of direct 
governmental manipulation and control exercised by elements within 
the managerial structures of the corporation as well as by 
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Governmental officials as senior as the State President himself. 
The Information Scandal: 
In November 1978, the Mostert Commission publicized its findings 
relating to the misuse of funds by the Department of Information. 
These revelations later become known as the 'Info Scandal' and were 
to rock the Afrikaner political establishment implicating Cabinet 
Ministers and even the State President. On the day of the 
publicizing press conference given by Judge Anton Mostert, the SABC 
virtually ignored the story with the evening television news 
broadcast omitting coverage of the press conference leaving South 
Africans to receive the news via both the English and Afrikaans 
press. [see Pollak, 1981:67]. 
Pollak quotes J.E. van Zyl, the SABC's director of news services as 
saying with reference to publicizing Mostert's findings that 11 the 
SABC is biding its time, as requested by the government, until the 
government r~ports on the information affair. At this time there are 
no facts, only newspaper speculation by the SAAN group. The real 
facts are that the English-language newspapers are in a battle with 
the government 11 • {Pollak, 1981:67]. 
This led the Argus [07/11/1978] to comment, "11 The SABC stands rightly 
condemned today for putting its master's interests before the 
public's. It has done so for years to the detriment of the country. 
It puts a halo around the Government's deeds. It covers up faults and 
failures. It soothes the public conscience. It urges no reform, no 
changes that are not the Government's. It is the Government's voice. 
It therefore cannot be relied on for objective presentation of the 
news and for fair comment. The voice, effectively of one political 
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party, it is paid for by all South Africans". This description 
clearly shows the frustration with the authoritarian operation and 
characteristics of the SABC. 
The SABC and the "Total National Strategy": 
Another example of direct governmental interference which was highly 
significant as it was this time more overt than covert came in 1980 
when the Prime Minister, PW Botha, clearly stated that 11 the SABC 
would be directed not to give prominence to revolutionary activities. 
The SABC was financed by the state and he would ensure that it 
followed this policy". [Survey of Race Relations, 1980-1981:296]. 
This clearly linked the practical financial viability of the 
corporation with continued pro-governmental bias on behalf of the 
SABC. 
This renewed mission to secure complete control over the broadcast 
media formed part of the 11 Total National Strategy 11 that was a feature 
of the early PW Botha years. This included an intensification of the 
State security machinery in an effort to curb 1 revolutionary 1 
activities and "inculcate in the White public a itotal onslaught' 
hysteria with programming reflecting and justifying the increased 
militarization of the South African state". [Davies, 1984:418]. 
Davies also highlights the post-1978 period which has seen 11 an 
increase in the number of programmes designed to boost morale within 
the armed forces and present the Defence Force's own self-image to 
the public". [1984:418]. 
This view was confirmed by Mr. G.P.D. Terblanche of the National 
Party who stated that, "The SABC is a powerful instrument for 
impressing upon all the people of this country the reality of South 
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Africa•s threatened situation. The radio and television services of 
the SABC can become the most important instrument in our struggle for 
survival 11 • [Hansard, 19/03/1980:3003]. 
Direct Mi~isterial Interference: 
In further direct governmental or ministerial interference, in 1981, 
the then Minister of Co-operation and Development, Dr. Piet Koornhof, 
apparently walked out of a 1 Midweek 1 (the then premier news-
background show) programme dealing with issues surrounding the Nyanga 
Squatters because 11 he had.not been given a prepared list of 
questions 11 • [Sunday Times, 10/09/1981]. 
Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli [1989:88] cite sources who claim that 
11 Cabinet Ministe_rs often ask to see the questions first .•. There were 
people in the news department who were telephoned daily by the Prime 
Minister 1 s office 11 indicating a high degree of direct authorita~ian 
influence in the broadcast of news and public affairs. 
Perhaps one of the most surprising events (and perhaps politically 
significant) in the relationship betwee~ the SABC and the government 
came in 1982 after the split in the National Party and the resulting 
formation of the Conservative Party led by Dr. Andries Treurnicht. 
Following jncorrect and unfounded news reports that Dr. Treurnicht 
had been shot dead coupled with extended television time given to a 
CP spokesman reacting to the dismissal of Rapport editor, Willem De 
Klerk, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information, Barend 
Du Plessis, criticized the SABC for allowing the CP considerable air-
time and in so doing providing it (the CP) with an opportunity for 
party-political propaganda. [see Die Burger, 02/09/1982]. 
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Du Plessis' remarks were forthcoming at a time when there was 
considerable tension within the Afrikaner ruling elite. The split in 
Afrikanerdom was a cause of concern for the ruling National Party as 
its institutions such as the SABC became vulnerable to alternative 
political influences. 
It should be noted that this event came under indirect fire by the 
Steyn Commission into the Media who said tha{ there was a desire on 
the part of the government to 11 achieve a position of more direct 
control over the SABC 11 with the climate being ripe for a 11 take-over 11 
which made sense for the ruling elite in the prevailing political 
uncertainty as the effects of this schism on the electorate had yet 
to be determined. [see J.J. Roelofse, 1983:73]. 
The Riaan Eksteen Case: 
It was within this climate of political tension and uncertainty that 
Riaan Eksteen was appointed to the position of Director-General in 
1983 and was a forerunner to perhaps the clearest example of State 
intervention in the broadcast media. 
Eksteen had been a loyal representative of the National Party as he 
had been the South African Ambassador to the United Nations as well 
being first secretary at the South African Embassy in Washington thus 
having considerable contact with the then Minister in charge of the 
SABC - namely Pik Botha. Botha's links with Eksteen led commentators 
to label Eksteen a 11 protege 11 [Dave Dalling in Cape Times:07(02/1983] 
of Botha as evidence exists that he (Botha) actually nominated 
Eksteen for the position [see Financial Mail:29/04/1988 and Die 
Burger:18/02/1983]. 
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This prompted the pro-Nationalist Vaderland newspaper to declare that 
this 11 unfortunately. lends weight to the accusation that the SABC is 
incr~asingly being controlled and prescribed to by the Government". 
[Rapport:06/02/1983]. Indeed, when questioned on his relationship 
shortly after assuming his new position of Director-General, Eksteen 
remarked that, "I will not hide the fact that I've known him (Botha) 
and worked with him for 18 years and that I have:a close relationship 
with him. I'm not ashamed to say he is a· friend of mine". 
'I 
[Argus:0?/03/1983]. 
Eksteen's career at the SABC is fraught with contradictions. The 
Financial Mail [04/04/1986] wrote in an article critical of the SABC, 
"What's wrong with the SABC? Why does it regularly give an impression 
of incompetence, coupled with i radical misreading of public 
preferences? Is this merely a question of image or is the problem 
more subtle"? This criticism was a reflection upon the management 
style of Eksteen himself. The same Financial Mail later declared 
"Riaan Eksteen did better at turning the SABC around than his critics 
.conceded". [Financial Mail:0?/04/1989]. 
Indeed, Riaan Eksteen was faced with a mammoth task of establishing 
himself within a corporation of which he had limited experience. This 
~as coupled with the fact that in the administration of a corporation 
of the nature and size of the SABC, policies that were put into 
practice by Eksteen's predecessors would still influence the 
corporation in the immediate years following his appointment. 
Eksteen 1 s appointment also came at the time of a recession which 
naturally saw a marked decline in advertising revenue coupled with 
the SABC continuing to lose money on the economically unviable TV2 
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and TV3 Black ianguage television services. This saw the SABC forced 
to become more prof it oriented and adopt a more relaxed news and 
public affairs policy that allowed for the liberaliz~ng of certain 
key services [see Chapter Five]. 
Eksteen has been credited with the rationalization of departments and 
services within the SABC having reduced the numbers of employees from 
7200 to" the current 5000. [see Wyn and M·a 1 an in Sunday 
Star:14/04/1988]. Eksteen was also witness to the d~mise of Springbok 
Radio as a distinct commercial radio station and the introduction of 
commercials to the so-called 'cultural' English and Afrikaans radio 
stations. These events were characterised by a public outcry in the 
press with the Financial Mail commenting that, 11 the effect on staff 
and listeners was bewildering, to say the least. Mistrust 
flourished 11 • [Financial Mail:04/04/1986]. 
The Eksteen years has also (and has been shown in this chapter) 
resulted in the very visible bias shown towards the ruling National 
Party. Eksteen himself, has been loyal to the Government in this 
respect and was even taken to task by the Media Council of South 
Africa for stating that the SABC would 11 not become a platform for 
those who by word or deed, wish to.create revolution, unrest or 
disruption and the corporation would not reflect the standpoint of 
those who had opted out of consensus pol itics 11 • [see Cape 
Times:03/09/1984 and The Argus:lB/10/1984]. In Parliament, 
Independent M.P. Wynand Malan has suggested that under the management 
of Riaan Eksteen, ~no one can expect the SABC news services to be 
more propagandistic than they are at the moment 11 • [Pretoria 
News:14/04/1988]. 
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Eksteen's downfall followed fro~ events directly initiated by the 
State president.· On August 24 1987, the leader .of the Labour Party, 
Allan Hendrickse resigned from Cabinet. According to Pottinger 
[1988:360], this event was reported 11 routinely 11 by the SABC in the 
20h00 Network news programme that evening. The reporter in question, 
Freek Robinson gave prominence to Hendrickse's reasons for resigning 
as being of his own initiative which angered State President PW 
Botha. Botha apparently (according to newspaper reports at the time) 
felt that the news slant should have highlighted the fact that it 
was Botha himself who saw fit to terminate Hendrickse's Cabinet 
membership rather than the other way round. 
Th~ .events of the evening showed clear and direct state intervention 
in the public affairs/hews p~ogramming of the SABC. The initial 
eleven minutes of the particular evening's news broadcast was devoted 
to the Hendrickse letter of resignation. In the later time slot 
devoted to news-background material further reports were included 
that 11 had just come to light" [see Die Burger:27/08/1987] and 
lengthy mention was then made of the letter PW Botha had sent to 
Hendrickse which stated that his membership of the Cabinet was 
11 unacceptable 11 • [The Star:27/08/1987]. 
This late addition to the earlier news reports followed a personal 
telephone call from Botha to Eksteen during the transmission of the 
evening Network news programme to ask him to intervene in the 
reporting of this specific event. Botha himself had earlier used an 
entire evening news-cast to castigate Hendrickse for bathing in 
protest on a 11 Whites Only 11 beach and was clearly, in this case, again 
directly involving himself in the news presentation on television. 
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The handling of the Hendrickse resignation led to the forced 
resignation of Riaan Eksteen as Director-Gener~l of the SABC. This 
caused Finance Week [14-20 April 1988] to declare that 11 the SABC 
will effectively have to surrender any pretence at being autonomous 
or independent. It will be universally regarded as an arm of the 
public service to such an extent that its own statute may as well be 
scrapped and Stoffel van der Merwe, as the new Minister for 
Broadcasting Services, appoint a director-general in his department 
as in any other government departments 11 • 
The downfall of Eksteen is interpreted differently by the official 
opposition, Conservative Party. In an interview with their spokesman 
on broadcasting, Dr. Pieter Mulder, it is suggested that Eksteen's 
appointment was based upon his being able to take orders from his 
superiors as well as benefit his friend, Pik Botha. Mulder feels that 
this was part of the Pik Botha empire that had as its ultimate goal, 
the eventual election of Pik Botha as-State President. 
Mulder ar9ues that Pik Botha has received an inordinate amount of 
television.coverage even in traditional quite news periods like the -
Christmas season. This occurred during the reign of Eksteen which 
angered his fellow colleagues and resulted in the administratio~ of 
broadcasting moving to.Alwyn Schlebusch who became the Minister in 
the State President's office entrusted with Administration and 
Broadcasting Services.· 
Coupled with the perilous financial state the SABC found itself in, 
was the Hendrickse resignation. Both Mulder and the Financial Mail 
refer to Botha as "irascible and irrational 11 [see Financial 
Mail:04/09/1987] and these events pushed Botha_ to ask for Eksteen to 
be relieved of his post. It can be argued, that the authoritarian and 
151 
imperial nature of the PW Botha Presidency meant that anything that 
angered the head of state would simply not be tolerated [see 
Financial Mail:04/09/1987 and Pottinger, 1988:418-421]. 
In the case of Eksteen, it would seem that even though the 
broadcasting medium was highly sympathetic towards the National 
Party, it needed to maintain its sympathy at all times ~nd not 
digress for one moment. Mulder argues that complete compliance is 
demanded of the SABC by Nationalists and the Hendrickse report was 
"just inadequate enough to indicate to the NP leadership that the 
SABC is not doing enough to promote the NP". [interview with Dr. 
Mulder 08 June 1988]. 
According to Mulder, the SABC operated in the late 1980's 1n an 
environment of great internal political feuding within the ruling 
elite coupled with the authoritarian nature of the Presidency. This 
view would contradict with the official Government explanation for 
Eksteen's resignation that spoke of 11 a breakdown in his (Eksteen) 
relationship with the board and the SABC 1 s poor financial showing". 
[Sunday Star:24/04/1988]~ 
This reason could largely be attributed to the difficulties that 
Eksteen inherited rather than caused by himself. Eksteen was, 
however, given a 'golden handshake' of R650000 and 11 will receive five 
years of basic pay but also deferred pension of undetermined value 11 
as compensation for his resignation. [Sunday Star:24/04/1988]~ 
Later reports (based upon the 1988 Annual Report financial 
statements) suggest that measures adopted by Eksteen were successful 
in turning the 1987 loss of R13 million into a 1988 record profit of 
R58.3 million indicating that had Eksteen remained at the SABC, he 
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could have claimed credit for this turnaround. Ironically, Eksteen's 
successor, Wynand Harmse stands to inherit a favourable financial 
position from Eksteen himself. [see Financial Mail:07/04/1988 and 
1988 SABC Annual Report]. 
Perhaps the reasons for Eksteen's downfall can be seen in the visible 
changes within the SABC since his resignation. Whilst these are 
difficult to articulate, the most apparent (and immediate) was the 
appointment Qf senior news-reporter Johan Pretorius to political 
editor-in-chief. Pretorius was also entrusted with reporting all news 
events concerning the State President. This was coupled with the move 
of the previous politic~l correspondent, Freek Robinson (who reported 
on the Hendrickse resignation), to the SABC bureau in London. 
This could indicate that it was the individual wrath of PW Botha that 
was instrumental in stamping out any reporting he per~onally did not 
like and is born out by the deferential style adopted by Pretorius's 
reporting of presidential matters. Essentially therefore, Eksteen 
was unable to maintain the adequate pro-Nationalist bias that was 
required whilst simultaneously encouraging advertising revenue that 
was distinctive of a service increasingly oriented towards 
entertainment programming. With this explanation, it is then perhaps 
fitting to agree with the Financial Mail's analysis that Eksteen was 
a 11 victim of the political system he supported so avidly 11 • 
Yet another example of direct intervention came in later reports 
showing PW Botha's anger at statements made by the SABC news 
director, Sakkie Burger during the 1987 all-night election coverage. 
Beeld Newspaper reported that the State President had 11 chastised Mr. 
Burger for not presenting the election results as a triumph for the 
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National Party". [Argus:16/06/1989]. Mr. Burger was subsequently 
(and unexpectedly) not appointed Chief Director News and Public 
Affairs but was rather dispatched to London to open an SABC office in 
the city. [see also Sunday Times, 11/06/1989]. 
Authoritarianism, Change and the SABC: 
In the ten year reign of PW Botha, the SABC has had five Directors-
Genera l which does question internal developments within the 
Presidency and constant attempts to find compliant administrators who 
will practice and promote National Party policy. As argued in this 
chapter; over the last ten years, the government has involved itself 
in the affairs of the SABC to a greater extent than in the previous 
fourty years. 
Ind~ed this is an important point. The increase in Go~ernment 
interference should be seen as part of a two pronged attack on the 
broadcast media. Firstly as has clearly been shown in this chapter, 
there can be little doubt that there was a realization within 
government that the broadcasting services could be a vital asset in 
winning the hearts and minds of the public (particularly since the 
introduction of television). However, the constant interference comes 
in an era of change and reform. The attempts at reform on the part of 
PW Botha and the National Party meant that a new message had to be 
inculcated in the minds of the voter. 
This was coupled by a shift in the parliamentary attack on the 
National Party from the liberal PFP to the right-wing Conservative 
Party. This also necessitated a change in the message conveyed to the 
electorate. The message further needed fine-tuning with the unrest of 
1985 and the resulting declaration of the State of Emergency. These 
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political shifts should also be seen within the context of a 
deteriorating economy and declining growth rate resulttng in the 
adoption of profit oriented practices in order to remain financially 
viable. 
Therefore it may be argued that the bias of the SABC can not be 
judged in a vacuum. It needs constant reference_ to the National Party 
leadership, the nature of the Presidency and reflects the reform 
policies of the National Party and the securocrat notion of the State 
of Emergency. 
The influence of the Broederbond has diminished and has been replaced ' 
with a new generation of Afrikaner leadership that increasingly shows 
cohsiderable sophistication in adapting to_ change and utilizing the 
media as events dictate. The resignation of P.W. Botha and the 
subsequent end of this era itself reflects a dynamic situation that 
may find the SABC take on new characteristics under changing 
leadership. 
It is therefore apparent that the advent of reform has seen some 
elements of liberalized thinking begin to emerge within the SABC and 
its respective controllers. Whilst clear control techniques are 
discernible within the programme areas discussed, the internal 
controversies within the SABC would highlight that the gross 
authoritarianism of the Broederbond era has become fragmented as a 
result of political and economic changes. 
Indeed, the Presidential interference in the Riaan Eksteen affair may 
be seen as one of the last vestiges of complete or gross 
authoritarianism (particularly ~ince the resignation of P.W. Botha) 
in reaction to decreasing subservience to the controlling authorities 
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and the introduction of a more market oriented service rather than a 
purely ideological channel. 
From this perspective it is possible to discern certain liberalizing 
anomalies that whilst simultaneously occurring with the authoritarian 
characteristics outlined, resulted in an important dilution of the 
control paradigm. These contradictions are a reflection of the 
changing policy of the ruling National Party as well as of the 
political and economic dynamics of South Africa and will be discussed 
in Chapter Five. 
' 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ANOMALIES AND CONTRADICTIONS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
BROADCASTING SYSTEM 
It has been clearly shown that direct and effective control over the 
broadcast medium has been established by the National Party. In an 
historical context, it has been possible to trace the influence of 
key personalities who have been associated with the ruling elite and 
therefore represent a particular ideology. This they can apply from a 
position of authority resulting in a symbiotic relationship with the 
ruling elite. 
The characteristics of broadcasting have been exposed where the 
policy and practice of the South African Broadcasting Corporation 
(SABC) as the country's ieading broadcast media institution has been 
largely guided by the National Party its sectional interests. 
However, this chapter serves to highlight the move away on the part 
. . 
of the South African broadcast media from the authoritarian position 
of the past to a more pluralistic and mixed model. This is occurring 
often concurrently and despite State sponsored authoritarianism and 
is due to the increasing anomalies found within the realm of 
broadcasting that have emerged over the last ten years. 
From this discussion there can be little doubt that governments shape 
their specific broadcasting system according to their own political 
orientation. Throughout the Third World, many one-party states have 
developed ~ uni-chann€l media system where the state enjoys a 
monopoly particularly in the realm of broadcasting. 
This is applicable to Zimbabwe where the state-run broadcast media is 
likely to continue to be biased in favour of the ruling elite as the 
movement away from White minority rule, has been replaced with a 
majority one-party state thus limiting media criticism and access. In 
another one party-state, Malawi, foreign correspondents are banned 
from entering the country and there are strict regulations pertaining 
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to local journalists who may face heavy penalties if their reporting 
does not please the ruling elite. [see Editor and Publisher, 
21/01/1984:16-19]. 
By comparison, the pluralistic (private and public) British example 
is based upon the parliamentary democracy of the United Kingdom and 
its model therefore, needs to be as unbiased as possible preventing 
the ruling party from dominating broadcasting and precluding 
opposition groups from threatening the ruling order. [see Head, 
1985:70]. 
In essence, the key here is the ownership of the media as this 
reflects on the characteristics of the particular national media 
system. It is evident that with the abandonment of democratic 
principles largely within the Third-World and other Developing 
nations, media freedom has deteriorated_ commensurately. 
Within the South African context, reference has been made to the 
tight political control that exists over the SABC particularly in 
relation to its monopoly television news coverage. It has been noted 
that governmental policies are either presented as the only viable 
option for South _Africa and are given extensive coverage on 
television news broadcasts to the detriment of other opposing views. 
This situation has led to the SABC being perceived as a mouthpiece of 
the National Party by opposition leaders to the left and right of the 
political spectrum and its close relationship with the ruling party 
emasculates its originality and objectivity and serves as a rubber-
stamp for the dissemination of governmental initiatives and 
programmes. However, Hachten and Giffard [1984:217] report that 11 the 
SABC does enjoy a high credibility with the South African public" 
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thus enhancing the quality of its pervasiveness. 
Having discussed the extent to which the broadcast media is 
controlled and manipulated, it is important to contrast this control 
with the tenets of authoritarianism as outlined by Fagen in Chapter 
Two. [see Chapter Two and Fagen, 1966:24]. This will indicate the 
extent to which the mass media in South Africa remains within an 
authoritarian paradigm as the evidence of the previous two chapters 
would suggest or whether there exists anomalies that make such a 
categorization difficult. 
The extent of political participation and power within South Africa 
is largely oligarchic in nature. This immediately assumes that a 
certain proportion of the population may elect a government of their 
will through the ballot box. Under the new South African Constitution 
of 1983 (the Tri-Cameral Parliament), it is the ruling party in the 
House of Assembly that dictates the political agenda based upon the 
dominant political beliefs of the White electorate. The exclusion of 
, 
Blacks from the formal parliamentary process effectively sees 20% of 
the population legislating over the rest. 
This entails a degree of political competition for control of the 
House of Assembly but is supplemented by forces who have rejected the 
. . 
Parliamentary option in favour of a transference of power through 
extra-parliamentary pressure. Both these groups (intra and extra-
parliamentary) vie for support within the broader South African body 
politic thus making for visible political competition throughout the 
political spectrum. 
Contradictions abound when discussing the scope for available 
criticism within South Africa. Over the last t~ree years, the State 
of Emergency has effectively silenced and detained critics of the 
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go v er n men t , b a n n e d po l i t i c a l or g an i z a t i o n s an d h a s s e v ere l y 
restricted or silenced the press. At the same time, there does remain 
avenues of criticism that range from carefully self-censored press 
editorials to statements from trade-unions to opposition 
personalities. The sanctity of Parliament has largely been unaffected 
and the opposition criticism emanating from that source remains more 
vociferous than ever. 
The key question of how the citizens of the country become informed 
about the world around them is of direct relevance to this 
discussion. Indeed, if it is the Whites who largely elect Lasswell's 
WHO (the ruling National Party) then their source of information 
plays a vital role in their 1 Weltaanschuung 1 • 
The press perform contradictory roles. Whilst operating under severe 
restrictions the 'Alternative' press serves to criticize government 
policy and present an alternative information source compared to the 
1 verligte 1 main stream pro-Nationalist Afrikaans newspapers. The 
English press also continue to be highly critical but in an 
increasingly competative media market coupled with economic problems. 
find themselves searching for circulation rather than promoting 
vehement opposition to the ruling party. Indeed, the domination of 
the SABC in the sphere of the broadcast media and its resulting bias 
towards the National Party means a compliant radio and television 
service al though this is tempered by key anomalies and 
contradictions. 
Just as these contradictions occur within these various societal 
components, they are also apparerit within South Africa's broadcasting 
system. Such anomalies portray alternatives to Governmental policies 
of Separate Development (or Apartheid) as articul~ted by laws such as 
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the Group Areas, Population Registration and Separate Amenities Acts. 
These anomalies highlighting differing lifestyle·s to that implemented 
as a result of these acts may even be broadcast by the State-run SABC 
and may be tolerated by their respective controllers. The 
cbntradictions also include a definite move away from pervasive 
control to more enlightened and relaxed programming that differs from 
the normative authoritarian model. This is further enhanced by the 
existence of alternative broadcast media (new 'independent' 
operators) with a resulting different media culture. 
This discussion serves to highlight the predominant contradictions 
that exist within the political environment of South Africa ·today. 
The anomalies within the wider society are also prevalent within the 
broadcast medium and it shall be necessary to show exactly where 
these exist within the available radio and television in South 
Africa. 
These anomalies are widespread and include the movement away from 
ethnically based language stations by the SABC; the emergence of 
'independent' radio and television stations thus breaking the SABC 
monopoly; the adaptation of SABC programming in the face of 
competition and the relaying by the SABC of entertainment programming 
that under the Albert Hertzog era would have been unacceptable. [see 
.Chapter Three] . 
The contradictions are highlighted when taking into account the 
opposing views presented by those on the far-left and far-right of 
the political spectrum. As with their criticism of the government of 
the day, there remains a widely disparate view on the role of the 
SABC within the South African.context which also. highlights certain 
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visible inconsistencies within broadcasting policy. 
It should be noted that many of the component elements that together 
create such contradictions correspond with the component elements of 
the De Fleur model as outlined in Chapter Two [also see De Fleur and 
Ball-Rokeach, 1982:173-176]. In assessing the contradictions 
presented in this chapter, it will be important to note this 
correlation in showing just how the broadcast media in-South Africa 
is also a function of the social system operational. The vital 
element here is that such a social system is one that is moving away 
from the conservative ideological rigidity of the past due to the 
changing dynamics and influence of its component elements. 
The key question is to discover what form these anomali~s take and 
why have they arisen? This contributes to finding some clarity 
regarding the characteristics of broadcasting in South Africa and to 
clearly delineate the bias (Chapter Four) from the apparent 
anomalies. As shall be seen, these anomalies are evident to a lesser 
or greater degree throughout the major broadcasting services 
operational within South Africa and are also evident withinrthe 
State-run broadcasting corporation. 
5.1 THE ANOMALIES OF RADIO IN SOUTH AFRICA: 
"Black" Radio in English - Radio Metro: 
Although the advent of television has recently dominated the analysis 
of broadcasting in South Africa, it is crucial to recognize the role 
radio plays in highlighting very definite anomalies within the 
broadcasting medium in South Africa. Indeed, whilst television may be 
the glamour medium, any tentative steps towards contradictions within 
the broadcast media may well initially manifest themselves in the 
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radio n~twork as radio's influence may not be perceived as effective 
as that of television whilst remaining financially less draining. 
It is evident that the radio services provided by the SABC have 
historically been as racially segregated as possible. The SABC 
operates 23 radio stations with much of these being distinct Black 
language services like Radios Tsonga, Zulu, Ndebele as well as the 
recent addition of Radio Lotus serving Indian listeners. [see SABC 
Report, 1988:37]. 
These differing services may be seen as simply providing listeners 
with a service in their home language with which they are most 
comfortable and which may be an essential cultural requirement. 
However, this choice is larg~ly confined to the services of the SABC 
although English speakers are able to tune into foreign broadcasts 
(Radio Moscow; BBC; Voice of America) and receive news from an 
alternative source whereas few foreign Xhosa and Tswana broadcasts 
exist. 
The existence of this multitude of separate services may also be 
seen as a perpetuation of the Apartheid ideology and an extension of 
the desire to see each individual Black group attain independence 
through its own homeland. Heribert Adam [Hachten and Giffard, 
1984:220] has suggested that radio can be seen as 11 one of the most 
powerful tools of social control over the urban African 11 • 
Drury [Hachten and Giffard, 1984:220] has suggested that 11 Radio Bantu 
is one of the most obvious, and most expensive features of Apartheid. 
It does an undeniable amount of good and, in the mind of its critics, 
an undeniable amount of bad, in that it of course gives the 
Government an ideal medium for political propaganda and persuasion 11 • 
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There is little evidence to suggest whether such propaganda succeeds 
although research quoted by Hachten and Giffard [1984:220] indicates 
that these services and the propaganda broadcast does serve to 
perpetuate a feeling of 11 separateness 11 and thus avoids any 
11 nationalistic or integrative tendencies among Blacks by reinforcing 
tribal and traditional differences 11 • This therefore can be seen as 
the extension of the 11 Divide and Rule 11 tactic that has for decades 
been part of the National Party 1 s unwritten policy in eliminating a 
"I 
black nationalistic consciousness. 
Hachten and Giffard [1984:221] tend to qualify the effect of such a 
broadcasting policy. They suggest there remains a split in the 
acceptance 'of the SABC by the Black population. It would seem that 
the SABC is more popular amongst older conservative Blacks than with 
the more militant younger generation who are aware of the the 
manipulative message that is directed at them. 
However, th~~ policy of language separation was ended with the 
introduction of the Radio Metro service on 01 September 1986. Here, 
the SABC broke with their policy of the past and instituted their 
first radio station aimed at Blacks broadcasting purely in English. 
The station, broadcasting on MW, was targeted at the large urban 
Black population of the PWV although there is 11 even some spillover 
into a White, urban, young listenership 11 • [Green and Lascaris, 
1988:74]. Metro 1 s format coincided with that of the White oriented 
Radio Five broadcasting popular music, the telephone 1 phone-in 1 
concept that started in the United States and became popular world-
wide. 
Metro 1 s introduction was accompanied by an extensive advertising 
campaign that portrayed the urban Black as a distinct key figure of 
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importance within South Africa who had definite sectional' interests. 
This was contrary to the language and tribal differences that had 
historically been SABC broadcasting policy. [see Appendix B: Figures 
1 and 2]. 
The question remains as to whether the SABC ·genuinely intended this 
new service to personify a new inclusiveness in its handling of the 
urban Black population or was it merely a more sophisticated attempt 
' 
at the co-optation of this group or even just a reaction to 
competition from other radio stations? 
The answer may be a combination of all these factors. There can be 
little doubt that Radio Metro represents a break from the past. The 
fact that all broadcasts are in English accepts the importance of the 
English language as a means of communication thus eliminating the 
need for Afrikaans broadcasting to be forced upon a population that 
rebelled against Afrikaans schooling ih 1976. 
However, critics of the SABC will .point to Metro r~taining the SABC 
character in their news broadcasts thus maintaining the political 
orientation of this new service to influence and channel political 
opinion. This may be as a result of desire on the part of the SABC 
and their parent authorities to take advantage of the massive and 
recent urbanization of Blacks and the resultant establishment of an 
ever increasing Black middle class with increased spending power. 
This may also be a f~ctor in the introduction of the TV2 abd TV3 
services. 
Metro also came into being at a time when SABC listenership was being 
challenged by a non-SABC Bophuthatswana radio station, Radio Bop [see 
Appendix B: Figure 2a], which initiated English language programming 
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for Blacks in the Transvaal. Metro could therefore be seen as a 
reaction to this competition as well as that posed by Bop TV in its 
attempts to reach the massive Soweto audience~ [see denial by the 
SABC in Star:09/08/1986]. 
The third reason for this break with tradition on the part of the 
SABC could be the financial crisis it found itself in during the mid-
1980's (referred to in Chapter Four) and the simultaneous increase in 
the consumer power of the urban Blacks that would encourage increased 
advertising expenditure on the part of advertisers resulting in 
increased revenue for the SABC. It would therefore be financially 
beneficial for the SABC to exploit these conditions by creating a new 
service. 
These reasons were possibly important motivating factors in the 
establishment of Radio Metro. However, the mere existence of such a 
service must indicate an acceptance into the broader South Africa of 
' 
a politically significant sector of the population which 
historically, has had to identify with their respective 'homelands' 
rather than being regarded as permanent residents within South 
Africa. This ·is particularly evident as a function of 
Green and Lascaris [1988:74] have suggested that 11 traditionally the 
points of difference in establishing an identity for a radio station 
were geographic location, language and ethnicity. Closer examination 
shows that ethnicity is not an impenetrable barr~er and probably 
never was for our linguistically talented Black population''. I~deed, 
this factor may well have been realized by the SABC and their 
controllers. 
The desire of the SABC to provide this service may be seen as shift 
in attitude even though some motivations may reflect the vested 
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political and/or economic interests of the corporation. Radio Metro, 
therefore, highlights one of the key anomalies in South African 
broadcasting. 
The Role of the 11 Independents 11 - CapHal; 702 and Bop: 
The second key anomaly is that of competition in radio. In the 
preceding chapters, mention has been made of the extent to which the 
SABC monopolizes the airwaves. Indeed, the provisions of the 
Broadcasting Act only allows transmissions to be undertaken by the 
State-run broadcasting enterprise. Ironically however, the National 
Party 1 s own policy of Separate Development/Apartheid and the creation 
of nominally 1 independent 1 homelands has led to the establishment of 
competitive operators. 
In their desire to establish 1 independent', internationally 
recognized and viable homelands, it was necessary for the South 
African government to provide these 'states' with symbols of their 
own independence with which the local population could identify. This 
includes the erection of parliament buildings in the respective 
capitals, the c~eation of national flags and anthems, the building of 
airports and sports stadiums and ironically, the ability for these 
states to broadcast independently for themselves, even across their 
own borders. 
A distinctive broadcasting service is a vital element of the symbols 
of independence. However, geographically many of these homelands 
often comprise multiple tracts of land close to the major industrial 
areas of greater South Africa causing considerable signal spill-over 
and result in virtual economic dependence on South Africa. These 
services may therefore be classed as virtually operating within South 
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Africa although their ownership and their transmissions originate 
from across the b~rder. The major actors in this regard are Capital 
Radio, Radio 702 and Radio Bop. 
All three stations are, in the words of 702's Gary Edwards, 
"independent licensed companies and neither the South African 
Government nor the SABC can touch us. They are separate organizations 
in separate countries''. [Sunday Tribune:22/05/1983]. At the same 
time, though, the reliance upon revenue from South Africa is 
highlighted by Capital's admission that ''although the station is 
completely owned by the Transkeian Government, 99% of our advertising 
revenue comes from South Africa so it's not our intention to buck the 
system''. [Sunday Tribune:22/05/1983]. 
Capital Radio broadcasts from the Transkei on medium wave (MW), fM 
and on short-wave to a largely daytime audience stretching from Port 
Elizabeth in the South to Richards Bay in the North. [see Appendix C: 
Figure 1]. Although its transmitters are located in the Transkei, 
programming originates from studios in the Milner Park shopping 
centre in Johannesburg and is sent via landline to Umtata where it is 
relayed to its transmitters. 
Radio 702, broadcasting from Ga-Rankua, north-west of Pretoria 
managed within a few years of its inception to become a major threat 
to the SABC in terms of listenership. Initially, both stations (with 
Capital) pitched their programming at the 16-24 age bracket and 
successfully launched new radio concepts that shifted listeners from 
the SABC's relatively outdated services. [see Sunday Times, 
30/06/1985 and see Appendix A: Figure 3]. 
The resulting key anomaly was the introduction of alternative 
newscasts. David Wigston of th~ Unisa Department of Communication 
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found that when compared with the SABC' s Radio Highveld, 11 702 
provided an opportunity for critics of the status quo to be heard". 
['Star:08/08/1987]. Wigston also found that 702 news was more 
"appealing and snappier" and in reference to news reports dealing 
with the repeal of the Mixed Marriages Act and Section 16 of the 
Immorality Act, found that "Radio 702 1 s report was dialectic in 
structure posing the pros and cons of the issue while Radio 
Highveld's was ironic, using a distant scepticism to avoid polemic 
·" situations inherent in the event". [The Star:08/07/1987]. This 
highlights the differing news-styles operational as well as the 
differing broadcasting cultures now available to the South African 
listenership. 
From an interview wit~ a Capital Radio free-lance journalist 
[29/06/1988], it would seem that Capital initially presented a 
11 progressive 1' news service. Many news items carried were simply not 
touched by the SABC such as detailed unrest coverage in the nightly 
news background programme during the 1984-1984 period. Capital's news 
included 11 a random sampling of topie's included news on pass raids, 
trade unions, the British anti-apartheid movement, detainees, black 
protest against apartheid, rent and bread price increases, few of 
which were featured on the SABC 11 ; [Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli, 
1989:141]. 
Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli also highlight Capital's use of news as a 
11 process 11 which follows a particular news story or set of events over 
a period of time as opposed to the SABC's 11 isola~ed 11 p.pproach where a 
particular news story may be presented without highlighting the build 
up to it thus causing a "state of panic". [Keyan and Ruth Tomasel 1 i, 
1989:142]. 
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Capital may therefore be seen as 11 one of the few mass media in South 
A f r i ca try i n g to P.r e sen t an a 1 t er n at i v e v o i c e to t he h i g h 1 y 
controlled SABC 11 [Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:143] having 
11 exploited their South African-created status of 1 independence' 11 • 
[Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli, 1988:89-90]. It should be noted that 
whilst these 'independent' stations (particularly Radio Bop) had an 
anti-South African orientation they largely supported their own local 
autocracies. 
However, technical problems and resulting poor reception quality bf 
Capital's broadcasts coupled with their geographical location _have 
sorely affected the operation of the station. In addition, are 
problems encountered with the post-office upon which Capital is 
dependent for its transmissions; the allocation of frequencies 
(Capital broadcasts on 585Khz which is close to the SABC's 558Khz 
which causes interference) and other unknown sources of interference 
i~ the Capital signal. [Interview with unnamed Capital journalist, 
29/06/1988]. 
There also exists a degree of interference from the Transkeian 
Government with ''little coverage g~ven to the internal Transkei 
situation 11 even during the military take-over in December 1977. 
[Interview with Capital Radio free-lance journalist, 29/06/1988]. 
There is also harassment from the SABC and in 1985 both Capital Radio 
and 702 were prevented from covering certain ~ajar sports events 
because the 11 SABC demanded exclusive rights 11 [Sunday Tribune: 
21/07/1985] thus affecting the advertising revenue of the independent 
stations. Further covert restrictions were apparent during the 1987 
General Election when the opposition Progressive Federal Party (PFP) 
were barred from buying advertising time on Capital Radio. [Interview 
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with Neil Ross of the PFP, 24/10/1988]. 
Naturally, the reliance upon revenue from South African sources in 
advertising will mitigate against the independents taking a 
particularly controversial line lest their advertisers feel 
threatened in any way. This suggests considerable self-censorship and 
restraint in these stations' political output. 
Notwithstanding these factors working against the successful 
operation of independent radio stations; they have nevertheless 
proved to have a major impact on the South African broadcasting ~cene 
and have provided the SABC with competition in the form of 
alternative news and entertainment broadcasts as well as challenging 
the SABC to match and better these services. The break with the SABC 
newscast monopoly now allows the listener to re-tune to a competing 
station confuting the past authoritarian exclusivity. 
The Liberalizing Effects of Competition on SABC Radio: 
The Introduction of Controversial Programming: 
The key b~nefit to listeners from this competition was the 
introduction of more controversial programming. The new independent 
radio stations, whilst reluctant to broadcast political controversy, 
did begin to cover controversial social items. This involved the 
concept of 11 live phone-in 11 shows that utilized audience participation 
in discussing a host of controversial medical, moral and particularly 
sexual topics. [see Gary Edwards of Radio 702 in Sunday 
Tribune:22/05/1983]. 
This meant that new material was being presented to the South African 
radio listener that was born out of a different media culture to that 
of the control orientation of the SABC. The South African radio 
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listener could now actually have his own view heard and hear non-SABC 
news presentation within a semi-liberal framework on these radio 
stations. That was indeed a break with the past and of great 
significance 'in providing an outlet for grievances which had not 
previously existed. 
The importance of the independents in pioneering this element of 
broadcasting freedom became even more appatent when the SABC through 
its Radio Five service overhauled much of its existing staid 
programming to also include live phone-in shows on controversial 
subjects that had never been tackied before. Until the early 1980's 
much of Radio Five's programming had been pre-recorded precluding the 
potential for controversy. 
The Employment of Anti-Establishment Staffers: 
Another essential characteristic of the independents was their 
attraction of a range of disc-jockeys that were often either of 
British origin or were ex-staff members of the SABC. This implied 
their representing a more liberal ideology than those who worked 
within the constrained environment of the SABC and resulted in the 
broadcasting of contradictory viewpoints to that heard on the SABC 
due to their anti-control broadcasting culture. This too impacted 
I 
upon the SABC where its own Radio Five announcers seem to reflect a 
greater degree of independence in their remarks and references rather 
than constantly having to toe the pro-government SABC stance. 
Therefore, the competition created by the independents meant that for 
the first time, the various radio ~tations were competing with 
salaries and incentives in order to attract the most popular 
announcers. Here, the SABC also played a role in the free market for 
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disc-jockeys and freely sought those that had an independent 
(politically) bias thus exposing themselves directly to staff members 
broadcasting to millions of South Africans who were not of the SABC 
controlled broad~asting culture, and therefore, the Government 
viewpoint. 
The Move away from Language Parity: 
Most importantly, whilst the SABC has hi~torically insisted on 
bilingualism (English and Afrikaans language parity) for most of its 
services, the Radio Five service now broadcasts most of its 
programmes in English. This indicated an acceptance by the SABC that 
if it wanted to compete for a larger market share it would have to 
allow Afrikaner youth to be exposed to English pop culture and a 
resulting non-collaborationist (with the ruling elite) broadcasting 
culture. 
This lack of Afrikaans programming has received much criticism from 
the Afrikaanse Taal en Kultuur Vereniging (ATKV) who stated that 11 Van 
die omroepers op Radio 5, soos David Blood, het blykbaar geen respek 
vir Afrikaans nie en kan dit oak nie praat nie 11 • [Die 
Burger:16/08/1986]. 
Technological Change: 
The threat of competition forced the SABC to unleash its most 
powerful weapon in the battle for listeners - namely that of superior 
technology in the broadcast of its services which resulted in Radio 5 
and Radios Good Hope and Highveld converting to FM Stereo - a 
facility of which the 'independents' are prevented from utilizing. 
The move to stereo has seen 702 respond by changing its format 11 to 
target our programmes at the upper-income over 35 1 s 11 • [Sunday Times 
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Magazine:18/06/1989] indicating a shift away from music to news. This 
prompted 702 to advertise 11 If you like your news uncut and unbiased 
you're tuned to the right station". [see 702 advertisements in 
Appendix B: Figures 3a and 3b]. 702 has therefore become targetted at 
the Radio South Africa audience and may result in further competition 
between these two stations. 
Anomalies within Existing Services of SABC Radio: 
Whilst it has~been evident that the SABC has entered the era of radio 
competition with regard to its Black services (Radio Metro) and to 
its youth market (Radio Five), the rest of its programming remains as 
uncontroversial and politically subservient as always. The newly 
commercialized 11 cultural 11 services of Radio South Africa/Radio Suid 
Afrika still maintain the controversial 11 Comment 11 programme although 
there has been some semblance of political liberaliz~tion in the 
"Radio Today" programme broadcast in the peak audience breakfast 
time-slot on Radio South Africa. 
. . . 
Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli [1989:107] report that initially, this 
programme was "backed up by a team of critical staffers who reported 
mainly from a liberal-humanist perspective". Effort was also made by 
certain announcers to distance themse·lves from the 11 Comment 11 segment 
of the Radio Today programme by announcing the programme very clearly 
as being "an SABC Comment" emphasizing that the views expressed 
therein were that of the SABC and did not represent that of the 
announcing staff. [Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli, 1989:107]. 
It should also be noted that the daily "Parliamentary Report" which 
is carried on this programme during the Parliamentary session tends 
to provide an unbiased and objective overview of key speeches made in 
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parliament on the previous day lending a considerable amount of air-
time to opposition speakers. 
Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli argue that the Radio Today programme should 
be seen as 11 a token liberal gesture from the SABC to distract 
attention from a 11 its other conservat i sm 11 • [Keyan and Ruth 
Tomaselli, 1989:107]. If this is the case then the question must be 
asked as to why the SABC ha~ chosen this specific programme as its 
11 token gesture''? It would seem strange that the only semblance of 
broadcasting liberalism is contained in a programme that is in one of 
the highest listenership slots on that particular radio channel. [see 
AMPS 1987-1988 figures]. This programme has however, been shortened 
thus losing some of its progressive orientation. 
Indeed, Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli are right when they argue that the 
caliber of the staffers of such programme~ are vital in defining the 
character of such shows. It may be apparent that liberal staffers 
will tend to test the system as far as it will go and may well leave 
the SABC when frustrated or silenced. Nevertheless, the system is 
constantly being tested by individuals from across the political 
spectrum (whether correspondents or presenters) and the anomalies 
that exist surroundin~ Radio Today may well be examples of this. 
The fact that individuals are able to run contrary to the SABC news 
department hierarchy (albeit in a very limited way) indicates a 
semblance of liberalism and is therefore an anomaly within the SABC 
news programming. It should also be noted that programmes such as 
\ 
11 Women's World 11 and 11 Talking of Books'' also tend to offer items that 
may contradict the SABC viewpoint albeit within the context of non-
controversial material. Each individual that has chosen to work 
within the 'system' may try to stretch the system as far as he can. 
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It should also be noted· that whilst hardly described as a threat to 
the SABC, permission has been granted for the religious station 
''Radio Kansel/Radio Pulpit 0 to lease a portion of the SABC Radio 2000 
FM transmitter time. This is the first independent radio station to 
be allowed to broadcast on FM albeit within the narrow confines of 
religious broadcasting. 
-
Lastly, the SABC's external service Radio RSA whilst historically not 
criticized to the extent that the domestic services were [see Chapter 
Three], has recently received a favourable review. [see Browne, 
1987:17-24]. Browne suggests that this service highlights the 
negatives of Black Africa as well as South Africa that could indicate 
that "Radio RSA is attempting to behave in the time-honoured 
journalistic tradition that promotes a revelation of the warts and 
blemishes of one's own nation as well as other nations". This 
additionally indicates a degree of liberalization within the external 
service operated by the SABC. 
Competition from Afar - Short-wave Alternatives 
The apparent political bias of the SABC coupled with considerable 
media restrictions may promote radio listeners to seek alternative 
sources of information such as those provided by short-wave 
broadcasters like the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) or VOA 
(Voice of America). 
Michael Hornsby, the f~rmer BBC correspondent for Southern Africa has 
said that because there exists a relatively critical English language 
press in South Africa, the need to look to overseas broadcasts has 
been somewhat limited. He has, however, admitted that ''the BBC only 
really comes into its own when the local press is for some reason 
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prevented from reporting what is happening 11 • [ 11 50 Years of 
Broadcasting to the ·world", 1982:17]. Such a scenario became 
particularly acute during the imposition of the State of Emergency in 
1985. 
The increased demand for objective news was recognized by the majrir 
international broadcasters who increased their coverage accordingly. 
This involved both the VOA and BBC commissioning new transmitter 
networks to improve their reception audio quality as well as 
embarking on extensive advertising campaigns in the South African 
press during 1985 and 1986 where "reliable news" was offered [see 
Appendix B: Figures 4 and 5]. 
The extent of BBC coverage of the unrest within South Africa was such 
that it prompted Cape Times columnist Guy Willoughby to suggest that 
this is "about as close to reliable local coverage as you can get. 
London, it seems, is c 1 oser to Soweto than Auck 1 and Park 11 • I Cape 
Times:14/08/1986]. 
It should also be noted that it is not only the Western nations that 
direct broadcasts towards South Africa. Radios Havana, Berlin 
International (East Germany) and Moscow all target specific 
broadcasts to South Africa with Moscow now broadcasting a segment of 
its programming in Afrikaans. Alternatives to the SABC also come from 
monitored ANC broadcasts (known as Radio Freedom) that may emanate 
from facilities in Zambia and Tanzania or even from the Voice of 
Revolutionary Ethiopia [information-supplied by the South African 
Short-wave Listeners club]. 
Whilst these broadcasts beamed at South Africa are often highly 
critical of the National Party, the authorities engage in virtually 
no audible jamming (signal interference of br9adcast) resulting in 
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these alternative views being relatively freely available ~gain 
flouting the normative authoritarian theory. 
However, whilst short-wave broadcasts remain a viable and distinct 
option to the services of the SABC and 61% of all households in South 
Africa have access thereto [see Appendix A: Figure 4], a United 
States Information Services survey conducted in November/December of 
1984 has found that 11 there is relatively little regular (at least 
once a week) listening to foreign stations 11 with only 11 1.6% of 
Whites; 0.2% ~f Blacks; 1.6% of Coloureds and 1.6% of Asians 
listening to the BBC 11 • [Information supplied by BBC Audience Research 
Department]. 
This may be due to the high import duties placed on quality short-
wave receivers as well as the rand exchange rate making electronics 
extremely costly. Many short-wave signals are also difficult to 
locate. and involve much effort on the part of the listener which 
mitigates against widespread usage and is coupled with listener 
ignorance in locating specific foreign broadcasts. However, an 
opinion poll taken during 1986 indeed found a definite move towards 
s~ch broadcasts among SABC listeners. [see The Argus:Ol/09/1986]. 
However, with such a high access ratio there 1s enough scope for 
strong foreign competition to the local SABC services to emerge. 
Whether the population actually takes advantage of the multitude of 
differing short-wave news broadcasts or not, these options-do exist 
and provide the most extensive opposition to the news/public affairs 
programming of the SABC. 
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5.2 THE ANOMALIES IN TELEVISION IN SOUTH AFRICA: 
Over the last 13 years, South Africa has seen its broadcast media 
services change drastically. Radio has changed in character 
reflecting the competition from the independent stations as well as 
due to the introduction of television. This resulted in th~ 
commercialization of the existing 11 cultural 11 services of Radios South 
Africa and Suid Afrika and the demise of an entire radio station -
Springbok Radio. 
~ 
Television has therefore had a major impact on broadcasting in South 
Africa. The key question is whether this new medium has (like radio) 
within it certain anomalies that contradict in any way the overt 
political bias as outl~ned in Chapter Four. Indeed, the introduction 
of television has seen it gain in importance within South Africa in 
terms of biased broadcasts (and resulting authorit~rian orientation) 
as well as becoming the major source of news (64%) for urban whites 
according to ar Omnicheck poll. [Argus:17/12/1986]. 
Independent Television: The Advent of M-NET: 
One of the most important anomalies in diverting from the 
authoritarian model has been the advent of an independent television 
service. Ironically, this was almost a direct result of the 
disastrous effect increasing adspend on television was having on th~ 
newspaper print medium which resulted in the closure and reduced 
readership of newspapers. 
Pressure mounted on the authorities from both the English and 
Afrikaans press to grant a broadcasting license for a subscription 
television (STV) venture that would supplement their own income with 
that of the lucrative television advertising market. [see John Van 
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Zyl, Style magazine, September 1988:38~43]. 
Indeed, it would seem that as a quasi-Governmental body, the SABC 
would hardly be distressed if their advertising lead led to the 
closure of opposition supporting newspapers but, according to John 
Van Zyl, [Style Magazine, September 1988:40] the request for some 
form of Governmental assistance could not be refused when the two 
major Afrikaans press groups (Nasionale Pers and Perskor) added their 
voices to the growing discontent. [see Van Zyl in Style Magazine, 
September 1988:40]. 
The Government relented and agreed to have their television monopoly 
broken as long as "news and 'public affairs' i.e. anything which may 
be conceived of as political, carried on STV (subscription 
television) will be provided by the SABC, and not the newspapers". 
[Tomaselli, Indicator SA, Summer 1986:20]. It should be noted that M-
NET is solely owned by the English and Afrikaans newspaper groups. 
' 
[see Appendix A: Figure 5]. 
The advent of M-NET has caused similar characteristics of competition 
that the SABC radio service had to deal with after the introduction 
of Capital and 702 Radio. Whilst M-NET is constrained in terms of not 
being able to present formal newscasts, they are nevertheless testing 
the provisions of their charter to the limit. 
By allowing an 'independent' television service to operate, the SABC 
are at the very least allowing a different entertainment culture to 
develop. Much like the imaginative formatting of independent radio 
challenged the conservative SABC programmes, so the conservative 
nature of SABC-TV has adapted over the years. M-NET, with their all-
movie format, has meant that South African viewers now can watch just 
180 
about any subject matter (through feature films) at almost any time 
of the afternoon or evening. 
The SABC has responded to this challenge also purchasing popular 11 low 
taste content 11 programming. This has increased the battle for 
viewership as both net~orks go after the largest financial rewards 
based upon advertising revenue and in so doing create a climate of 
competition lacking in authoritarian characteristics. [see Chapter 2 
and De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1982:172-173]. 
There can be little doubt that this has contributed to a 
liberalization in terms of the subject matter entering viewers homes 
and is again often in contrast to_the strict religious ethic that is 
often propounded by Governm~nt speakers. This is proved through 
programming on Sundays and religious public holidays where whilst the 
SABC may concentrate on religiously acceptable farei M-NET is able to 
present bold programmes to attract an even higher audience. 
Th~ M-NET entertainment.programming not only-competes with religion 
on a Sunday evening b~t also with the political on a nightly basis. 
\ 
Whilst SABC schedule their main evening newscast, 11 Network 11 at 20h00 
every evening for one hour, M-NET provides a definite entertainment 
alternative during this prime viewing slot. 
This means that the SABC is prepared to lose some of its all-
important news audience in favour of the entertainment programming of 
M-NET. ·indeed, this could encourage the SABC to make its news more 
attractive as can be seen by the introduction of the 11 Network 11 
programme and resulting format changes where a multiple of 
newsreaders are used for differing subjects. 
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Again, it should also be noted that M-NET broadcast an abundance of 
American programmes. Often these imports shown are those the SABC may 
find unacceptable as M-NET's transmission of "Soapu and the 
cont rovers i a 1 "Roots 11 bear out. The showing of "Roots 11 was indeed 
significant as it was originally rejected by the SABC. [see Pollak, 
1981:73]. 
Not only does M-NET provide direct competition in this area, it also 
is beginning to supply its own local programming as it is obliged to 
do this in terms of its license to operate. It has recently embarked 
on its own magazine programme, "Carte Blanche", which has to date 
raised issues which border on the political and seem unafraid to 
provide a wider perspective on issues than that of similar SABC 
programmes. 
Whilst this can not be said in any way to compete with the formal 
news bullettns of the SABC, such M-NET programmes are able to 
highlight alternative angles on subjects that may be put on the back 
burner by the SABC. M-NET have also bought certain overseas news 
programmes. and show these regularly as examples of investigative 
television journalism at its best. M-NET and Bop-Tv both transmit the 
Australian 11 60 Minutes" show whilst M-NET have recently secured the 
rights to the BBC "Newsnight" programme which clearly contra~ts with 
the subservient style of SABC news and public affairs programming. M-
NET also tends to involve its Coloured and Indian continuity 
announcers in a wide range of roles that contrasts with the SABC TVl 
and TV2/3 split. 
Perhaps the most daring break with the SABC control tradition has 
been M-NET's production of a 11 chat show" series (entitled 11 Indaba 11 ) 
hosted by the anti-Apartheid actor and playwright Pieter Dirk Uys. 
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Uys' interviews with South African personalities and politicians are 
conducted in a satirical and informal manner and are peppered with 
innuendoes parodying the ruling elite. 
Indeed, the M-NET 11 open window" programming which allows non-decoder 
.holders to view M-NET programmes has been allocated a time slot by 
the SABC from 18h15-20h00 thus avoiding any competition the 
subscription channel may provide for the main evening SABC TVl 
newscasts. As of August 1989, this time slot changed to 18h00-19h00 
as M-NET have reached their quota of subscribers upon which the 
original concession was based. Thts enables them to directly compete 
with the 18h00 news bulletin. 
Eric Louw and Ruth Tomaselli have suggested that the governmental 
incentive for the intfoduction of M-NET has been the bringing in of 
the traditional opposition English press groups to a position of 
subservience where the "Press houses get the money and the SABC gets 
the (sole) power 11 • [The Journalist, March 1987:6]. Whilst this may 
be true, the Afrikaans Press groups of Perskor and Nasionale Pers 
that share in the STV system will be faced with the influence of the 
English language press (with which they are partners) and if the 
development of the aforementioned domestic programming is anything to 
go by, this is indeed a by-product of such co-operation. 
It should also be noted that M-NET's magazine programmes are shown 
live allowing not only for the airing of controversial topics but 
also for a certain degree of unpredictability that is a function of 
live broadcasting and can be contrasted with the more conservative 
SABC whose live broadcasts are usually confined to non-controversial 
magazine programmes and sport. 
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M-NET has also proved ~o be a sanctuary for ex SABC staff members and 
, it is likely that the more independent minded journalists and 
staffers (particularly those who feel constrained. at the SABC) will 
increasingly find a _home in the new subscription service since it is 
obliged, and has undertaken to, increase its local content in 
'· programming and will therefore need the services of experienced 
personnel. This indicates that M-NET's local programming may provide 
an alternative socio-political culture much like th~t of the 
independent radio stations where 11 greater freedom, imaginative 
paprogramming and money 11 are on offer.· [see Sunday Times, 
23/07/1989]. 
Indeed, the existence of M-NET al.lows for a new media identity, in 
opposition to that of the SABC within the South African 
communications network. Technically, the existence of M-NET (and the 
1 independent 1 radio stations) also means the erection of new 
transmitters and new communication facilities notwithstanding the 
heavy restrictions placed upon Bop-TV to prevent ftny spillage to 
White areas. All of this is occurring in a country which has over the 
last ten years centralized its authority and power bases under a 
State of Emergency. 
The Move Away from Language Parity - English Domination: 
A feature of both SABC-TV4 and M~NET's programming has been their 
overexposure of programmes in English. This contrasts strongly with 
the early SABC-TV attempts at complete language parity in terms of 
hours broadcast. Most M-NET programmes are in English with a few 
being simulcast in Afrikaans as per the M-NET charter. The SABC has 
also been party to this resulting in only 10% of the total TV4 
viewing time being in Afrikaans. [see Die Burger:l6/08/1986]. Most 
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English (and Afrikaans)viewers are no longer forced to watch 
programmes in Afrikaans as the English soundtrack is transmitted 
simultaneously on the FM radio network of the SABC indicating a move 
away from the forced bilingualism of the early years of SABC-TV. 
This newer feature of television broadcasting has also brought with 
it considerable criticism· from the Afrikaner Taal en 
Kultuurvereniging (ATKV) to the effect that Afrikaans was being 
neglected at the expense of English programming. [see Die 
Burger:16/08/1986]. 
The well known Afrikaans author, WA De Klerk is quoted as saying, 
11 Afrikaans word al hoe meer in 'n hoekie ingedryf. Ek is verslae, 
want dit was met groot moeite wat Afrikaners vir horn 'n trotse plek 
in die uitsaaiwese oopgetrap het 11 • [from Die Vaderland:l2/04/1986 and 
in Bothma, 1988:177]. In an editorial, Beeld newspaper said that 
11 these changes were a serious encroachment on equal language rights 
and were probably an effort by the SABC to safeguard its considerable 
income from advertisements in Engli'sh. 11 [The Cape Times, 19/08/1986]. 
Indeed, the increasing commercialization of the television service 
a s a bu s i n e s s en t er pr i s e [ s e e Co ll i n g s i n 11 Le ad er s h i p •i Vo l . 7 
No.3:190-196] and the increased usage of sponsorship is also likely 
to move the SABC away from insisting on language parity and towards 
the transmission of programmes based on popularity and high 
viewership ratings which usually are those broadcast in their 
original English. This is already evident in the Top 20 television 
ratings which show that 75% of such shows are broadcast in English. 
[see Appendix A: Figure 6]. 
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The incremental commercialization of the SABC will, according to 
Green and .Lascaris [1988:71], be further emphasized by the 
utilization of electtonic 1 peoplemeters 1 reseafch devices and the 
resulting more accurate audience research findings. The advent of 
such advanced technology is likely to increase the competitiveness of 
the SABC thus increasing its adherence to the business motive rather 
than the ideological. This will also promot~ a move towards more 
popularist programming away from rigid language parity. 
The pro-English language bias may however be seen as an indication of 
the financial rather than ideological motivations at the core of 
broadcasting philosophy. Increasing English speaking support for the 
National Party may also have dissipated the fears of the Afrikanei 
establishment as to the effects of English popular culture making it 
increasingly easier to show such programming. 
Integrationist Progra11111ing - American Domination: 
P~rhaps one of the most important anomalies that exist within the 
realm of television programming within South Afri£a is in the 
transmission of certain categories of programming by the state run 
SABC-TV (and other independent operators). South Africa is barred 
.from purchasing British television material due to the Actors Equity 
ruling prohibiting sales to this country. Ironically, the lack of 
British programming means that in terms of 'providing entertainment, 
SABC programme buyers are forced to turn to the United States. 
Indeed, the average local content of English drama on TVl is only 
15.28% indicating the foreign domination of this category. [see 
Appendix A: Figure 7 (a} 7 (b) and 1988 SABC Annual Report:41-43]. 
This fact is ~pupled with the high production costs of manufacturing 
domestic programmes and the relatively low cost of acquiring 
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syndicated sh,ows from thg United States. As Head [1985:230-232] 
shows, 11 on average domestically produced programmes cost eight times 
as much a~ syndicated prog~ammes 11 resulting in the the relatively low 
cost per half.;.hour episode of an imported programme in South Africa 
at US$1500. Programmes dubbed into Afrikaans still remain five times 
cheaper than if made locally. [Interview with Dr. D.P. Van Vuuren, 
Head of the SABC Audience Research Unit, 10 July 1989]. 
Since the inception of television in 1976, the SABC has constantly 
aired most of the current Top 60 United States Nielsen ratings 
entertainment programming. [see US Television ratings in USA Today, 
14/12/1988]. The SABC is therefore increasingly prepared to tran~mit 
most of the most popular television shows regardless of their content 
or subject matter which should be compared in the historical context 
with the extreme forms of Verwoerdian Apartheid 'and the personal' bias 
of personalities ljke Albert Hertzog who dominated the control of the 
media during the 1960 1 s. 
One of the.most popular forms of entertainment promoted by the SABC 
since the inception of television has been the half-hour situation 
comedy (sitcom) often either entirely involving Black actors or at 
least integrating Blacks into the lives of Whites. The Black 
orientation may well be seen as part of the growing influence evolved 
for themselves in the American body politic [and social system of De 
Fleur - see De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1982:172-181] and is reflected 
through the popular mass medium of television. 
The best known and universally popular (indeed often rated ~he most 
popular show on American television) is The Cosby Show. This show 
depicts an, upper middle-class Black American family (both parents are 
depicted as professionals) interrelating with their family on a micro 
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Indeed, the shift in. the South African society away from job 
reservation and towards an integrated and interdependent economic 
workforce (Black or White) is what is being portrayed to a large 
extent in the multitude of American television broadcast and 
corresponds with Heribert Adam's view [1987:211] that a racially 
mixed workplace environment enables a better understanding between 
the groups to emerge and results tn ''the functional basis for racial 
groupings disappearing''. The constant emphasis on racial harmony 
.. . 
within the popular American television culture must be of some 
benefit and could hardly be seen to have a negative impact on race 
relations in South Africa. 
Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli [1989:138], however, suggests that the 
transmission of American television programmes "legitimizes the 
capitalist ethic and the stability of the class structure'' and 
therefore shows "the argument that multi-racial series have been in 
opposition to the 'Broederbond Masterplan'to be inadequate''·. Indeed, 
~ 
the programming of the SABC certainly is not geared at rocking the 
boat of the existing class order within South Africa. With American 
programming that promotes the Capitalist ethic, the SABC is merely 
promoting the "Free Enterprise" rhetoric that is so popular with 
governmental speakers. Indeed, this forms the basis of De Fleur's 
social system [De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1982:176-178] from which 
such programming emanates (the USA). 
However, this does not me~n that the mere existence on a daily basis 
of Government sanctioned non-racial programming portraying Blacks and 
Whites operating on a principle of merit-based individualism, is 
necessarily detrimental to society or more specifically, race 
relations in South Africa. Just as these programmes highlight the 
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advantages of free enterprise, they also highlight the values of 
freedom of speech [see De Fleur and Ball Rokeach, 1972:178] and 
resulting values of equality that can be enjoyed unhindered by the 
entire society. 
Tomaselli [1986:19] also argues that these programmes 11 all feature 
middle class Blacks with American accents who are sufficiently remote 
to be unthreatening 11 • Whilst this may be true, these shows may 
promote the creation of a Black middle class which is one of the 
desires of the ruling National Party either to further the principle 
of co-optation or to genuinely uplift the population. 
It is conceivable that whilst most Whites interact with Blacks in a 
socially hierarchical fashion within South Africa, the visuals of 
middle-class equality may lead to greater acceptance which is 
consciously applied by the SABC to 11 create a better attitudinal 
climate 11 in South Africa. [Interview with Dave Dal ling 02/10/1987]. 
Indeed, it is virtually impossible to quantify the effects of this 
on viewers and Keyan and Ruth Tomaselli [1989:136] admit that 
11 unfortunately no survey of audience response has been done on these 
programmes in South Africa and our observations, at this stage, must 
be regarded as speculative". 
The important point to re-emphasize is whatever the merits and 
demerits of American programming, a fundamental characteristic of 
drama series and sitcoms is the non-racial portrayal of life and 
where racism is involved, it is treated in a sensitive manner that 
exposes injustice and attempts to educate against it. 
The recently screened classic Western series 11 Gunsmoke 11 (TV4) has 
been referred to, within the American context , as 11 teaching us about 
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race relations and showing us how to defend human rights when nobody 
was doing it overtly 11 • [Horace Newcombe, Chairman of the Department 
of Radio, Television and Communications at the University of Texas on 
M-NET broadcast 16/04/1989]. 
Just as this description may apply to the USA in the 1940 1 s and 
1950 1 s, the shows may well be intended to give South African Whites a 
better view of Blacks and to emphasize US superiority in race 
relations. Indeed, the portrayal of integration highlights the 
positive nature of racial mixing and integratidn is not viewed upon 
through the medium of television as something negative. 
Perhaps the closest government reaction to the 1 Cosby 1 type of 
programming comes from an editorial in Die Vaderlan~ [12/08/1985 and 
Bothma, 1988:173] which states that, 11 Die waarde van hierdie 
gemoedelike reeks (The Cosby Show) le daarin dat dit eerder 
ooreenkomste as verskille tussen blankes en swartes wat op diselfde 
sosio-ekonomiese peil leef beklemptoon - almal is maar ewe klein 
mensies, gelyk geskape met diselfde soort probleme - en dat dit 
ongegronde vooroordele afbreek 11 • Indeed, this indicates that the 
programme is not just shown for its entertainment value but may well 
be part of an intentional process to, according to Die Vaderland, 
11 break down unfounded prejudices 11 • 
The extent to which these American television shows portray contrary 
signals to the SABC viewership and deviate from the normative 
authoritarian model is highlighted by criticism from the right-wing 
Conservative Party. In an interview with Dr. Pieter Mulder, the CP 1 s 
spokesman on Broadcasting Service-s and the Film Industry 
[08/06/1988], Mulder agrees that such programming represents a form 
of cultural imperialism where the values of one ~_ociety are being 
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transported to another. Dr. Mulder, however, regards th~ key value as 
an attempt by the Americans 11 to do away with stereotypes within their 
society" and in so doing encourage integration rather than 
separation~ 
The CP have recently presented a list of televisi~n 
programmes(including 11 Matlock 11 ; 11 Miami Vice" and 11 North and South") 
they regard as objectionable. The CP believe that these programmes 
11 represent a distorted view of reality in the United States (which) 
gives the impression that negros have control of the country 11 • This, 
accordi~g to the CP is 11 unacceptable 11 • [Sunday Tribune:31/01/1988]. 
This serves to highlight the CP view that these programmes encourage 
integration and their vehement criticism indicates the extent to 
which they feel their own policy of separation and Verwoerdian 
Apartheid is being threatened and deviated from. 
One must also note domes~ically made material that simulates these 
overseas examples. Whilst locally made dramas that highlight 
integration o~ society may be far more relevant to the South African 
viewer, these have been rare due to the high production costs and 
risk incurred in offending the SABC hierarchy. 
Contrary to this is the example of 11 The Outcast" and a number of 
local Afrikaans dramas that which "quarters formerly taboo subjects 
like mixed blood". [Sunday Star, 22/09/1985]. This indicates that the 
SABC is willing to allow some semblance of controversy having exposed 
its viewers to the American example. Some integration has taken place 
in the genre of 11 Game 11 shows and in a children's entertainment show 
called 11 It 1 s a Knockout" where "White, Coloured and Indian Schools 
were represented competing for cash prizes. 11 [Sunday Times, 
08/12/1985]. 
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However, the SABC is still holding the racially con~roversial shows, 
11 Newlands 11 , 11 Two Weeks in Paradise 11 and 11 People Like Us written and 
- directed by John Cundi 11 and Grey Hofmeyr. [see Sunday 
Tribune:24/05/1987 and Sunday Times, 16/07/1989]. It should be noted 
that these shows represent the work of the more liberal staffers of 
the SABC and with their talents recognized and acclaimed 
(particularly in high viewership ratings), it would seem foolish of 
the SABC to stifle their work. 
Some degree of _liberalization may also be found within Afrikaans 
television. Perhaps the most notable indication is the ethnic sat1re 
contained in the highly acclaimed programmes 11 Kooperasiestories 11 and 
11 Spies en Plessis 11 • These shows indulge in a degree of self ridicule 
which may attack the conservatism of Afrikanerdom in a humerous way. 
Whatever the problems encountered, the existence of such programming 
is a recent manifestation of the introduction of television and 
represents an important anomaly and contradiction with the control 
paradigm of the normative authoritarian model. 
Towards a Common Telev;s;on Culture: 
In his discussion on whether South Africa is a common or plural 
society, Adam [Adam and Moodley, 1987:211] argues that the fact that 
I 
all South Africans 11 share aspirations, Hollywood soap operas and 
leisure activities, jokes, tastes and sacred texts 11 contributes 
towards this country being classified plural and enables it to have a 
better chance at securing a democratic fut~re as an i~tegrated 
society. Indeed, Adam would argue that the cross-cutting enjoyment of 
the aforesaid television programmes indicates the role of the media 
in forging links across historically divisive cleavages. 
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Similarly, Green and Lascaris [1988:70] have suggested that tastes 
are increasingly the .same whether in music, cinema, clothes and 
sport. TV4 with its multi-ethnic viewership is perhaps 11 the primary 
showcase for our increasingly crossover culture''. In this regard, Don 
Beck, has stated that 11 the glitter of Dallas is in line with 
aspirations in Soweto 11 • [The Argus:24/04/1989]. This point is vital 
in arguing that imported American television media, other than 
portraying Blacks and Whites operating on a non-racial basis, also is 
able to creat~ a common culture of television identity. 
If the authorities purposefully encourage the mass media in this way, 
then it may be seen as a unifying factor in society following the 
developmental theory (rather than the authoritarian model) approach 
which encourages 11 positive uses of the media in national 
development 11 • [see McQuail, 1987:120]. Indeed, this cannot be argued 
in any way when analyzing the news/public affairs programming of the 
SABC but can indicate the cross-cultural acceptance of popular 
American programming as having a distinctly non-divisive role in the 
South African society. 
The Role of Advertising: 
The State run SABC are also key actors in perhaps one of the most 
important changes the broadcast media has seen in the last decade - · 
the advent of integrated advertising. Advertising revenue has 
continuously grown to become the major source of revenue for the 
SABC. [See Appendix A: Figure 8] In 1988, it provided over two-thirds 
(68.9%) of the total income of the corporation (R597million) and has 
steadily increased since the introduction of commercial television in 
1978. [see Appendix A: Figure 9. Also see 1988 SABC Annual Report:12] 
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Increasingly, advertisers have seen fit to deracialize their 
advertising. Thi~ could well be as a result of the development of a 
common consumer culture [see Adam and Moodley, 1987:203-214] 
mentioned earlier. It should also be noted that integrated 
programming attracts advertisers who themselves are looking for an 
expanding market. Their appreciation of multi-racial television to 
reach a bigger market would indicate their own liberalistic 
tendencies as born out in the nature of their advertisements. 
This has meant racially integrated advertising on the so-called White 
target television channel of TVl and on TV4. Many major companies 
specifically show integrated work or social conditions with numerous 
advertisement flighted nightly in prime-time viewing hours. Often 
their contents contradicts with existing social practice in. South 
Africa. Amenities are shown to be shared with integration depicted as 
the norm rather than the exception. (see the South African Breweries 
television advertisements). 
The Conservative Party has again criticized the SABC for encouraging 
11 an Americanization process which was taking place by the broadcast 
of film after film, programme after programme and advertisement after 
advertisement showing integrationi. [Prof. Chris Jacobs in The 
Sowetan:26/08/1987]. 
However, Anske Basson of the Department of Communications at the 
University of the Orange Free State found in a survey that 11 65 
percent of Blacks and 35 percent of ·Whites believe that multiracial 
television commercials will help improve race relations and 
accelerate social integration 11 indicating a considerable degree of 
acceptance of such advertising and a perceived benefit such 
advertising can have. [see SA Digest, September 02, 1988]. Hunt and 
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Lascaris [1988:114] also show an increasing acceptability of multi-
racial advertising [see Appendix A: Figure 10]. 
Whilst it is apparent that the SABC needs as much advertising revenue 
it can get, it nevertheless transmits such advertisements 
highlighting an Apartheid-free South Africa as opposed to the more 
distant aforementioned American example. Whilst such situations are 
lacking among locally made television shows, the quantity of 
television advertisements of this nature depicts greater integration 
than SABC commissioned dramatic works. 
It should be noted that whilst the SABC vets all advertisements shown 
on television, M-NET's criteria may differ allowing for 
advertisements refused by the SABC to be broadcast-on the 
subscription channel. 
Contradictions in Formal News\Public Affairs Proqra11111inq: 
It may be apparent that by the exclusion of analysis regarding the 
formal news bulletins offered by the SABC, this is not an area of 
liberalization although some mention needs to be made of the 
"Network" news/public affairs programme. Ruth and Keyan Tomaselli 
are quite correct when they suggest that the introduction of this 
television programme was born out of the ''internal power struggle 
within the SABC" [Die Suid Afrikaan, Somer, 1986:48-50] which was a 
result of the National Party split and resulting formation of the 
Conservative Party which polarized Afrikanerdom. 
The new style of "Network" may have represented an attempt on the 
part of the SABC to increase the attractiveness of its news programme 
and build a higher viewership. Whilst there is little to commend the 
actual formal news broadcasts that comprise the first twenty minutes-
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of every bulletin, the background reports vary greatly within the 
context of a highly controlled broadcast media network. 
This segment of the Network programme has contained some of the most 
pro-Nationalist reports seen on South African television and in 
particular, the Cliff Saunders report on Liberation Theology duri.ng 
October 1986 found the SABC described as "sinking to new depths". 
[Sunday Tribune:19/10/1986]. 
However, Network has also transmitted relatively controversial 
material and during 1988, broadcast a debate on the role of the 
Church with Johan Heyns and Alan Boesak. This indicates that even 
where some of the most explicit forms of pro-government bias are to. 
be found, at the same time, opponents of the South African Government 
are also beamed,into the homes of viewers and given some air-time to 
state their ~ase. 
Ironically, the SABC themselves have brought the ANC into the 
spotlight by gaining special permission to quote speeches and hold 
relatively.friendly interviews with selected members although many 
broadcasts have been aimed to reinforce the ANC/terrorism/Communist 
Party link. 
These •arch enemies• of the state (Joe Slovo) have been shown on 
television and may contribute to a softening in perception on the 
part of the regular viewer. Whilst ANC members appear rarely and in 
edited form, this represents a break with past SABC policy that would 
only allow such voices to be heard if, according to SABC News Editor, 
Sakkie Burger "they renounced violence and became part of the 
negotiation process". [Argus:26/02/1986]. 
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Such broadcasts of opposition members have angered the right wing and 
Louis Bothma of t~e Oranjewerkers has stated that 11 wat egter 
kommerwekkend is, is die toegang wat die land se tradisionele vyande 
tot ons woonkamers het. Van ons vyande het skielik vriende geword. 
Hulle stry vandag die stryd teen apartheid op ons eie televisie met 
die aanmoediging van die regering 11 • [Bothma, 1988:173]. 
11 Network 11 has also been used to inform the public about certain key 
legislative changes. The scrapping of Influx Control saw a 
preparatory programme broadcast Which clearly indicated that th~ 
removal of this piece of legislation would not have a detrimental 
effect on society. 
A recent programme undertaken by reporter Barbara Folsche_r has 
suggested that the Separate Amenities Act is also an obstacle to 
better race relations indicating that direct governmental involvement 
may be instrumental in using such programming in order to soften up a 
conservative electorate into accepting key political and social 
changes indicating an apparent 11 meer progressiewe strekking 11 • 
[Tomaselli, 11 Die Suid Afrikaan 11 , Somer 1986:48]. 
This aspect of broadcasting, if it genuinely moves away from 
discrimination and towards greater democracy can hardly be termed 
authoritarian. In fact, it again may be more applicable to the 
Development Theory where 11 social change 11 and "nation building 11 
becomes important. [see McQuail, 1987,-121]. 
Indeed, it is this perceived use of the media that most angers the 
right-wing in South Africa with Louis Bothma suggesting that 11 die 
SAUK is gebruik om 'n riuwe gemeenskap te kweek waarin ras as 'n 
onderskeidingsfaktor tussen mense totaal en al geignogreer sal word. 
Dit is egter nie al nie. Daar word gestreef om 'n 'nuwe nasie' daar 
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te stel wat random 'n stel gemeenskaplike waardes gebind moet wees 11 • 
[Bothma, 1988:176]. 
Perhaps the clearest liberalizing feature has been the television 
debates between the political parties contesting the 1989 general 
election. The debates were unrestrained and for the first time saw· 
the National Party confronted publically on its policies in this 
format. This new direction came into effect in the last week~ of the 
Botha presid~ncy perhaps indicating the lessening of authoritarian 
influence from this source. 
These contradictions apparent in formal newscasts should be seen, , 
according to Tomaselli, as an attempt 11 om die reformistiese saak te 
stoat ondanks voortdurende ondermyning van reformistiese inisatiewe 
deur die Polisie en die Veiligheidsmagte en moontlik ook die 
nuusdepartement van die SAUK self''. [Die Suid Afrikaan, Somer:48] . 
. This analysis could well highlight the anomalies existing due to 
internal political conflicts within the ruling elite and may be seen· 
in the context of the National P~rty/Conservative Party fight to 
represent Afrikanerdom and the battle for control of key institutions 
between the 1 verligte 1 and 1 verkrampte 1 elements. 
The Influence of Liberal Staffers in Tel~vision: 
It should also be noted that whilst anomalies are present within the 
news broadcasts, so the arts television programme, 11 Collage 11 and 
certain documentaries (some of them shown during 11 Network 11 hours) 
tends to cover items that highlight a deviation from official 
Government thinking. This fact may well be due to those 
per~bnalities/j6urnalists involved in presenting and compiling these 
programmes coming from a non-Nationalist background and therefore 
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presenting a more liberal (albeit under threat of sanction) picture. 
·In the case of 11 Collage 11 - the programme has for an extended period 
been presented by Barry Range whose journalistic writings are 
critical of the ruling establishment. 
Controversies have continued to plague the SABC and have largely been 
based on a constant conflict between the SABC staff and their 
executive over matters relating to policy. The organization also 
suffered considerable allegations of corruption and may reflect the 
general stagnation of creative freedom that has characterized the 
corporation. [see Sunday Star:Ol/09/1985]. This may highlight the 
resistance of liberal staffers to executive decisions and creates 
room for anomalies in output to occur. [se~ Chapter Four and earlier 
discussion on radio for examples]. 
Internal and External Pressures - Changing Media? 
The anomalies and contradictions are very apparent both in radio and 
television. The normative authoritarian model has, in practice been 
difficult to maintain. Internal political change based upon the split 
in Afrikanerdom in the early 1980 1 s has seen the South African debate 
shift to the policy directives of the 11 Verligtes 11 and 11 Verkramptes 11 
within the ruling elite. 
The establishment of a strong right-wing opposition has seen the 
broadcast media adapt. Fears of the Conservative Party has seen the 
media present contr~dictory images about South Africa ~ images that 
have considerably angered the CP and their allies. Internal and 
external pressures also play a role in influencing the actions of the 
ruling elite and whilst ideally, authoritarian •gatekeepers' may 
wish to silence their opponents and keep them from the public eye, 
pressures make this unavoidable. The pressure for meaningful reform 
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is one that is continually emphasized and may affect the media and 
the type of programmes shown. The emerging e9ucated Black middle 
class coupled with the violent demands of a disenfranchised mass 
place, pressures on the body politics that simply have to be addressed 
whether the authorities want to or not. 
Economic realities, also indicate the need for change. If the 
broadcasting services are to be efficiently administeredand present 
their desired message, they must be financially viable. These 
realities bring anomalies and contradictions in the desire to 'give 
people what they want• rather than 'give them what they should have•. 
To this end, integrated advertising brings in much needed revenue to 
support popular multi-racial programming, 
The toleration of competition has, in itself, been identified as an 
important contradiction with the monopoly of the past. This factor 
has emphasised the anomalies to an even greater extent as the media 
· agenda may now be set by a multitude of services rather than by one 
State-run enterprise. 
Finally, the human element within broadcasting should be emphasised. 
Again, the diversity and dynamics of the human condition are apparent 
in individual political orientations of SABC staff. Such members will 
constantly try to test the system; particularly when the system 
itself is dynamic due to political and social pressures. 
Clearly therefore, the differing contradictions presented indicate 
the way in which the internal component elements of the South African 
social system [see De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1982:173-176] are 
beginning to influence the broadcast media. They key element here is 
that this represents an important break with the past. Today audience 
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response, the role of advertisers, distributors and producers are 
vital actors in combination with the legislative bodies that 
ultimately control broadcasting (the National Par·ty). Their combined 
influence therefore has a marked liberalizing effect. 
These anomalies therefore represent continual changes within the 
avowed policy of the broadcasting authorities. The question is 
whether these changes move the SABC away from the author~tarian 
broadcasting model outlined in the earlier chapters of this thesis to 
a more pluralistic (mixed) alternative? 
Flowing from this question is that of the motives of the SABC. If one 
is to accept that these anomalies do exist, are they there to break 
down racial barriers that have been established under the very same 
National Party or do they exist for other reasons that have little to 
do with providing South Africans who have been compartmentalized into 
racial groups with some sort of introduction to what a freer society 
can look like? These are the key questions that must be addressed in 
the concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION: SOUTH AFRICA'S BROADCASTING SYSTEM ~ 
MOVEMENT AWAY FROM AUTHORITARIANISM 
The broadcasting of politics in South Africa is d~pendent'on, and a 
function of, the politics of this country. In striving to highlight 
' broad themes, patterns and characteristics that permeate the 
broadcast media, one encounters considerable internal and external 
dynamics that make a clear cut classification of the national 
broadcasting system problematic~ 
This thesis has attempted to show the key elements of the 
broadcasting of politics in South Africa. Chapter Two has endeavored 
to outline some of the fundamentals in characterizing mass media 
systems in general and has focused on authoritarian systems where the 
cont~ol and therefore the characteristics of the WHO are of paramount 
importance. This normative approach has itself highlighted the 
difficulties of such an analysis indicating the need to study 
permutations of models rather than rigidly adhering to any single 
one. 
The historical devilopment of broadcasting in South Africa as 
·outlined in Chapter Three serves to show the creeping authoritarian 
control that was exercised over this medium particularly since 1948. 
This was due to the views of responsible governmental appointees like 
Piet Meyer and Albert Hertzog who saw television as "that evil black 
box, sickly, mawkish, sentimentali~tic, and leading to dangerous 
liberalistic tendencies''. [see Van Zyl in Style Magazine, September 
1988:39]. These views dominated the 1950 1 s thro~gh to the 1970 1 s. 
This highlights the importance of the personality within South 
Afri~an broadcasting. The influence of such right·wing reaction~ry 
viewpoints were a manifestation of the prevailing Verwoerdian 
ideology and the increasing authoritarian nature of the National 
Party which saw the broadcast media brought under even closer 
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governmental control. 
This creeping authoritarianism extended to the all powerful medium of 
television upon its introduction in 1976. The increasing control and 
utilization of the broadcast media to bolster a narrow political 
elite was a logical outcome bearing in mind the prevailing 
philosophies regarding the usage of broadcasting as outlined in 
Chapter Three. Indeed, the authorities viewed television as possibly 
a necessary evil that if it had to be introduced, could be of 
important propagandistic value to the ruling Nationalist elite. 
This became apparent soon after its inception as outlined in Chapter 
Four. The SABC, in close contact with the government of the day, were 
able to broadcast news and public affairs programmes that gave 
prominence and access to government speakers and emphasized their 
viewpoint over alternative views. 
This was accomplished through the promotion of the National Party at 
the expense of the'other political actors which was particularly 
evident in times of elections; in internal censorship resulting in 
pro-Nationalist programme orientations and through direct 
governmental/ministerial interference. As indicated throughout this 
thesis, the lack of neutrality in the news and public affairs 
programming of the SABC (radio and television) indicates a broadly 
authoritarian orientation. [see Chapter Four for examples]. 
The authoritarian nature of television broadcasting became 
particularly acute during the PW Botha years (1978-1989) as a 
function of the centralized and more authoritarian nature of the 
presidency due to the implementation of the 1983 Constitution. If 
anything, the SABC took on the characteristics of the Presidency and 
the forced departure of its Director-General, Riaan Eksteen saw 
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"Botha 1 s personal pique'' as not only guiding the news content of the 
SABC but also affecting the appointment of the.chief administrators 
of the corporation. [Pottinger, 1988:21]. 
Towards Liberalization - Anomalies in the Broadcasting System: 
However, as Chapter Five has clearly indicated, whilst the SABC 
remains and must b~ acknowledged as a service that ''does provide the 
National Party with the kind of mobilizing support, consensus 
politics, that it furiously miises in the English press" [Phelan, 
1987:55], there remain important contradictions and anomalies (as 
opposed to the normative authoritarian model) within its own service 
and within the macro broadcasting environment that have been 
increasingly apparent throughout the Botha years. These anomalies 
are: 
- The SABC no longer enjoys· a monopoly of radio or television 
broadcasting in South Africa. 
- SABC newscasts now compete with entertainment programming (M-NET 
on television) and alternative news (the 1 independents 1 on radio) 
from other non-State services for high viewership. 
- An ~lternative radio culture has been developed by 702 and Capital 
and has had a competing effect on the SABC product. 
Racial integration is regularly shown in imported programmes and 
on a more limited scale in local productions. 
- Racial integration is regularly shown on _domestically made 
television commercials. 
- Individuals within the SABC and M-NET regularly test their 
programmers to see how far they can go in pre~enting controversial 
programming. 
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- Language parity (English and Afrikaans) on certain services is 
disregarded. 
- Limited coverage is granted~to opponents of the Nationalist 
Government. 
[see Chapter Five]. 
These contradictions highlight the key question of the motives behind 
the existence and tolerance of such anomalies. Indeed, if such 
motives simply perpetuate the control paradigm then one is witnessing 
the adaptation of authoritarianism rather than liberalistic changes. 
This will provide guidelines of whether South Africa does indeed 
retain an authoritarian system of broadcasting or whether its 
classification cannot be compartmentalized within this normative 
model. 
As has been detailed, the advent of the 11 independent 11 radio stat ions 
has brought with it an alternative media radio culture to that 
presented by the SABC. Not only do these stations provide competing 
newscasts, they also employ personnel whose political outlook does 
not necessarily support the status quo. The existence of the 
television equivalent of 1 M-NET 1 provides a similar picture albeit 
without direct news broadcasts. 
The competition created by such services [see advertising in Appendix 
B: Figure 6] has seen the SABC react in a market oriented, commercial 
fashion in order to secure the greatest listener and viewer numbers. 
These stations have broken the pure governmental monopoly on 
broadcasting and represent a distinct move away from the control 
paradigm of authoritarianism. 
It would seem that the existence of these services has not been 
welcomed by the SABC. Indeed, efforts to black out lucrative sports 
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coverage [see thaptei Five] are testimony to this. It has been argued 
elsewhere i·n this th~sis that.these radio stations constitute a 
manifestation of the National Party's 1 ho_meland 1 policy where it is 
necessary to grant the trappings of independence du~ to pressure 
from the respective 1 homeland 1 leaders. Indeed, this may be the prime 
motivation (reluctant as the SABC was) in allowing these stations to 
become a threat to the existing monopoly and to present an anti-South 
African and anti-Apartheid bias. 
Notwithstanding the power of the SABC to subvert the listenership of 
such stations through its superior transmitter, technical and 
frequency allocation resources, the existence of alternative radio 
networks remains one of the most important anomalies in the 
broadcasting of politics in South Africa and has had a liberalizing 
effect on the programming and personalities within the SABC itself. 
[see Chapter Five]. 
Another key anomaly is the shattering of the monopoly of SABC 
television due to the intr~duction of a competing subscription 
service, M-NET. Here the combined pressures from the Afrikaans and 
English press groups for its introduction [see Chapter Five] meant 
an alliance in its development. The nature of Nasionale Pers and 
Perskor as representative of the more 11 verligte 11 elements of 
Afrikanerdom coupled with the influence of the la~gely anti-
National ist English language press has seen the 'independent' radio 
culture extend into television with the English componerit of th~ 
alliance influencing this subscription service to take a more 
enlightened stance in its broadcasting policy. 
' Here again, it is unlikely that the National Party agreed to the 
implementation of such a service because of a desire for competition 
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but was rather pressurized into liberalizing the broadcast media due 
to demands from members of their own ruling elite who felt that the 
future of the pro-Government press would be in danger if the major 
newspaper groups could not increase their share of advertising 
revenue. 
Indeed, whatever the motives for the introduction of M-NET, there 
exists today an alternative television network that is prepared to 
take a more progressive approach to programming {albeit under 
constraints ~ see Chapter Five) which serves as a vital break with 
the normative authoritarian model. 
Coupled with the fact that the most popular (and a~ailable) 
television fare is American, the SABC themselves have reluctantly 
been forced to liberalize and broadcast television shows that 
highlight an integrated society operating successfully. In addition, 
in order to fund the purchase of such shows to keep pace with their 
competition and to enable the corporation to expand, the SABC 
transmits integrated advertising as a norm within its daily 
broadcasts. Ironically, the vitally important revenue gained here may 
temper the reluctance to compete efficiently. 
It is therefore evident that in order to secure this revenue, the 
SABC is prepared to follow the liberalizing trends set by advertising 
agencies, their copywriters and more importantly, their clients. 
[see Chapter Five]~ These actors (many of which may be anti-
apartheid) recognize the existence of a common consumer culture and 
represent the desire on the part of the business community to target 
the expanding Black middle class through the advertising medium. 
It would seem that in terms of the right-wing criticism presented, 
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the SABC is prepared to go for the financial gain of attracting such 
clients (e.g. South African Breweries) rather than be dictated 'to by 
the political morays of conservative Afrikanerdom. This suggests that 
the SABC sees the very obvious financial rewards as paramount over 
any covert social message that such transmissions may have. This also 
highlights the shift in SABC policy where 11 bureaucratic practices 
have to make way for a sound and competitive approach''. [Riaan 
Eksteen in Financial Mail, 07 April 1989:26]. 
Taking into account the characteristics of domestic advertising and 
American entertainment programming, it is important to note that the 
SABC can effectively show these programmes without the fear that they 
are rocking the national boat. No matter how integrationist such 
visuals may be, they are not likely to result in the electorate 
questioning the legitimacy of the ruling elite and therefore pose no 
danger to the privileged status of the ruling group. This is due to 
the· continued news/public affairs pro-Nationalist bias. 
However, integration in commercial~ and programme content remain key 
anomalies. The argument of this thesis is that the continual 
broadcast of such visuals can only be beneficial in moving away from 
the concept of racial group rigidity that has for so long been a 
touchstone of National Party policy. [see Chapter Five]. 
Contradictions With Broadcasting Authoritarianism: 
These key points highlight a picture that categorizes South Africa 
only partly within an authoritarian system of broadcasting. The SABC 
is no longer a pure monopoly having its own services now compete with 
Capital, 702, Bop Radio and TV and M-NET. 
Head [1985:59-62] suggests that an authoritarian broadcasting system 
is one which is characterized by ''insulation from both consumer 
preferences and market forces, with arbitrary government regulation 
exercised in the name of the people but with little concern for 
individual preferences that do not coincide with official doctrines" 
as well as "ruling out private ownership entirely". Indeed, the 
existence of the aforesaid competition and market oriented operation 
on radio and television mitigates against this classification. 
Similarly, the South African example contradicts strongly with the 
typicai Third World broadcasting orientation (as applicable to other 
Southern African countries like Zimbabwe and Malawi) which suggests 
that "Competition from private commercial stations with different 
objectives diminishes the status of the national service, limits its 
effectiveness in meeting its national responsibilities, creates undue 
co~petition for physical and financial resources and impedes the 
development of the creative possibilities of radio." [Combroad in 
~ead, 1985:63]. Indeed, South Africa has seen a move away from 
monopoly broadcasting a~ highlighted earlier and increasingly in the 
direction of mixed (State and Private)or pluralistic ownership of 
the broadcast media. 
In Chapter Five, mention was made of the increasing commercialization 
of the broadcast media resulting out of competition between the SABC 
and its competitors. Head [1985:298] argues that a characteristic of 
authoritarian systems is that their programming "leans towards 
persuasion and education".-
However, since increasing competition has meant a greater exposure on 
the part of South African television viewers to popular American 
television entertainment programming, educational television 
I 
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represents only 6.02% of the entire SABC-TV broadcast time. [see 
Appendix A: Figure 11. Also see 1988 SABC Annual Report:46]. Formal 
news broadcasts are also overshadowed by entertainment programming 
thus moving South Africa away from a normative authoritarian model. 
-
However, an abundance of "low taste" entertainment (sex and 
violence) may rather highlight De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach's 
[1982:178-182] notion that the ''maintenance of the stability of the 
system" is paramount where "the key to heading off dramatic changes. 
in audience behavior is to provide entertainment (low taste) content 
that will satisfy and motivate the largest possible number of 
audience members to carry out their roles in accord with the needs of 
the social system". Indeed, television may not 'rock the boat• and 
rather be used to maintain the National Party imposed status quo. 
[also see Fauconnier, 1975:109-114]. 
It is apparent that the SABC is.continually adapting its own services 
to remain in a dominant position. The virtual monopoly of formal 
newscasts (on television) make this vital area the domain of the SABC 
and therefore, the National Party. It is the view of this thesis that 
for all the contradictions that exist, the political control of the 
SABC remains solid and the corporation continues to represent the 
interests of the ruling National Party without threatening this 
relationship. 
Motivations For Change: Competition or Political Shifts? 
Having discussed the motivations behind the existence of the key 
anomalies within broadcasting in South Africa, the key question is 
whether these contradictions are as a result from competition within 
the media system itself or whether they are a direct result of 
political policy shifts within the wider South African context? It is 
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the view of this thesis that it is a combination of both these 
factors that enable the anomalies within broadcastin~ to be 
explained. 
Whilst it has been suggested that the motives behind the increasing 
1ibera1 ization of the broadcast media in South Africa are more profit 
oriented or as a result of pressures from traditionally sympathetic 
intere~ts (the Homeland governments and the Afrikaans press groups), 
the capitulation to these demands on the part of the ruling elite 
represents a fundamental shift away from the pure monopoly ~nd gross 
I 
authoritarianism (Hertzog and Meyer) of the past. The toleration of 
anomalies itself is a liberalizing tenet and in turn promotes further 
liberalization. 
This shift indicates that other than just reacting to competitive 
market forces, the SABC is being forced to confront the dynamic 
realities of So_uth Africa today. Indeed, the Nationa_l ·Party 
government.faces similar pressyres which-may result in a conscious 
attempt by the broadcasting a~thorities and their controllers to move 
the electorate to a more racially harmonious society in order to cope 
with the changing realities of the South Afiican body politic. The 
mere existence and tolerance of anomalies may also be a result of a 
sustained government reform package. 
By being forced into a market oriented competitive ~roadcasting 
r 
system, the SABC may be compelled to face and address the realities 
of South Africa. They are forced to accept the viewpoint of 
advertisers that racially integrated advertising and viewing is 
beneficial to market penetration and realize that the most popular 
television progr~mmes amongst its all-race viewership remain 
integrated American entertainment. Whilst Equity sanctions-prevent· 
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the broadcast of British shows, the popularity of American television 
from across the ethnic spectrum mitigates for the increased broadcast 
of such programmes. 
The lack of language parity and the domination of English is also 
important in this regard. Neville Alexander highlights the increased 
importance of English and states that 11 in a post-apartheid South 
Africa, Afrikaans will rapidly lose its most favoured language status 
and, again for purely economic reasons, the promotion of English as 
"I 
the 'lingua franca• will become the most rational policy option 11 • 
["Critical Choices for South African Society 11 , June 1989:5]. 
Indeed, it may be argued that the evidence presented in this thesis 
already shows the adaptation on all constituent elements of the 
broadcast media· (including the SABC) to this eventuality. Green and 
Lascaris [1988:71] that the language parity of the past has been 
forgotten and "market forces now determine the language used". 
These inconsi~tencies are apparent when comparing and contrasting the 
news bias of Chapter Four with the emerging liberalization in Chapter 
Five. Indeed, the more comfortable, the WHO feels with his political 
environment, the less authoritarian he will become thus again 
conflating the normative model. The ·contemporary period of F.W. De 
Klerk and resulting international initiatives may therefore increase 
the anomalies. 
Indeed, the desire to move away from blatant racial discrimination of 
the Verwoerdian era, by the National Party is accepted in this 
the~is. As noted, the extent of liberalization within the media 
indicates the symbiosis of the reform process of the early P.W. Botha 
years with that of the broadcasting policy and could resume under a 
\ 
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De Klerk premiership. 
These reforms, have themselves been inconsistent as they have often 
gone hand-in-hand with repression (influx control abolished whilst 
mass political movements were restricted). Graham Leach [Tyson, 
1987:206] has suggested in relation to the lack of unrest related 
news durjng the reform and repression 1984-1986 years that "there is 
a thought within the Government of managing the reform programme so 
that it does not lead to extensive instability. I think controlling 
what is seen on television is a part of that process". The control is 
therefore bound to be inconsistent as long as it is based upon the 
external environment. 
Indeed, the 11 reform 11 process itself resulted in the significant split 
in Afrikanerdom in 1982 and the resulting formation of the 
Conservative Party. These events coupled with increasing 
international pressure and the practical implementation of sanctions 
may have direct bearing on the SABC as those in control of the 
organization propounding the more reformist line, may have direct 
influence on the liberalization within the broadcast'media. 
Whilst the reformists may have the upper-hand, their inconsistencies 
reflect that-of the South Afiican political process which has had to 
face mass uprisings following the formation of the United Democratic 
Front in opposition to the 1983 Constitution which in turn resulted 
in a State of Emergency. 
The control and authoritarian legislation that has followedretarded 
the reform process and re-integrated the authoritarian model within 
South Africa 1 s broadcasting system (witness the lack of unrest and 
biased Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) television coverage). Indeed, 
this situation saw the SABC 11 shift in tandem wjth the presidency from 
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a dutifully reformist political line from 1978 to 1984 to a confused, 
sullen and introspective approach post-1984 11 • [Pottinger, 1988:420]. 
The other key issue is that of broadcasting•s role in the split 
between Afrikanerdom regarding the pace of political reform and the 
resulting fear of losing voters to the right-wing. Here the SABC has 
two options. Either it can present a conservative picture of the 
world rtot to anger a potentially powerful political advisory (the 
CP) or it can use the media in line with the Developmental Theory 
model [see McQuail, 1987:119-121] in attempting to break down 
differences and encourage some degree of nation-building. 
Here again, inconsistencies abound. Conservative news programmes 
contrast with integration which has caused violent anti-SABC and 
therefore anti-National Party sentiment on the part of the CP. The 
portrayal of events is also likely to change based upon the ruling 
elites perceived fears of the right-wing at any given time. 
Evidence presented in-this thesis suggests that within popular 
programming, the SABC is indeed, emphasizing integration (and 
therefore the "social change'' aspect of Development Theory) through 
the selective purchase of such shows. If the electoral threat of the 
right-wing is stultified, this is likely to continue; however, the 
flipside of this is increased conservatism and a regression into the 
authoritarian 11 laager 11 syndrome. This will have a direct bearing on 
the pace of political reform and is likely ·to be reflected 
commensurately in the orientation of the state-run broadcast media. 
It is also possible that the ruling National Party may use the mass 
media to present a more enlightened image in order to secure support 
from the more liberal English speaking voting block. This may be a 
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direct result of the move of many Afrikaners to the Conservative 
Party resulting in the need to muster the English vote in order to 
maintain a majority in the House of Assembly. The emerging.domination 
of English as broadcasting language.and the use of integrationist 
programming may be a result of this. 
Increased liberalization could also occur as a result of the 
increased rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the United 
States as a function of the Gorbachov premiership. This links with 
the implementation of Resolution 435 and the Namibian independence 
process where South Africa has engaged in direct negotiations with 
historical enemies such as Cuba and the Soviet Union. Similarly so,_ 
the peace accords in Angola and Mozambique as well as increasing 
signs that the South Africa is enjoying a degree of diplomatic 
success and acceptance in Africa may lead to a relaxation of the 
internal political environment and the mass media as a function 
thereof. 
Having mentioned the symbiotic relationship that exists between the 
SABC and the National Party, it is evident that these contradictions 
mentioned earlier are compatible with the reform and repression 
policy of PW Botha. Taking into account the continued and unabating 
influence of the National Party in the broadcast media, it is 
possible that the contradictions forced upon an historically 
conservative organization, place the SABC (and the broadcast media in 
general) in a key position ahead of the reform process. 
With the apparent contradictions discussed, it would seem that the 
the existence of competition and the integration of all races into 
the various broadcasting services (radio and television) show a 
degree of integration and harmony not yet achieved within South 
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African society. Programming as discussed earlier also depicts other 
societies that are1 at a stage in their development that goes way 
beyond the reform process within South Africa (the USA). 
It is also possible that the SABC has been prepared to change in 
consultation with its parent government who themselves may wish to 
portray a deracialized picture of society in order to decrease levels 
of group animosity that they have fostered for so long. This is in 
line with the reform desire (successful or otherwise) to reduce 
racial tensions in the face of increasing unrest and foreign 
pressure. Indeed, the immediacy that television enjoys coupled with 
the unlimited access given to the National Party, makes this an ideal 
medium in which to promote new initiatives. 
Whilst this liberalization may have been forced upon the SABC and the 
National Party (the view of this thesis) it is inde~d movement away 
from the historically controlled authoritarian model as outlined in 
the earlier Chapters of this thesis. Existing contradictions in the 
-broadcast media may be exploited with the intention of moving away 
from the rigidity of Apartheid. 
The anomalies within the broadcast media are likely to increase 
further with the introduction of Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) 
to South Africa. As technology develops, the cost to the public of 
owning satellite dishes will drop. There can be little doubt that 
with world telecommunications increasingly relying on satellites and 
more specifically with the increased use of satellite technology to 
broadcast television transmissions, pressure will mount on this 
country to legalize DBS. 
Currently, a numbe~ of nations broadcast via satellite. In South 
Africa one of the most visible networks is that operated by Cable 
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News Network (CNN) that broadcasts news on a twenty-four hours 
basis. The legalization of DBS (currently under discussion) will 
therefore immediately expose South African viewers to an alternative 
source of news/public affairs programming and a resulting alternative 
television news culture. 
Movement From Authoritarianism to Controlled Pluralism: 
An easy classification into atithoritarianism is not possible as the 
~ 
anomalies overlap into varying other normative categories such as the 
Developmental Theory. The inadequacy of rigid classification is 
evident leading to the view that the available models are 
insufficient in dealing with a society moving from a monopoly 
authoritarian media system to a controlled pluralistic [see Chapter 
One] orientation that is liberalizing continuously. 
It is again important to emphasize that in relation to the internal 
motivations behind the liberalization of broadcasting, it is the ever 
increasing role of the internal components of the social system [see 
Chapter Two and De Fleut and Ball-Rokeach, 1982:173-176] such as the 
advertisers, producers, distributors and audiences that increasingly 
are exerting their influence alongside the legisJators or ruling 
elite. 
The more the broadcasting orientation shifts from authoritarian to a 
more pluralistic model, the greater the influence that such component 
elements will exert on the medium. Indeed, the American example 
outlined by De Fleur [1982:178] highlights the financial motivation 
as paramount. Within South Africa, the discovery on the part of the 
broadcasting authorities that liberalization ·also brings with it 
considerable financial rewards will promote further the tolerance of 
218 
anomalies and the movement away from authoritarianism. 
Indeed, the existence of multiple motivations in the production, 
selection and scheduling of broadcast programmes highlighted by the 
existence of competition between State and privately run media 
institutions contribute towards a shift to broadcasting pluralism.-
Head [1987:13] argues that within pluralism both the profit and the 
public~service components of broadcasting retain equal importance. 
Ideally such pl.uralism enables healthy competition without a 
politically subservient State-run enterprise. Whilst within South 
Africa this has yet to be achieved, the emerging contradictory 
motivations outlined indicates the movement towards this trend. 
In conclusion, the SABC remains the domain of the ruling National 
; Party. It has reluc~antly been forced into a position of accepting 
and reacting to the advent of competition. By merely reacting and 
therefore being able to react, it has moved away from the Verwoerdian 
historical matrix that was a characteristic of its services for so 
long. 
At the same time the political realities and dynamics of South Africa 
as well as the component elements of the socjal system are 
increasingly influencing the WHO or controllers of the media away 
from their past rigidity. Independent operators and the increasing 
involvement of the private sector in the exploitation of the 
profitability of television and radio are also steadily pushing the 
various services to their resp~ctive limits which in turn reflects 
upon the p~ogram~ing of the SABC as it attempts to maintain a 
listenership and viewership superiority over its competitors. 
These factors are likely to increase the many contradictions within 
the broadcast media in South Africa. Once the SABC has tasted the 
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benefits of increasing commercialization, it is unlikely to retreat 
to the era of Albert Hertzog. However, the SABC 1.s continual dominance 
in the news/public affairs programming will remain a controversial 
issue. Whilst the entertainment monopoly has been broken, pressures 
will increase on the authorities to allow a full scale alternative 
television news culture to develop. 
As has been seen the politics of broadcasting in South Africa is a 
complex issue. It is the conclusion of this thesis that whilst the 
ruling elite retain a dominant influence over both radio and 
television, there are enough contradictions that increasingly allow 
the broadcast media to present a picture of South Africa that goes 
beyond the narrow 11 General and Own 11 affairs policy of the National 
Party whilst simultaneously remaining as unthreatening as possible to 
the future maintenance of National Party rule. 
Indeed, Dr. Paul Vorster of Rand Afrikaans University [Argus: 
20/01/1986] has argued that television has "paved the way for the 
Afrikaner to become more part of a broader nationalism .•. where South 
Africanism and Afrikaner identity is no longer seen as mutually 
exclusive 11 • 
Vorster [Argus: 20/01/1986] adds that this enabled the Afrikaner to 
be "more ready to meet fellow South Africans on equal terms and 
realize that he had to discard as untrue the stereotypes of others 11 
resulting in th_e Afrikaner adapting to a 11 new world view 11 • If these 
perceptions are accepted as true then the broadcast media and 
particularly television has played a vital role in_conscientizing an 
historically isolationist people into confronting societal realities. 
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The existence of liberalizing tendencies within the broadcast media 
have a multiplicity of explanations. Not only were they a response to 
the dynamics of the political environment and mounting political 
pressures, they were also a response to pressures from fellow members 
of the ruling elite as well as to financial and commercial demands. 
It should be noted that these demands are genuinely shifting the 
broadcasting orientation away from the authoritarian albeit within 
the early stages of such a continuum. 
The broadcast media must be looked at as an integrative whole. The 
various media actors have differing orientations and cultures that 
exerting considerable influence on one another. In describing South 
Africa's broadcasting system, the characteristics of all these 
component elements need to be analyzed as the increasing mix of 
private and public ownership contribute towards a pluralistic 
broadcasting categorization. Whilst none of the 'independent' actors 
propound a serious threat to the State, the control and monopoly 
legacy of the past has been broken. 
The perspective of broadcasting contributing to meaningful change in 
South Africa remains a controversial issue and it would seem that the 
continued dominance of the SABC as a function of the ruling National 
Party will dictate these terms. However, if pushed to its limits, the 
SABC seems set to react to both competition and societal pressures in 
order to retain its influential position as chief disseminator of 
news, entertainment and information. This position, most importantly 
remains ahead of the National Party and it can be seen that the SABC 
may in the future perform a more encouraging inclusive role despite . 
. (or due to) its relationship with the National Party. 
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Such a scenario may be in line with the growing autonomy of quasi-
State institutions away from direct Governmental control - a 
sentiment that the new chairman of the SABC board, Professor Christo 
Viljoen, continually emphasizes in relation to the SABC. [see 
Citizen:06/05/1989]. It may also be a result of the weakening of the 
National Party as the ruling party and resulting creation of .a 
political vacuum in which a power struggle could emerge. This lends 
two contradictory orientations to the broadcasting of politics in 
South Africa. 
Firstly, the news monopoly held by the SABC prevents a free flow of 
information, it being adherent to the National Party. News and Public 
Affairs programmes large.ly highlight the official view and attempt to 
persuade listeners and viewers to accept it as their own. Indeed, the 
' 
continued control of the State-run media indicates that the National 
Party is unlikely to capitulate to the opposition forces and will 
continue to employ techniques that maintain its authority. This is 
the perpetuation of the controlled authoritarian model. 
Secondly, the liberalization of elements within the services of the 
SABC, the increasing influence of non-State component elements as 
well as the existence of competition in both radio and television 
create ~dynamic broadcasting system. These pressures also place the 
broadcast media at the forefront of a process to conscientize the 
public into accepting the need to move away from ethnically based 
societal perceptions and may therefore promote a less rigid 
ideological matrix. Indeed, this may be a result of the weakening of 
the National Party's ideological base. This moves away from the 
authoritarian to a more mixed/pluralist model. 
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The categorization of South Africa's broadcastjng system into a 
I 
normaiive authoritarian model is ~o longer possible indicating the 
inadequate nature of such a model in dealing with a broadcasting 
system _in transition. Whilst the Broadcasting, system continues to 
contain considerable authoritarian influences, the existence of key 
anomalies and the increasing influence of non-State actors 
introducing liberalizing tenets are steadily moving the broadcasting 
system of South Africa towards a controlled pluralistic model sharing 
component elements other than those classified as authoritarian. 
. 'I 
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APPENDIX A: 
Figure 1. SABC-TV Referendum Coverage 1983.(from Dalling, 1983:184). 
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Figure 2. SABC % Time Allowed to Political Groups 1987. (from 
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Figure 3: R~dio Listening "Yesterday" 1987-1988. (from AMPS 87/88, 
Volume 86: 66-68). 
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'M-NET OWNERSHIP SHARE 
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Figure 5. M-NET Ownership Share 1989. (information supplied by M-
NET). 
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SABC-TV DOMESTIC DRAMA CONTENT 
(Local versus imported programmes) 
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Figure 7 (a). SABC-TV Domestic Drama Content. (from SABC 1988 Annual 
Report:41-43). 
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Figure 7 (b) Top 20 SABC-TV Ratings July 1988. (from Sunday Times, 16 
July 1989). 
227 
f-
SABC ADVERTISING INCOME 
(Millions) 
100~-------------~ 
597.2 
600 
1976 
SABC 1988 ANNUAL REPORT112 
APPENDIX A: 
Figure 8. SABC Advertising Income 1988. (from SABC .1988 Annual 
Report:12). 
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Figure 9. SABC Revenue Sources 1988. (from SABC 1988 Annual 
Report: 12). · 
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Figure 10. Acceptability of Multi-Racial Advertising 1987. (from 
Green and Lascaris, 1988:114). 
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Figure 11. Education as a% of Programme Content 1988. (from SABC 
1988 Annual Report). 
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' See, the city is the only jungle I know. And nothing's going to sidestep. ' if you want to get through to me, (I you'd best get in the right groove.' ' 
. I J b 
----.------- - --=o--_ - .- .- - --- i-- . . . .. .. Jl UIJ i U> 
F igure ~f · Radio Metro Print Advertisement. 
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··R·l·T·U·A·L·· M·U·S·l·C·· 
• • "Sure /'...e got a black skin .. Doesn't mean I come from the dark ages. 
my man. Yeah. /'...e had to mo...e on from my rural roots - so now you want 
to stereoiype me 'Urban Black ·. Well. suit yot1rsel( But 1ust get one thing 
straight. I am an individual. I'm educated, and I know what I want. 
• • See. it 's no longer a question of colour. It's a matter of attitude. And 1f 
)OU want to get through to me. it's time you were on my wavelength." · 
Figure 2 . . Radio Metro Print Adverttsemeni: 
Figure 2a. Radio Bophuthatswana 
Print Advertisement. 
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So_mu{;h.Jgr the se.x,.drugs...and_a,:o,~k!n.roll..e.r.a 
:~, Now for a little stimulation. I ~ ~:.: m- - -=---····--·n 'Ir ···-m ... ·· ··· r-· o-·· .. - · ;;;;;1· · · -··;·1 T , , _ _ 'E "' 
I - ;:'· c ,'f'i I ~ 
a. 
<( 
Want to wake up to what's happening? 
702's morning show has all tJ1e stimulation you need. 
II ~ e10 we·1e11 11 1.~l1 1 nowdoc')n'c l1<Ne ot011vet1k..·11l hon<lle. 
1111111secrib 10 />1ve a kit 10 do w1il1 >11<cess. hco/1/ 1 011c./ /~1/ls 'n 
I><,•> (Mule.I you. ~·x "' 11cvc1 oul of /ash1(J(). Nw 10< k ·,. roll (or 
11•11 ma11er.) 
I rkc Bob Dylm SiJtd. 1/ie wires 1hey are a d)(111i,:in: and so rs 
1l 1c lrt"-""/' "" 702 We've r1x•h'" prcHnr.,c 10 do 11 fnr yo<1 (llld 
\vr'H.• ') l1cJ..111g l 'Y ti Yo11 \l\'cJ/ll more 111li: ll1!,-en1 ')f 11n11/01101 1 11 re 1l 
cnm~:s 
Wake u1, to raillo that onen~ 
y~yes. 
Fror11 5 lo 7 every 11KJ111rng Grny Edw<u<I, 
will COie you 1111 0 !lie <kiy w11h rlcl\-S a11d 11111>rc 
o/ onyrl11ng {rnm Y '( 10 /inorn e 
John al>o I/OS Andy Taylor for Im/fie. on<i )o/"111 Hobbie 
(or sport olong with the rest a( the nrom1ng team with him all the 
woy. 
Next up is M ike Mr/ls, (rom 10 om through to 2 pm. Tolk 
about ente1 w1nmen1! Mike does. Plus rJ whale lot more tflot makes 
li(e i11 702/and interesting. 
702 meons plenty o( groot music all the time. And 1( you 
Sometimes laughter is · > nest tJ1ing in a crazy world. · .•. 
(We must be a pretty sane radio stntion.) 
wont to k11owwfKll 0S 110/•f>ening at the leadr11g t'<lge.JttSI rune inlo 
Rob Wheatley (!om 2 to 5 pm 
For j!eonle with wisdom be}'.on!!J!!~ir 
ears. Hot news. Burning issues. 
There rs no one belier l/ KJn Chris Gr/>bons to 1ur111hc 
spor1ight on the news of the day nnd /J1 1t Ille new..inokm Oil the 
spat. Now Chris tukes hrs New..wlk a slcp f<r11hcr. rnlc.l 11110 a 
loler tinie slot. Sa wlien ii's 5 in !he a~ernoo11 oridyou'1e wo1Kk•rrng 
what in the workl is going on, Chris, supported by Inn C1cwe, wr// fill 
depl/1 ncW> covcwge. 
WI ren Chr is ~1g11s off Cit 7 
it's tune for rilOl e 11111>1c w11/J 702 's 
resrcb rl Hoel. Doc. Neil Joi rr "°" 
He'll be p1111111g l11s fi11i~~ r Oil 11 1 •1~e 
of rile mt /SIC scene - new, low/ und 
· inl ernu1io1 x~. Then 01 10 1~11 DI/vie/ Blood 
Jiols rn wrl h a phonc-rn show, folk <11 I 0, 
covers o// k11c ln~il.111~ 1>cW>. ll K1I wkes 
yw 1h1 ough to llJ<: 1dl n11;/11 
m<tSic slot. Thnt's 24 horns ij of eye-o~ning mdio. 
,\{ ~l!eakmg of S!!ort. 
'S Anyone rnn 1d l you a 
They say Transvaal lack 1g temPerament 
What do Transvaal say? 
Where has all the good music gone? 
In case you're w0t Kk11ng cd10111 those un(orgeuoble clossic 
l1il5 - we /l()Yc11't (0tgo1ten i/1c1n. In pan iculor wlien you're . 
n1cllowrng Otll over 1l1e weekend. we've got lhe presen1e1s ready lo . 
keep you con11x1ny. Andrew Brook;. Mo/coin 1 Russell. Ion L ogon, 
P<111/ Stevens. Cocky-Two Bull. fl(Jnk Sonde1s, Gary Ec.lwords. Akin 
l'ie1ce. HKk E1J K/1n, Oc110'Donovano1x/1110te. 
Wlici/J(;r your oO 1111 1C (11V01 11 llc mb/C belongs IO !lie fift ies. 
si<r1cs, sevenrres or c1~hl 1CS. yo11 con bel they'// be pfoyrng your 
~igs. 
We do it for you. 
702 rs more ti • in o 
rodro swrion We're also 
cill7etis of 702knxt We 
score. On 102 we go a wlx>l1• rnre nboul w/Jm 's going 
lo! (w tlicr by gc11rng yot110 ,,J~ue 0t1, CllKI we're p1epo1ed 10 
your opinions w11h ltS And we le1 For tJ1ose who prefer to make up tJ1eir own ge1 rnvolved. Besides oor 
1he plnyc1s le// you tl ie11 side ofrr. minds - hear tJ1e views from borh sides. Gigl1ne. Helpline ond Crisis 
/11 odd1110n IOS/>Ot10t1llie11KJ1111ng sJ11rw. Jol111 Centr e. y0t1 ccm count 0t111S to be 1/ic1e (or 702ku>cfs big 
Ho/A~e w1ll IJC '1 111irr1r1ig 11p ll'f'l'~ '" "l;porl wrlh 
o r0t1nd-L1/i a( cveril\. o p,11t ~I '" rl•· >11•/ro 111Kf 
yo11 0t1tlie til1<•k:. f11Ut';w 1 5' 11111,~ry,,6 .. Jl /m 
We're independent and we call 
it as we see it There's notJ1ing 
superficial about 702 news. 
t1 >01ric11t.s. Conic IO lhink of rl wi1 l1 0t 1r c0t 1~ic11t 1011S. fun cloys e11xl 
ti "' rtl<~•lc 101 Boatner, we s1111•/yo few btg n>011iet11s o( Ol /f own. 
Ar J< l 11 rl1ut's /IOI >lrrrn1/<1l•"1. wl•ll "'' 
Figure 3 (a) . Radio 702 Print Advertisement. 
...e4L--------- •u••••••1•DBB!!!itifiW!a1~GD.!li&.Jfl/1U.W>-'IA~li.~·,n,,& RADIO THAT OPENS YOUR EYES 
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APPENDIX B: 
' 
539 000 loyal subjects. 
Recently released AMPS figures reveal that over 539 000* people listen 
to the magic 702 every sin9le day. Proving that 702 .r~mains the 
most effective way of getting your message to the ot1zens of 702 land. 
*AMPS '85/'86 
-McCANN 2- 402822 FAMOUS FOR OUR MUSIC 
Figure 3(b). Radio 702 Print Advertisement. 
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I 6190 kHz ~ NEW FREQUENCIES ..., 3255 kHz I 
AFRICA AND AROUND THE WORLD 
A new, more powerful radio signal Is 
being transmitted on the shortwave 
frequencies shown below, In addition to 
existing frequencies . 
Shortwave frequencies may be 
mart.eel SW, KW or OC on your set. Please 
remember that reception can vary with the 
time of day or year. 
BBC World Service opens up the world 
of news, lnternallonal affairs, sport, 
commerce, entertainment and education. 
And, of course , It brings you special 
programmes for Africa and about Africa . 
•== 
G--;-,..;-;;,;-~ ~,;;.--u:-~y;;;.;::; ;;.;-de-;;.-:;-.,,;~.-
1 
andfrequenclft . MNftMit~b:l~, O.,C . FM.P0.,.2717, C.,.lown. 
NAME=---- ---·----- ------
1 AOOR£SS' ------
1 
== ~MES 
I ~ '""""'"' \_ • =;!. 
~OFFERS 
RELIABLE NEWS 
ON-THE-HOUR AT 621 kHz MEDIUM WAVE** 
Voice of America Programs 
of Special African Interest: 
• Daybreak Africa 
News, music and features to start your day 
Every day. 5:00 - 6:00 am and 8:00 - 9:00 am 
• Nlghll/ne Africa 
Reports on African and world news. 
Everyday, 10:00 - 11 :00 pm 
• African Panorama 
In-depth reports on African events. 
Monday through Friday, 8: 10 pm 
• Focus 
In-depth exammation of important world issues. 
Sunday through Friday, 8:10 pm 
" Also on shortwave 
kHz 17785 15600 15445 11920 7280 6035 
OB.IOIVE 
.ACCURATE 
COv1PLETE 
for a progr9m echedu'9 contact: UnHed Se.tn tnronnetion Service, USIS AHding Room 
ltd Floor . Alucan Lile Cenlre. Orlando YMCA SOweto 
111 CommiSSIOOef Street, Johannesburg telephone 933 2 186 
lelephone 29·3•5 I 
Figure 5. Voice of America Print Advertisement. 
Figure 4. British Broadcasting Corporation Print Advertisement. 
APPENDIX B: 
Figure 6. S~LECTION OF PRINT MEDIA ADVERTISING. 
Figure 6. M-NET "Carte Blanche" Print Advertisement. 
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See Warflnd 
Remembrance 
T!zuf!day niglzt 
at nine. 
Fasten your seatbelts for an advenl1Jrt of the unbelieuable 
_ kind w:itlt the ri::ltackiest. fJ!:eirdest bunch of guys . .-\ rtal case 
of suroival tJf the craziest. Carrlt The A-Team 
on .llonday niglzt at seven. 
APPENDIX B: 
Tie youf!elj down for 
--
a tonic of suspense 
and intrigue. Catch 
the spies and double agents of 'Spioen Spioen ', 
simuk:ast in English on Sa11Jrday niglzt at sec:en. 
THIS WEEK, 
IF YOU WANT TO BE SHAKEN, 
Steel your nen:es and stay riuted 
to .vour set for our deadly mm:ie. 
Road Games. 
Starrinp;Stacey Keach. Jamie 
/Je Cunis atid»ome t·ery scary 
people. Saturday 
night at nme 
tltim. 
If the bad guys don·, shake you. then rite 
/zero 's hair raising sl1Jnts in his super 
sophisticated, ltiglz tech 
chopper, r;:ill. 
Catch Airwolf in acrion 
at ser;en on Friday 
night. 
Get s/1Jl'k into a DON'T STIR. late niglzt mm:ie 
with a reformed gangrterwlto finds 
it difficult to shake off the mob. 
Starring Humphrey Bogart 
and&kardG. 
Robinson. Thursday 
niglzt at eler.:en. 
~-~: 
··--
Sit dOfllln, and prepart 
you{Yelj for some lteort-
stopping action in tile 
British Open Golf 
Tournament. 
today at !line. 
~ · -t.,. 
.... ...»-
- Figure 6. SABC-TVl "Where Variety Shows" Print Advertisement. -
WH.ERE VARIETY SH OW ~S 
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AREA S OF C OV E ~ AGE 
• • • • • MW caytime catchment area 
Cradock • 
CAPE PROVINCE 
Somerset East • 
O.F . S 
Gr1h1111stown 
• 
'' '""'"' 
RICHARD~ b· 
• Estcourt NATAL 
Howick • 
•Pietennari tz~urg 
• Umtata 
figure 1. Capital Radio Reception Map. 
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WORLD FIGURES (approx.) 
EUROPE 
Western Europe 
USSR & Eastern Europe 
-
MIDDLE EAST 
(inc. North Africa) 
AFRICA (ex. North Africa) 
South Africa 
Other Countries 
ASIA 
Chinese P.R. 
India 
Japan 
Other countries 
WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
United States of America 
Canada 
Latin America 
West Indies 
AUSTRALASIA & OTHER 
OCEAN TERRITORIES 
JUNE 1986 
WUNLll l\AlllO ANll 'ft::LEVlSION KECE!Vt:l\S - 1~8~ 
-- - -------(All- fia~;-.-;.-~~~tu•ionale) -
RADIO 
Number of Radio Sets 
Population (excluding wired receivers) 
(OOOs) ('OOOs) 
1985 1955 1965 1975 1985 
4, 785,000 237 ,000 529,000 l,010,000 1,650,000 
- 1-- - - - 1-- - 1-- -
428,000 65, 310 116, 500 186,600 297,800 
392,000 20,260 59, 700 92,600 164,300 
229,000 2,200 12,300 29,300 58, 100 
29,000 875 2,600 4,800 10,000 
392,0.00 360 4,800 18,500 42,600 
1,050,000 l,000 6,000 35,000 120,000 
740,000 l,000 4,800 24,000 50,000 
121,000 12,000 27 ,000 87,000 100,000 
723,000 l,800 13,300 49, 700 111,600 
237,000 111,000 230,000 380,000 500,000 
25,000 5,500 14,000 23,000 32,000 
382,000 12,600 29,400 62,800 133,500 
11,000 190 860 4,000 5,600 
26,000 2,760 7,800 13,000 24, 700 
APPENDIX C: 
TEL~VISION 
Number of Television Receivers 
('OOOs) 
1965 1975 1985 
177,000 398,000 737,000 
- -
-
-
-
49,400 103 ,400 162,900 
24,000 87 ,000 130, 100 
l,250 6,000 19,500 
- 500 3,000 
100 600 7,900 
70 750 56,000 
2 300 2,300 
18,000 42,000 70,000 
700 8,950 31,000 
68,000 110,000 175,000 
5,000 .9,500 14,000 
7,400 22,600 54,900 
100 1,200 2,000 
. 3,200 5,000 8,600 
INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING & AUDIENCE RESEARCH 
Figure 2. World Radio and Television Recei~ers - 1985 (information 
supplied by the BBC). 
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